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Preface
One of the most complex challenges for the future of aviation is to ensure a safe
increase in expected air traffic demand. The growth in air traffic operations is
expected to almost double its current value in 20 years. This impressive air traffic
increase requires the development, validation, and implementation of new concepts
of operations that have to tackle future needs. The Single European Sky in ATM
Research in Europe, Next Generation Air Transportation System in the United
States, and Collaboration Actions for Renovation of Air Traffic Systems in Japan are
the most important research macroprograms to respond to these aviation
challenges.
Nonetheless, air traffic management (ATM) must ensure and even increase current
safety levels. The International Civil Aviation Organization defines safety as “The
state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct sup-
port of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.”
This definition is underlain by two crucial concepts: risks and acceptable level. They
have their own meaning and the implications of both are diverse, depending on the
scenario and actors involved. The aviation system has evolved from a reactive to a
predictive approach, and requests the assessment of risks in ATM to minimize the
probability and severity of intrinsic hazards.
The primary issue that risk assessment in ATM must face is the lack of a common
and widespread methodology and safety metrics in the aviation community. Multi-
ple factors must be taken into account in ATM that, typically, are gathered into
three areas: navigation, intervention capacity, and exposure to risk. However, these
factors cannot be considered isolated from the regulatory framework that imposes
acceptable levels for the different stakeholders, such as airports, airlines, manufac-
turers, pilots, air traffic controllers, and so on.
Moreover, the approach for analysis differs when the temporary horizon is intro-
duced, as the available information, data accuracy, and goals vary. Strategic ana-
lyses focus on airspace design and define safety levels based on air traffic flows.
Pretactical analyses demand different information because the network manager
and airspace users provide specific information about flight plans. Tactical analyses
provide insights into the air traffic network or dig into specific collision avoidance
or trajectory optimization. As the reader will discover, there are as many different
methodologies and safety metrics as the researcher’s goals and/or approaches.
To date, many books on aircraft and air transportation systems have been published
worldwide, and particularly by IntechOpen. However, few books have brought to
light the different purposes and methods developed for risk assessment in ATM.
This book entitled Risk Assessment in Air Traffic Management tries to motivate
further research by encompassing crosswise and widespread knowledge about this
critical and exciting issue. In case a novel researcher would like to delve into this
area, this book could be the backbone for a comprehensive listing of references as
well as a focal point for current risk assessment in ATM trends.
The first section is entitled “Airspace Design and Air Traffic” and presents different
conflict or collision risk models to calculate the level of safety in particular scenarios
regarding a strategic horizon.
The second section is entitled “Complexity and Regulation,” which is the most
crosswise section. Works included in this section provide different methods to
convert regulations to acceptable levels of safety in specific areas such as air traffic
control complexity or ATM system performances.
The last section is entitled “New Airspace Users” and introduces possible ways to
apply risk assessment to new airspace users such as unmanned aircraft. These works
bring to the fore different methods from strategical to tactical points of view and
define the process to ensure the safe operation of unmanned aircraft.
Finally, the editors would like to acknowledge and express their gratitude to all the
authors for their contributions and to the IntechOpen team who made this book
possible. We wish readers a fruitful and enlightening read.
Assist. Prof. Dr. Javier Alberto Pérez Castán
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Álvaro Rodríguez Sanz
Universidad Politécnica de Madrid,









Collision Risk Model for
High-Density Airspaces
Francisco Javier Saez Nieto
Abstract
This chapter describes a collision risk model (CRM) of airspace scenarios to
describe their safety levels when populated by given air traffic. The model requires
the use of representative data, containing a description of the flown aircraft trajec-
tories. It is a combination of deterministic and probabilistic mathematical tools able
to estimate the level of safety. Furthermore, the model captures the frequency and
spatial distribution of the encounters and conflicts, the time in advance the conflict
is identified and the overall reaction time of the Air Traffic Control ATC system,
and finally, the effectiveness of the ATC as safety layer. The model considers that
the risk of an air miss depends on two different factors: on the one hand, the
frequency of exposure to risks and, on the other, the chance of collision associated
to this exposure. The exposure to risk is captured following a deterministic data-
driven approach, whereas the associated chance of collision is derived from a
statistical mathematical model, fed by the kinematics of the encounter and the
statistics associated to the accuracy of the aircraft state vector when following a
planned trajectory.
Keywords: risk, conflict, collision, air miss, CPA, safety barrier,
level of safety, LAT
1. Introduction
Air miss in the airspace has been studied for decades since Marks [1] and Reich
[2] formulated mathematically the collision risk probability associated with parallel
route structures during the early 1960s. The Reich approach was used as the refer-
ence model by ICAO to determine the minimum safe separations applied in the
ICAO NAT region. As E. Garcia [3] identified, it was during the 1990s when a new
wave of different theoretical studies was introduced extending the Reich approach
to more complex airspace scenarios [4–9].
None of these models though consider scenarios with positive control, where the
a priori planned trajectory is usually continuously monitored and modified, as it is
required in high-density controlled airspaces, in order to maintain the demanded
flow throughput safely.
Just by using statistical concepts applied to aircraft, flying their planned trajec-
tories with some degree of uncertainty, it is not feasible to capture the intrinsic
complexity of the traffic flows flying planned trajectories but dynamically adapted
to accommodate the airspace demand-capacity balance problems.
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Currently, complexity is derived from reports provided by the controllers and
pilots involved in the incidents, from which the mid-air collision risk is estimated.
These incidents are extremely rare events, which make them infeasible to derive
any reliable statistics. Furthermore, not all incidents are reported, making it diffi-
cult to infer how many true incidents have really occurred. Finally, the used inci-
dent classification is ranked according to how close the involved aircraft finally
were, omitting any associated kinematics, which could provide us with more rep-
resentative information about risk.
This chapter describes how to estimate the probability of mid-air collision plus
additional helpful information, used to estimate the safety level of given airspace
when populated with a sample of air traffic. The process is based on an integrated
hybrid approach, using flights stored in a database and a stochastic mathematical
collision risk model. The database containing the trajectory description for the traffic
sample is used to empirically determine the conflicts or encounters from which the
frequency of risks (FoR) and the kinematics of the aircraft involved in these encoun-
ters can be determined. Whereas the mathematical model is used to estimate the
probability of collision associated with each aircraft encounter, and from them the
global probability of air miss [10], Figure 1 describes the whole process:
Risk is here understood as any event that requires immediate reaction to avoid
a dangerous situation which has the potential to cause damage or harm. In
particular, regarding mid-air collisions, it refers to any situation where two or more
aircraft are evolving toward a loss of separation; if not corrective action is taken.
Nowadays there are different databases from which the encounter identification
and characterization can be derived. They can be grouped into two families: sur-
veillance data files, describing the aircraft trajectories by a sequence of 3D + T
positions for all flights at time intervals (around every 5 s), and on event data files,
containing 3D + T positions or all flights at any time the aircraft speed vector
changes, for example, the Demand Data Repository 2 (DDR2) of Eurocontrol. This
chapter applies the results to a particular case of use, with the purpose of showing
the value of the model as a powerful safety tool. There are different tools that allow
us to identify and characterize the encounters from these databases, for example,
the Eurocontrol’s Network Strategic Tool (NEST) uses DDR2 to this end. In this
work, the used tool was developed by E. Garcia [3].
2. Risk mitigation in a defensive ATM structure composed of layers
and barriers
James Reason proposed in his Swiss cheese model (SCM) [11] that accidents and
incidents can be traced through up to four different domains: organizational
Figure 1.
Method to estimate the probability of mid-air collision.
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influences, supervision, preconditions, and specific acts. Accidents and incidents in
the airspace caused by the air traffic management (ATM) are known as “air miss,”
and they represent a safety issue or a risk. Safety is then usually measured by its
absence, using the risk as key indicator.
Safety in ATM has two opposite sides: negative and positive. The first is given by
air miss caused by the ATM system failure. Luckily, as for all safety-critical systems,
these are always rare events, and removing them, as much as reasonably possible, is
the main objective of the safety sciences. The positive side of safety, on the other
hand, relies on the background of these systems evaluated by its intrinsic resistance
to operational risk.
Within ATM, the ICAO’s Annex 19 and the Safety Management Manual [12–13]
contain the required guidance, to be used by practitioners, for measuring the
safety’s negative side and, as well, the intrinsic resistance to risk. Derived from these
documents, ATM organizations have built up the safety management systems
(SMS) that, among others, deal with risk and risk events and how to make the ATM
system more resistant to risks, based on these.
As previously mentioned, risk means in this chapter any dangerous situation
that arises from hazards and requires immediate reaction, while hazard is some-
thing, such as a physical object, environmental variable, or a state of a process,
that causes or leads to problems. In general terms, it can be stated that the
airspace, particularly in high-density volumes, is hazardous, because there are
objects (aircraft) sharing it, where weather conditions, or other unplanned events,
might drive changes in their initial flight plans, and then, the operations have to
be adapted in real time to ensure the safety while handling the required system
throughput, even under the uncertainties derived from these and other
circumstances.
ATM contains three different “defensive” big layers; air space management
(ASM), air traffic flow management (ATFM), and air traffic control (ATC), all of
them devoted to reduce the hazards and, when cannot be removed, the likelihood of
risks produced by those hazards and the severity of such a risks. Briefly, it can be
summarized that the ASM layer function is to determine the volumes (airspace
availability) and the required conditions under which aircraft can operate within
them safely. Complementary, ATFM layer is devoted to the function of making
compatible the demand for flights with the available capacity of airspace and air-
ports in the so-called demand-capacity balancing process. Finally, the ATC layer is
looking after the separation between any pair of aircraft and ensuring they are
always flying with these separations above the applicable minima while maintaining
the system throughput and the efficiency of flights.
Within the ATC layer then, pilots and air traffic controllers are working together
to minimize the likelihood of having an “air miss” or a loss of separation. ATC as
such usually contains different safety barriers, for instance, MTCD and STCA, and
beyond these ATC barriers, commercial aviation has an additional technologically
supported barrier: the TCAS. Beyond that, the see and avoid and the providence are
the very last chances to avoid an accident. Any foreseen air miss finally sorted
becomes a “near air miss” or “near miss.”
The layered scheme presented above (Figure 2) indicates that the design of the
ATM system is driven by safety. The knowledge about the contributions to the
safety provided by each layer or barrier is then a paramount target in the assessment
of the ATM safety performance.
This chapter focuses its interest in establishing a method to derive the level of
safety produced by the ATC safety layer when a volume of airspace was populated
for a given sample of flights, executing their actual trajectories, during a given
timeframe. It is assumed that the sample of flown trajectories has been stored in a
database.
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3. Risk identification: conflict
Risk is then any dangerous situation that arises from hazards where the safety is
compromised and demands an immediate reaction. When it is applied to air misses,
risk is considered as any situation where two or more aircraft are in course of losing
the required separation minima in the coming minutes. These events are referred
here as “conflicts.”
Obviously, when we use stored data, containing just flown trajectories, almost
all of them are “conflict-free,” as during their operation, the pilots and controllers,
supported when required by the safety barriers, reacted and removed all of them,
and, as a consequence, there aren’t dangerous situations recorded, reflecting in a
hidden manner the effectiveness of the operational personnel and safety barriers
but nothing regarding how hard they worked out.
This lack of information has to be sorted by performing some kind of inference
to unveil where and when the conflicts appeared and how they were sorted. If the
available data source contains not only the actual flown trajectories but also the
planned trajectories, then it would not be so complicated to derive when a change in
the expected trajectory is driven by a reaction to a conflict. But if the planned
trajectories are not known, the conflict identification is inferred from the following
process.
Most of the stored flown trajectories exhibit a uniform behavior during most of
their flight time, that is, except for some short intervals, where the aircraft changes
their vertical speed or heading, the rest of the time they broadly follow the law of
the uniform movement. Consequently, the stored trajectories can be approached by
an ordered sequence of straight lines (assuming flat Earth), flown at constant speed,
connected by events or “joints” where some change of the vertical speed or heading
is registered [3]. This model is perfectly suited for en route airspaces but can have
some limitations at terminal manoeuvre areas (TMAs), where the straight segments
can be modeled by polynomial splines [14]. It should be remarked that the initial
data, containing aircraft positions every few seconds, is now transformed into the
mentioned ordered sequence of segments parameterized with time.
Once the flown trajectories are represented by this sequence of segments
parameterized with time, the current and expected positions within a predefined
look ahead time (LAT) can be determined at any time (see Figure 3). Hence, at
each time, the positions for all aircraft within the chosen LAT are well defined, and
the existence of conflicts in such a time horizon can be captured.
Figure 2.
The ATM safety layers, the ATC, and beyond safety barriers.
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There are different elements that characterize any conflict as:
• The look ahead time (LAT), the chosen timeframe during which the current
position is extrapolated, assuming uniform movement, determining the
expected “short-term” trajectories of the aircraft
• The involved aircraft, usually two, discretionally named as the reference
aircraft (ACi) and the intruder aircraft (ACj)
• The closest point of approach (CPA), the physical situation in the airspace
where the two involved aircraft are (or are expected to be) at minimum
distance. Note that CPA encloses the 2 physical points, representing the
positions of both aircraft, the distance between them, and the time of
occurrence
• The time to CPA, the remaining time until the involved aircraft reach the CPA
The LAT is a key parameter that has to be adapted to the characteristics of the
assessed airspace, for instance, in en route airspace, the aircraft follows extensively
the assumption made considering uniform movement, unless something unex-
pected happens (weather, other traffic, etc.) and then extrapolating the current
position through along LAT seems acceptable, say, for example, 10 min. On the
other hand, in high-density TMAs, the flown trajectories have shorter straight
segments, which means that is not realistic to extrapolate the current position with
such LAT but with values around 2 min or less. The best value for the LAT has to be
derived from the observation of the flown trajectories in the airspace of interest,
establishing the average time the aircraft has been flying following uniform
movement.
4. Characterization of conflicts
Working with trajectories as straight lines, parameterized with time, makes
rather simple and computationally fast, using linear geometry, to find out the
minimum distance between them and the time it happens. It is then applicable to
explore for encounters or aircraft crossings, and particularly conflicts, at any
Figure 3.
Identification of a conflict from the segmented trajectories (courtesy of Eduardo Garcia).
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time (t), using the chosen LAT, just by extrapolating the position at this time (t) up
to (t + LAT) and computing for all flights the minimum distance between possible
pairs. If this distance is equal to or below the applicable separation minima, then it is
declared as a conflict; otherwise, it will be a crossing.
In high-density airspaces, the separation minima are defined by building up a
protection cylinder around aircraft, which shall remain free at all times of other
aircraft. For example, typical dimensions for such a cylinder are a radius of 5
nautical miles (NM) and height of 2000 feet (ft), considering the aircraft in the
center. From now on, this cylinder will be named as “conflict cylinder.” Analo-
gously, the “collision cylinder” is defined by using as horizontal (λxy) and
vertical (λz) values the characteristic dimensions of the aircraft (see Figure 4).
The conflict or collision events characterization can be better observed when
referred to reference aircraft (ACi) axes rather than when referred to the local axis
(Earth fixed). Two reference frames fixed to ACi are used, vertical (x,y,z) reference
frame and the projection frame (x1, y1, z1).
The vertical reference frame is defined by the local vertical axis (Oz). Then, the
horizontal axis (Ox) is perpendicular to Oz and contained in the plane defined by
this axis (Oz) and the vector velocity of the intruder (ACj) relative to ACi (vji). And
the (OY) horizontal axis is perpendicular to the other two axes. From this vertical
frame, the projection frame (x1, y1, z1) is obtained by rotating through (Oy) axis the
vertical plane (y, z) until the (Ox) axis is parallel to (vji). Let us call the resulting
(y1, z1) plane “impact plane” where the intruder (ACj) will hit this plane just when
they reach the CPA.
Figure 5 shows an encounter between the reference aircraft (ACi) and the
intruder (ACj), where the intruder is approaching the reference with a relative
velocity (vji). The reference aircraft (ACi) has been represented with its collision
(in yellow) and conflict volumes (not in scale) on the top left-hand side. On the
bottom right-hand side, the projections of such cylinders onto the impact plane
(y1 z1) are presented. As can be seen, depending on the foreseen impact of the
intruder on the impact plane (red dot), the severity of the encounter can be derived,
allowing, in a deterministic way, to establish if the intruder is in a course of having a
conflict or even a collision or just a crossing without compromising the separation
minima.
Applying the above method, the author and others [3] over a particular traffic
sample of 1 month flying over Maastricht airspace (MUAC) that included 131,151
flights and 47,078 flown hours obtained the results shown in Figure 6.
From these results, the frequency of risk or FoR (situations requiring corrective
action) is around 0.27, and the rounded frequency of air miss or near air miss
is 1:4 104.
Figure 4.
Characterization of the collision cylinder (courtesy of Eduardo Garcia).
8
Risk Assessment in Air Traffic Management
The above description presents and aggregated deterministic model providing
relevant information about the number of initial safety issues (conflicts and near-
miss) for a particular traffic sample, flying in a given airspace, just by using the
stored flights in the form of surveillance data files or on event data files. In the
example, the former was used.
The method proposed ignores many elements that are essential to unveil rele-
vant information related to the actual safety level of the scenario, populated with
the sample of traffic, as:
• Kinematics of the encounter (relative velocity)
• The available time until reaching CPA when the conflict was initially detected
Figure 5.
Identification of a pairwise encounter determining if it will come up as “safe” crossing, conflict, or collision,
depending on the expected impact of the intruder onto the (y1, z1) plane.
Figure 6.
Separation of expected impacts of the intruder aircraft onto the impact plane of the reference aircraft for a
sample of 131,151 flights.
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• The time taken by ATC to remove the conflict condition or the time to CPA
when it was sorted
• Uncertainty of the current and, particularly, the extrapolated position of
aircraft
This information is singular for each encounter, but some aggregations illustrate
relevant characteristics related to safety.
5. Time evolution of conflicts and the safety barriers
The method of using current positions at any time, and their extrapolated posi-
tions, allows to track the evolution of conflicts while evolving toward the CPA [3].
There is neither common criteria nor common characteristics of the safety barriers
applied in ATC. Although STCA is broadly applied, each ATC system can have a
different value of the time to CPA value that triggers this alert to the controller
(between 90 and 120 sec.). MTCD is a supporting tool that has not been always
welcomed by controllers, and then, it is omitted in the following discussion, using
instead the operational pre-tactical and tactical barriers (Figure 7).
Typically, in an ATC center, the controllers try to remove the conflicts as early
as possible; this criterion is limited by the uncertainty associated with the extrapo-
lation of the current aircraft positions. Some of the identified conflicts might not be
actual conflict; then taking the removal decision of such uncertain conflict far in
advance introduces undesirable disturbances in the aircraft planned trajectories.
This is why operationally it is usually considered that a conflict sorted before
around 4 min prior to reaching the CPA is a pre-tactical ATC action. On the other
hand, some conflicts appear with a very short term in advance, even with times to
CPA below these times.
When the removal of the conflict is taken later, but before reaching 2 min to
CPA, then it is said it has been solved at the tactical level. Around these 2 min, most
ATC systems provide the controllers with the STCA tool that triggers an aural and
visual alert, preventing them that they shall take immediate corrective action.
When all the above barriers have failed, and the thread of an air miss remains,
the involved aircraft triggers the TCAS TA just when the time to CPA reaches
around 48 s. Once a TCAS TA is triggered, the aircraft still shall follow the
Figure 7.
Example of safety barriers and their triggering times to CPA. Pre-tactical, tactical, and STCA are part of ATC.
TCAS is not an ATC barrier.
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controller instructions, but if the situation remains and the time to CPA reaches
35 s, the TCAS will trigger the RA and indicates to the involved pilots the vertical
maneuver they shall follow; once RA is triggered, these pilots shall ignore any
further instruction by the controller.
In the brief previous discussion, the relevance of exploring the relative
frequency of unsuccessful removal of conflicts by a given safety barrier
becomes clear.
Figure 8 shows a scatter plot with the number of conflicts for each time to go to
CPA when the conflict was identified, the associated reaction, and the time required
to sort it. The data used was drawn from the same sample than in the previous
example.
As observed, most of the conflicts (33,185 AC out of 35,166) are identified with
more than 4 min before the CPA, although there are some “sudden” conflicts that
appear with less than 4 min and more than 2 min (1763 AC), and even there are
those arising between 2 min and 45 s before reaching the CPA (190 AC), the latest
demanding urgent attention. The figure also shows that few of them were not
solved and reached the CPA without ending in an air miss. This fact (those cases
represented over the diagonal of the graph) indicates that the separation minima
were infringed, which is an ATC failure, but the involved aircraft still crossed each
other with enough separation to avoid the air miss.
Additionally, Figure 8 shows that around 88% (31,109 AC enclosed by the box)
of the conflicts were identified between 5.5 and 10 min to go to the CPA and
sorted in a time between 30 s and 2 min and 15 s.
Figure 9 represents the times used in the previous discussion, relative to the
CPA time.
Barragan [15] studied the value of the frequency of conflicts associated with
their time to go to CPA and the overall reaction time to produce precursors about
the safety status of airspace volumes. Clearly, the airspace where conflicts are
identified soon, when the involved aircraft is still far from reaching the CPA, and
the overall reaction time to remove them is small exhibits good behavior, whereas if
the former decays and the latter grows, some concerns should have risen about the
safety in this airspace. Summarizing, if τ1 is big (above 4 min) and τ2 small (below
2 min) and condition τ1 ≫ τ2 applies, then the ATC safety barriers are working
properly; otherwise, some concerns arise.
Figure 8.
Frequency of conflicts for given times to CPA and overall reaction time.
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6. Measuring the effect of the safety barriers
The previous section presented the time evolution of the airspace conflicts for a
sample of traffic, deriving some deterministic results. This information unveils the
degree of stress under which the controllers dealt with the air traffic encounters
contained in the sample. The model is able to provide as well the effectiveness of the
safety barriers comparing the predicted separation of the involved aircraft (at the
CPA), when the conflict was identified, with the final separation of those aircraft
that crossed each other. Figure 10 shows the three-dimensional results.








The sample then contains, among all conflicts having a “Predicted Horizontal
Separation” of 0NM, 3 conflicts that finally had an actual separation of 5NM.
The bottom part of vertical plane, represented by red dotted lines, shows only
two conflicts (the little peaks) with predicted horizontal separations of 2 and 4 NM
that finally had an actual separation of 4NM. It can be also observed that there are
no conflicts with an actual separation equal to or below 3NM.
Figure 9.
Interpretation of overall reaction time and time to go to CPA.
Figure 10.
Representation of the effectiveness of the safety barriers.
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All the sections above use a simple linear model over the database to extrapolate
the current aircraft positions until the LAT and take the resulting segments,
containing the time as parameter, to determine the separation between all possible
aircraft pairs. If the separation is below the required minima, then a conflict is
declared, and the key elements of it are retained to perform the assessment
presented for a particular case of use.
Of course, as has been shown, relevant information about safety is derived, but
still, there is not a simple formula that could estimate the safety level. This is the
objective of the next section.
7. Estimation of the level of safety
Let us now abandon the deterministic approach followed so far, although we still
require the sample of traffic in a given scenario. Now it is assumed that both the
actual position and the predicted future positions are just estimates of actual
position and expected future positions of the trajectory.
The objective is to estimate the probability of an air miss associated with each
crossing or among all captured pairwise encounters from the aircraft population. It
is pointed out that, now, we are considering not only those encounters with an
expected separation at the CPA below the separation minima (conflicts) but as well
as those with separations above these limits. This is to recognize that any foresee
crossing; irrespectively the expected separation at the CPA might come up with an
air miss.
According to Figure 5, captured encounters are identified by the CPA, which is
the situation where the separation between ACi and ACj will be minimum, and the
intruder (ACj) will reach the impact plane after a time (τ1) at the point, in the
reference frame (x1, y1, z1), of coordinates (0, y1p, z1p).
Let us assume that the probability density function of the intruder aircraft (ACj)
reaching the CPA at the time (τ1) hitting the impact at coordinates (0, y1p, z1p) is
known: f p y1p, z1p
� �
. Then, the probability of collision, that is to say, the probability
that these coordinates are within the collision area (SPCOL, yellow area in the impact









dy1dz1 ≈ fp y1p, z1p
� �
� SPCOL (1)
The approximation made in the last term of Eq. (1) assumes that the pdf func-
tion remains constant over the collision surface, as these surface dimensions (char-
acteristic distance below 150 ft) are very small in comparison with the characteristic
horizontal (yp) and vertical (zp) distances of around 5NM and 1000 ft., respec-
tively, that produce first-order changes in this pdf function.
Eq. (1) shows the way to establish the safety level of any scenario populated with
known air traffic (positions and velocity). To this end, the two factors in the last
term of the equation shall be determined for each encounter.
The surface of collision (SPCOL), defined onto the impact plane, is given by the
physical typical dimensions of the aircraft (λxy, λz) and, additionally, by the
horizontal and vertical components of the velocity of the intruder (ACj) relative
to the reference (ACi) aircraft (vx, vzÞ. Therefore, it can be expressed as the area
of the rectangle plus the area of the two half of ellipse, resulting in:
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SPCOL λxy, λz, vx, vz
� � ¼ 4λxyλz � vxffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
v2xþv2z














The probability density function fp y1p, z1p
� �
determination requires a careful
approach to obtain realistic results, despite the random nature of the involved vari-
ables (τ1, y1p, z1p). One key assumption is to consider that it is a bivariate normal
distribution with zero mean (no biases) in y1p, z1p
� �
, while the time to go to CPA
(τ1Þ variable affects linearly the value of the standard deviations of those variables.
Additionally, it is assumed that the two random variables y1p, z1p
� �
are



















where the standard deviations for coordinates y1p, z1p
� �
, σ y1, σz1
�
), respec-
tively, are linearly dependent on τ1. Eq. (3) can be expressed in terms of the vertical






















� 1þ r y � τ1
� �
1þ rz � τ1ð Þ
� �
(5)
where r y and rz are the ratios giving the increase (in NM and ft., respectively,
per minute) of the horizontal and vertical standard deviations, respectively, with
the time to go to CPA. Now the stochastic model demands four parameters to








It is related to the accuracy of the position for the
involved ACs as stored in the database, around several
NM
Standard deviation over Oz1
axis, σz0
Feet As above, around a hundred feet






This value shall be estimated assessing the errors in the
model to predict the future positions, around 1NM per
minute
Ratio of variation of the




Varies, when vz ¼ 0 is low, say 20 ft./minute. When
vz 6¼ 0 is high, say 500 ft./minute
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Once the above parameters are defined, using any traffic sample of N aircraft, all
crossings between aircraft can be captured and analyzed, determining their three
main variables:
• Time to go to the CPA (τ1) when the encounter was initially identified
• Horizontal separation at the CPA (yp)
• Vertical separation at the CPA (zp)
Finally, the values for the collision volume shall be determined with the param-
eters (λxy, λz).
With all these elements, the estimated probability of an air miss E(Pcoll), before
acting the ATC barriers, for the traffic sample is given by:























where N is the number of flights in the sample, regardless of them having a
crossing or not, in cases of flight without crossings, they count on N. When an
aircraft has different crossings, it counts as a different flight for each.
Computationally this expression (6) is demanding, considering that the vari-
ables (τ1, yp, zp, vx, vz) are dependent on each particular aircraft pair, as they are the
parameters (σ y, σz) which are τ1 dependent. The computational burden then grows
linearly with the size of the sample. When applying this model to the case of use,
the obtained results are the following.
Collision risk of the traffic sample before the air traffic controllers and pilots
react to remove conflicts is E(Pcoll) = 1:23� 10�4. Eq. (6) can also be applied taking
other times to go to CPA (τ1); other representative times are looking for the prob-
ability of collision of encounters when triggering the STCA (say, 2 min before
CPA), the result, in this case, is E(Pcoll)STCA = 6:65� 10�6. If it is the one triggering
TCAS TA (48s), we get E(Pcoll)TA = 5:30� 10�7. Finally, when the conflict evolves
and reaches the value that triggers the TCAS RA (35s), the value is E(Pcoll)RA =
8:25� 10�8 (Figure 11).
Figure 11.
Evolution of the probability of air miss with time to go to CPA.
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These values, together with the information obtained in the deterministic part of
the chapter, described previously, complete the methodology CRM to assess the
safety performance of a given traffic sample of flights in a defined volume of
airspace.
8. Conclusions
High-density airspaces are actively managed by ATC, speeding up the traffic
flows and maintaining the required separation minima at any time. Their job is
based on the surveillance of the traffic flying within their volumes of
responsibility (ATC sectors). The surveillance function is supported by radar
and/or other sensors (multi-lateration, ADS B, etc.), and the tracks representing the
state vector of the aircraft presented to controllers are, as well, usually stored in
databases.
The chapter presents a collision risk model that helps to assess the safety
characteristics for any volume of airspace where the above data sources are avail-
able. The model is data-driven, and most of the information comes up directly from
working with the stored flown trajectories complemented with a linear prediction
of future positions of the flights, up the so-called look ahead time (LAT).
In the last section, nevertheless, the stochastic nature of both, the data and the
linear predictive models, have been considered, providing relevant additional
information about the safety levels of the traffic in the sample for different chosen
times to go to CPA.
The sampled used takes radar tracks during a month of flights through the
MUAC airspace, but other sources of information can also be used, particularly
DDR2 from Eurocontrol, containing significant points of the trajectories, where a
special event, apart from the uniform movement, took place.
The results show interesting information closely related to the safety of the
airspace volume, when populated with the flights contained in the sample, from
deferent viewpoints as:
• Frequency of risks at a time (τ1) before reaching CPA, where the ATC conflict
was identified
• The overall time required to remove the conflict (τ2Þ
• The initial (when the conflict was identified) and final (actual) distances at
CPA for each conflict
• An estimation of the probability of air miss at different safety barriers
This set of information provides an exhaustive picture of the safety level
exhibited by the flown trajectories. The airspace volume, and the data sample, can
be chosen, with the only limits of making the results representative and, on the
other hand, allowing our computational capabilities to work out with the amount of
data, keeping in mind that the burden grows linearly with the size of the sample.
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Chapter 2
Relationship between Air Traffic 
Demand, Safety and Complexity 
in High-Density Airspace in 
Europe
Tamara Pejovic, Fedja Netjasov and Dusan Crnogorac
Abstract
Air traffic performance of the European air traffic system depends not only 
on traffic demand but also on airspace structure and its traffic distribution. These 
structural (airspace structure) and flow characteristics (factors such as traffic 
volume, climbing/descending traffic, mix of aircraft type, military area activity) 
influence airspace complexity, which can affect controller workload and influ-
ence the probability of safety occurrence. In other words, all these dynamic and 
static complexity components can potentially have an impact upon the safety of 
the air traffic management (ATM) system. Having in mind fluctuation in traffic 
on daily, seasonal or annual level in certain airspace, a few questions arise: How 
changes in traffic demand influence complexity and conflict risk? Is there any 
correlation between traffic demand, conflict risk and complexity? and Are there 
any differences between seasons? For that purpose, an investigation is performed 
on FAB Europe Central (FABEC) airspace, based on 2 weeks of operated traffic 
during the summer and fall of 2017. Air traffic complexity is estimated using the 
EUROCONTROL complexity metrics, while conflict risk is assessed using the 
conflict risk assessment simulation tool. Results show that certain positive relation-
ship exists between traffic demand, conflict risk and complexity.
Keywords: air traffic complexity, conflict risk assessment, air traffic management, 
safety performance
1. Introduction
In 2018, instrument flight rule (IFR) movements within the European airspace 
continued to grow strongly (4.65% versus 2017), making last year a new record year 
in terms of traffic volumes: the number of flights controlled reached an all-time 
record of more than 11 million [1]. The forecast growth indicates that by 2021, the 
European sky will handle over 12.3 million operations.
This is an incredible challenge for the safety, the en route sector capacity and 
impact on the environment. The implementation of two operational concepts, the 
free route airspace (FRA) and functional airspace block (FAB), is seen as crucial 
‘tools’ for solving those issues.
By definition, FRA is a specified airspace wherein users can freely plan a route 
between a defined entry point and a defined exit point, with the possibility of 
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routing via intermediate (published or unpublished) waypoints, without refer-
ence to the air traffic service (ATS) route network, subject of course to availability. 
Within such airspace, flights remain subject to air traffic control (ATC) for the 
separation provision and flight level (FL) change authorizations.
The overall benefits of free route operations are distance and flight timesaving, 
resulting in less fuel consumption and a notable reduction of engine emissions, 
which benefits the environment [2]. FRA is seen as a cornerstone to improve FAB 
Europe Central (FABEC) structure and utilisation.
From the other side, an implementation of FABs should bring further efficiency 
of airspace operations because FABs are ‘based on operational requirements and 
established regardless of State boundaries, in which the provision of air naviga-
tion services and related ancillary functions are optimized and/or integrated’ [3]. 
Currently, there are nine FABs established to cover almost the whole European 
airspace [3]:
• Baltic FAB (Lithuania, Poland)
• BLUE MED FAB (Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta)
• Danish-Swedish FAB
• Danube FAB (Bulgaria, Romania)
• FAB CE (Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia)
• FABEC (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland)
• North European FAB (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Norway)
• South West FAB (Portugal, Spain)
• UK-Ireland FAB
However, their implementation is still too slow (according to the European 
Commission [3]) causing inefficiency in the European ATM system.
1.1 Complexity of air traffic
Complexity of air traffic can be defined as the level of either perceived or actual 
spatial and time-related interactions between aircrafts operating in a given airspace 
during a given period. Specifically, complexity of air traffic in a given airspace 
can be very high solely because of the traffic intensity and its pattern in terms of 
mutual interactions between different traffic flows, as well as between individual 
aircrafts. Such presumably high complexity could be used for both planning and 
operational purposes mainly aimed at reducing it. Consequently, it may be reduced 
at the strategic, tactical and pre-tactical level. At each of these levels, it can have a 
spatial-based nature (such as airspace and airfield system design and/or assignment 
such as air routes, sectors, terminals, runway systems, etc.) and also time-based 
solutions (such as schedules, slot allocations, flow management, etc.). In that 
context, according to Netjasov et al. [4], complexity is understood as a demand 
characteristic of air traffic that is to be served by an appropriate supply system. 
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Gianazza [5] claimed that no single universal complexity measure exists but rather 
a set of complexity metrics, shown to be useful and relevant in a particular context 
and for a particular purpose.
Over the last 25 years, concern about measuring how difficult a traffic situation 
is, i.e. measuring complexity, has risen. Mogford et al. [6, 7] were some of the first 
to deal with complexity and its influence on air traffic controllers (ATCo) workload. 
They identified two basic elements of ATC complexity: sector complexity and traf-
fic complexity. Dealing with the influence of a ‘free flight’ on physical and mental 
workload of the ATCos, Pawlak et al. [8] developed a model of air traffic complex-
ity with the hypothesis that complexity causes a great change in the ATC cognitive 
workload.
In order to measure the ATCo workload, Laudeman et al. introduced a concept 
called ‘Dynamic Density’ (DD), which ‘includes both traffic density (a count of air-
craft in a volume of airspace) and traffic complexity (a measure of the complexity 
of the air traffic in a volume of airspace)’ [9]. DD was also applied in the studies of 
Sridhar et al. [10] with the aim of determining whether a DD could be predicted in 
the future. DD concept was further elaborated and its applicability further broad-
ened in the studies of Smith et al. [11], Kopardekar and Magyarits [12], Masalonis 
et al. [13], Rantanen et al. [14] and Kopardekar et al. [15, 16].
Schaefer [17] defines complexity as a measure of difficulty that a particular traf-
fic situation will present to an ATCo. This measure is limited to the characteristics 
of the traffic situation itself and may thus be considered as a factor that contributes 
to the workload. Schaefer used complexity as a key concept for solving the problem 
of the ATCo workload and sector capacity. Similarly, Chaboud et al. [18] have stud-
ied the influence of complexity on workload and air traffic service costs and Flynn 
et al. [19] on sector categorisation and comparison between the US and European 
sectors based on traffic complexity characteristics. de Oliveira et al. [20] are dealing 
with workload balancing using complexity. Even in the last decade, investigation of 
relationship between complexity and workload remained actual [21–23].
Delahaye and Puechmorel [24], Histon et al. [25] and Delahaye et al. [26] dealt 
with the problem of measuring complexity of air traffic. They assumed that air-
space complexity is related to the traffic structure and airspace geometry. According 
to this assumption, they concluded that a measure of complexity would find wide 
application in balancing the sector load, distribution of traffic in the sense of con-
gestion, new airway network design, dynamic sectorisation, slot allocation, traffic 
flow management, comparison of different airspace structure effectiveness, etc. 
Following previous study, Gianazza [5, 27] applied complexity metrics to airspace 
configuration. In its study, Hilburn [28] provides a comprehensive literature survey 
of different theoretical views concerning complexity, different complexity factors 
and data collection methods. He identified more than 100 complexity factors and 
almost 30 methods for elicitation, refinement and validation of complexity factors.
Other approaches to define, measure, manage or even reduce air traffic or 
airspace complexity have recently appeared, opening a new field for further 
application of the complexity metric [29–32]. The above-mentioned overview also 
shows that great attention was given to modelling and measuring complexity in the 
en route environment related to the ATCo workload.
In recent years new approaches to study air traffic complexity emerged. Hong and 
Kim [33] dealing with the reduction of air traffic complexity have introduced a concept 
of complexity map. Wang et al. [34, 35] investigated the structure of air traffic situa-
tions based on aircraft clusterisation and using complex network theory. Further on 
searching for objective air traffic situation measurement, they have used a dynamic 
weighted network [36]. Some authors have used machine learning methods (ensemble 
learning models) [37, 38] while others human-in-the-loop simulations [39].
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Traffic complexity affects control task complexity (Figure 1), where the 
control is performed by human operator. It is expected that a more complex task 
will produce a higher workload. However, the workload differs between ATCos 
(Figure 1) due to differences in their working environment, perception of the 
traffic situation, personal experience, etc. Therefore, complexity represents 
a contributing factor of task complexity and ATCo workload (more on ATCo 
workload modelling may be found in the studies of Loft et al. [40] and Majumdar 
and Ochieng [41]).
The approach presented in this chapter is based on EUROCONTROL [42] 
methodology, with exclusion of ATCo workload issue from the explicit consider-
ation. Approach is taking a macroscopic view, and it is considering four complexity 
components: adjusted density, potential vertical interactions, potential horizontal 
interactions and potential speed interactions. A single metric, ‘complexity score’, 
which incorporates these four separate parameters, was considered as the simplest 
for benchmarking purposes. Recently, Pejovic and Lazarovski [43] have studied the 
performance of the North European Free Route Airspace using EUROCONTROL 
approach.
1.2 Conflict risk
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has developed the 
Collision Risk Model (CRM) as a mathematical tool used in predicting the risk of 
mid-air collision [44]. Although aircraft collisions have actually been very rare 
events, contributing to a very small proportion of the total fatalities, they have 
always caused relatively strong impact mainly due to relatively large number of 
fatalities per single event and occasionally the complete destruction of the aircraft 
involved.
From other side, one of the principal matters of concern in the daily operation 
of civil aviation is the prevention of conflicts, i.e. loss of separation between aircraft 
either while airborne or on the ground, which might escalate to collisions. A loss 
of separation is a situation when two aircrafts come closer to each other than a 
specified minimum distance both in the horizontal and the vertical planes. One can 
imagine that losses of separation are more frequent event than collisions, so assess-
ment of conflict risk is becoming important.
In order to determine whether or not loss of separation situation exists and 
to calculate a conflict risk value, a cylinder-shaped ‘forbidden volume’ is defined 
around the aircraft [45]. A loss of separation exists between two aircrafts if one 
of them enters the other’s forbidden volume. Losses of separation could be of a 
crossing or an overtaking type, depending on the aircraft trajectory relations both 
in horizontal and vertical planes [46].
Figure 1. 
Scheme of the relationship between complexity, task complexity and workload (based on [4]).
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Dealing with a conflict risk (see Section 2.2.2) instead of a collision risk (a con-
cept established by ICAO) is enabling a proactive safety approach, which is much 
closer to everyday ATCo activities.
2. Study approach
To analyse how future changes in airspace structure and traffic flow could influ-
ence complexity and safety performance, this paper proposes a showcase methodol-
ogy on the analysis of FABEC.
FABEC, which includes airspaces of six countries, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Figure 2), is one of the biggest 
FABs and is handling more than half of the European annual traffic. According to 
EUROCONTROL [48] this ‘airspace is one of the busiest and most complex in the 
world’ with ‘most major European airports, major civil airways and military train-
ing areas located in this area’.
In addition, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) within FABEC airspace 
(7 ANSPs with 14 area control centres (ACCs)) handle 55% of the annual European 
air traffic.
FABEC would surely benefit a lot from FAB and FRA implementation; however, 
their implementation would cause airspace structural as well traffic flow changes 
which could further influence complexity and safety performance, and also indi-
rectly ATCos workload.
Prior to assessing those potential future influences, it was necessary to create a 
benchmark. For that purpose, an analysis of traffic situation in terms of safety and 
complexity in FABEC airspace in 2017 was made, before full FAB airspace integra-
tion and full FRA implementation.
Figure 2. 
FABEC airspace (source: [47]).
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The latest information about FRA implementation status from the ATM Master 
Plan Portal and Local Single Sky Implementation (LSSIP) reports show that FRA 
implementation at the end of 2018 in some states is ongoing (green) while in 
some states late (yellow). The current FRA implementation of FABEC is shown 
in Figure 3. At the moment final implementation dates vary from end of 2021 for 
Germany and Switzerland to the end of 2024 for France.
2.1 FAB and FRA concepts in FABEC airspace
The FABEC airspace is situated in the core area of the European Air Navigation 
Service network. It is among the busiest (handles about 6 million flights per year—
55% of the European air traffic) and most complex airspaces in the world. Most of 
the large European airports are also located in this area. Since June 2013, FABEC is 
officially in operation.
FABEC defined a stepped and gradual FRA implementation approach, whereby 
FABEC area control centres (including Maastricht Upper Area Control (MUAC)), in 
cooperation with airlines and computerised flight planning service providers, develop 
and implement cross-border free route airspace based on a single common FABEC con-
cept of operations, which complies with standards defined by the Network Manager.
FABEC FRA initiative includes joint efforts of the seven service providers, and 
the project was launched in 2011. FABEC ANSPs agreed on one common concept 
of operations to ensure a harmonised process. First implementations took place in 
December 2017 in the MUAC airspace. By 2018, ANSPs of Germany, France and 
Switzerland have also implemented several direct routes.
2.2 Traffic data and scenarios
Traffic demand data used for simulation and analysis were available via 
EUROCONTROL Data Demand Repository (DDR2). The analysis of complex-
ity and safety was done using the current tactical flight model (CTFM) flight 
Figure 3. 
FABEC FRA implementation status [49].
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trajectories (M3 in Network Strategy Tool (NEST [50]) terminology). These are 
trajectories constructed by the Enhanced Tactical Flow Management System 
(ETFMS) of EUROCONTROL Network Manager to tactically represent a flight 
being flown.
This actual trajectory refines the last filed flight plan trajectory (M1 in NEST 
terminology) when correlated position reports (CPRs) show a significant deviation 
(1 min in time, more than 400 feet in en route phase, more than 1000 feet in climb/
descent phase or more than 10 NM laterally) and/or upon message updates from 
ATC (direct, level requests, flight plan update) [51].
In other words, an initial flight trajectory is updated with available radar infor-
mation whenever the flight deviates from its last filed flight plan by more than any 
of the predetermined thresholds. Therefore, used trajectory represents the closest 
estimate available for the flight trajectories handled by controllers on the day of 
operations.
To allow the analysis of different airspaces of FABEC of seven ANSPs in a similar 
manner (in terms of static and dynamic parameters), the airspace and traffic only 
above FL195 were chosen for analysis (as the lowest level at which lower airspace 
starts in FABEC airspace = Class C airspace). The selection of traffic above FL195 
excluded terminal manoeuvring area (TMA) traffic, which could have had addi-
tional implications during analysis of safety performance (different separation 
minima levels could be applicable at TMAs).
Two traffic scenarios covered 1 week of summer (July 3–9, 2017, with 131.268 
flights) and winter (November 13–17, 2017, with 94.947 flights). For each traffic 
scenario, calculation of complexity parameters (calculated using the NEST tool) 
and safety indicators (calculated using the Conflict Risk Assessment Tool [44]) was 
done using the same input—summer and winter traffic (Figure 4).
2.2.1 Assessment of complexity indicators
The assessment of complexity was done using the EUROCONTROL complex-
ity score [42] as airspace complexity indicator. The two main metrics that define 
the complexity score are the adjusted density and the structural index. The latter is 
derived from three parameters describing potential number of interactions in specific 
Figure 4. 
Structure of the methodology.
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situations classified as vertical, horizontal and the mix of aircraft performances. 
These potential interactions can have additional complexity if they involve aircraft 
in evolution (vertical interaction) and in horizontal flights for headings of more than 
30° of difference (horizontal interactions) and/or combining aircraft with different 
performances (speed interactions). Formulas used for the calculation of complexity 
score are explained in [42].
The adjusted density assesses the potential interactions resulting from density, 
including uncertainty in the trajectories and time, while the structural index 
balances the density metrics according to the interaction geometry and aircraft 
performance differences. The parameters used indicate the difficulty to manage 
the presence of several aircraft in the same area at the same time, particularly if 
those aircraft are in different flight phases, have different performances and/or have 
different headings [43].
The horizontal interactions assess pairs of aircraft depending on their relative 
headings, and only pairs of aircrafts with a difference greater than 30° heading 
are considered. The vertical interactions measure the interactions when aircraft 
in a climb/descend phase has vertical speeds with more than 500 feet per min 
difference (also when one of the aircrafts was in cruise). Finally, the speed inter-
actions provide a value of the mix of aircraft types (it considers pairs of aircraft 
only if their different speed performances are greater than 35 knots in nominal 
cruise) [43].
Complexity is calculated for the en route traffic in FABEC airspace above FL195. 
The calculations are done in airspace volume in 3D cells of 20 × 20 NM × 3000 ft. 
The complexity is computed separately for each grid cell and for discretised 60 min 
periods, and finally averaged [42].
2.2.2 Assessment of safety indicators
The assessment of safety indicators was done using Conflict Risk Assessment 
Tool [46]. This tool is intended for the simulation of planned or analysis of realised 
air traffic, consisting of flight trajectories (4D trajectories) crossing a given air-
space, with the aim of assessing safety performance. Conflict Risk Assessment 
Tool has been developed as a network based simulation model consisting of three 
modules, each being used for the calculation of certain safety indicators [46]:
• Separation violation detection module (dynamic 3D conflict detection model 
based on known flight intensions and distance-based separation minima) 
used for the calculation of duration and severity of potential loss of separation 
(PLoS) as well as determination of number of PLoS
• Traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) activation module (stochastically 
and dynamically coloured Petri net model) used for the determination of 
number of traffic alerts (TAs), resolution advisories (RAs) and near mid-air 
collisions (NMACs)
• Conflict risk assessment module used for the calculation of conflict risk
The separation violation detection module simulates flights (following discrete 
simulation logic with constant time steps) and compares the actual separation of 
aircraft following certain predefined flight trajectories (both in horizontal and 
vertical planes) with a given separation minima in order to detect PLoS [46]. Once 
PLoS are detected, this module counts them and for each of them calculates its 
severity and duration under given circumstances. Finally, a list of PLoS is created.
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Each PLoS discovered by the separation violation detection module is then con-
sidered by TCAS activation module. Namely, not every PLoS will activate TCAS. If 
the situation worsens, then TCAS activation module will uncover which event could 
occur. It counts TAs and RAs and based on vertical separation between aircraft at 
closest point of approach (CPA) counts possible number of NMACs [46].
Finally, the conflict risk assessment module is based on the calculation of 
 ‘elementary risk’ for each specific conflicting pair of aircraft, considering both 
duration and severity of PLoS. Summing up elementary risks for all possible 
conflicting pairs of aircraft and dividing it with the observed period of time 
(e.g. 24 hours), a conflict risk in a given airspace can be estimated [46].
2.3 Objectives and assumptions of the study
Having in mind changes in the European airspace (such as introduction of FRA 
and FABs) and constantly growing traffic demand, the following research questions 
emerged:
• How did those changes influence air traffic complexity and safety?
• Is there any relationship between traffic demand, air traffic complexity and safety?
• Are there any differences between seasons?
The main objective of the research presented in this chapter is to find answers on 
above questions by analysing air traffic within FABEC airspace (a discrete simula-
tion with fixed time step).
The main assumptions were as follows:
• A time increment of 10 sec is chosen as a result of the balance between run 
time and quality of loss of separation detection (smaller values could be better 
from the quality point of view but would last much longer).
• Consequently, all events lasting only 10 sec were excluded from further analy-
sis in order to deal with potential trajectory inaccuracies.
• The safety minima separations used were horizontal separation (5 NM) and 
vertical separation (1000 ft); however, those values are relaxed for 10% 
(4,5 NM and 900 ft) in order to deal with potential position and altitude 
inaccuracies.
• The tactical actions by the pilots and ATCos as well as their behaviour in 
traffic separation are not analysed as their interventions were already partially 
included in M3 trajectory.
• Complexity in horizontal and vertical plane is homogeneous within FABEC 
airspace.
3. Results
Analysis of complexity and safety performance is performed in five stages:
1. Analysis of daily variations of complexity and safety indicators described above
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2. Analysis of correlation between traffic, complexity and safety indicators 
(overall and seasonal comparison)
3. Analysis of PLoS severity and duration as well as horizontal and vertical 
separation at closest point of approach
4. Analysis of complexity and safety indicator values per flight levels
5. Analysis of geometrical characteristic of PLoS
3.1 Complexity and safety indicators overall analysis
Daily fluctuations of both complexity and safety indicators follow similar 
pattern throughout the week in both summer and winter. Traffic values indicate 
that traffic demand during winter is lower than during summer in a range from 22 
to 37%. Similarly, the complexity score values fluctuate in a similar manner, and 
summer values are higher in a range between 17 and 29%. Overall, changes of daily 
complexity values are following the changes of daily traffic demand.
Contrary, the changes in daily number of PLoS and conflict risk do not follow 
strictly the changes in daily traffic demand. However, variations in the number of 
PLoS are following the changes in conflict risk. The number of PLoS during winter 
is lower in a range from 33 to 63%. Similarly, the conflict risk shows lower values in 
winter in a range from 28 to 65%.
Complexity analysis shows that total hours of interactions (bars, Figure 5) 
increase during winter mainly due to increase in speed interactions (yellow bars, 
Figure 5) which could indicate the greater changes in the mix of aircraft used. 
However, overall complexity score reduces during winter by 15–20% depending on 
the day of the week. This indicates that overall complexity score (black line, Figure 5) 
is mainly influenced by changes in adjusted density (green line, Figure 5). Adjusted 
density assesses aircraft interactions resulting from density, including uncertainty in 
the trajectories and time. Adjusted density shows that interactions are not only related 
with the traffic volume, however also with how this traffic is dispersed in airspace.
The analysis of number of interactions and number of PLoS per hour of flight 
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during winter by over 23% (0.224 in summer vs. 0.172 in winter). The number of 
PLoS per hour of flight is somewhat more stable and does not change much with 
decrease in traffic. Overall change is approximately 13% (0.015 in summer vs. 
0.013 in winter).
3.2 Correlation between traffic, complexity and safety indicators
A very strong correlation (R2 = 0.9807) was found between the daily number of 
flights and complexity (Table 1). Strong correlations were also found between safety 
indicators (slightly better correlation with the number of PLoS) and the total number 
of flights. Similarly, strong correlations exist between safety indicators and complexity.
These findings could lead to a conclusion that with increase in traffic, one can 
expect the higher complexity, which is mostly influenced by the number of PLoS 
and conflict risk. In other words, this means that ATCo task load will increase, lead-
ing to a higher ATCo workload.
3.2.1 Seasonal comparison
The results of correlation analysis between traffic demand, complexity and 
safety indicators (conflict risk) show the positive correlation between the number 
of flights and complexity score (as dependent variable) that is stronger in winter 
(summer R2 = 0.7163 (Table 2) vs. winter R2 = 0.9022 (Table 3)). This is expected 
as daily complexity scores follow the daily number of flights (see Section 3.1). 
Moreover this could be explained by the fact that during the winter traffic is more 
uniform, while during summer there are more charter and business flights (un-
scheduled flights) that could change traffic flows and locations of potential conflict 
points, which in turn is decreasing predictability and increasing complexity score. 
Operationally, this could also potentially increase ATCo’s workload during summer.
Figure 6. 
Number of aircraft interactions and PLoS per hour of flight.
Both seasons Complexity PLoS Conflict risk
Number of flights +0.9807 +0.8819 +0.8008
Complexity — +0.9138 +0.8296
Table 1. 
Linear correlation coefficients for both seasons combined.
Risk Assessment in Air Traffic Management
30
Moreover, the positive correlation between the number of flights and conflict 
risk (as dependent variable) is not significant (in both seasons, although in summer 
is somewhat stronger). Similarly, the positive correlation between complexity score 
and conflict risk is not significant (R2 is higher in summer than in winter).
Correlation between the number of flights and number of PLoSs is not sig-
nificant (although somewhat higher in winter). Contrary, correlation between 
complexity scores and the number of PLoS shows a significant positive correlation 
(stronger in summer).
Overall, it can be concluded that correlation between complexity and the number 
of PLoSs is stronger than between complexity and conflict risk (Tables 2 and 3). 
Similar behaviour can be observed in the case of correlation between the number 
of flights and the number of PLoS. However, it has to be noted that the conflict risk 
as an indicator contains more information about the loss of separation than just the 
total number.
3.3 Analysis of potential losses of separation
3.3.1 PLoS duration and severity
Each PLoS is characterised by the combination of severity (related to the breach of 
separation) and duration. The severity of the PLoS depends on the minimum distance 
(spacing) between the pair of aircraft (Smin) and the applied separation minima 
(Sepmin)). The severity presents the level of aircraft proximity and is defined either for 
the violation of separation in the horizontal or the vertical plane, or both [45]:
  Severity  =   ( Sep min −  S min )  ___________ Sep min  
where 0 < = Severity < = 1.
Severity could be 1 in the case when both aircrafts are at the same point in the 
horizontal plane (although they could be properly separated vertically) or in the 
case when both aircrafts are at the same altitude (however they could be properly 
separated horizontally).
Results of PLoS duration analysis show that majority of PLoSs are short, up to 
30 sec (roughly two-thirds, i.e. 372 cases), while almost 90% do not last more than 
1 min (Figure 7). Results of severity analysis (Figure 8) show that in 80% of cases 
severity is 1, which means that both aircrafts were at either the same flight level or 
at the same point in the horizontal plane.
Winter season Complexity PLoS Conflict risk
Number of flights +0.9022 +0.5005 +0.2207
Complexity — +0.5640 +0.2843
Table 3. 
Linear correlation coefficients for winter season.
Summer season Complexity PLoS Conflict risk
Number of flights +0.7163 +0.3716 +0.3114
Complexity — +0.6980 +0.5144
Table 2. 
Linear correlation coefficients for summer season.
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3.3.2 Horizontal and vertical separation at CPA
The results of the distribution of minimum vertical separation at the CPA show 
that almost 80% of PLoSs are at the same flight level or are separated vertically up 
to 100 ft. (top Figure 9). The results of horizontal distribution show that roughly 
50% of PLoSs have breach of less than 3 NM (bottom Figure 9).
3.4 Complexity and safety per flight level
Both complexity and conflict risk can change with flight level. The distribution 
of an average daily complexity and average daily number of PLoS per FLs (grey 
lines show a standard deviation) is shown on Figure 10.
The highest average values of complexity are on higher altitudes (FL350 to 
FL380) which correspond to the level used for en route cruise. Somewhat increased 
values of complexity could be also seen between FL220 and FL240 (corresponds 
to situations in which flights are entering or leaving lower airspace), however, the 
number of PLoSs is not increased at this level band.
Distributions of average daily complexity and average daily number of PLoS per 
FL are similar, with lower values during winter days (Figure 10). Additionally, it can 
be concluded that traffic demand is influencing higher complexity values; moreover, 
the number of PLoSs evidently contributes to higher complexity values (Figure 11).
Figure 11 shows that in the summer period increase in the number of PLoS at 
high complexity altitudes is of higher magnitude than in winter months. This could 
be related to the fact that summer traffic is less predictable (due to the existence of 
increased number of charter flights and summer destinations traffic).
3.5 Geometrical characteristics of PLoS
To better understand the influence of PLoSs on complexity scores, it is necessary 
to investigate geometry between aircraft in PLoS encounters. Three types of PLoS, 
Figure 7. 
Distribution and cumulative distribution of PLoS duration.
Figure 8. 
Distribution and cumulative distribution of PLoS severity.
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based on special position of two aircraft in PLoS, are used: overtaking (difference 
between headings is ±700), crossing (difference between headings is in a range 
between ±70 and ±1600) and head-on encounters (difference between headings is in 
a range between ±160 and 1800).
Figure 12 (top) shows the share of each encounter type. In summer sample 
percentage of overtaking and crossing PLoSs is almost similar (51 vs. 46%) while 
in winter there are more overtaking PLoSs (71%). Daily values (Figure 12 bottom) 
Figure 10. 
Complexity and the number of PLoS per FL.
Figure 9. 
Distribution and cumulative distribution of vertical and horizontal separation at CPA.
33
Relationship between Air Traffic Demand, Safety and Complexity in High-Density Airspace…
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.88801
show that daily share of encounter types are more stable during the winter which 
could be related to more uniform traffic flows during winter months (e.g. no 
seasonal and charter flights).
4. Conclusion
Air traffic performance of the European air traffic system depends on traffic 
demand but also on airspace structure and its traffic distribution. These structural 
and flow characteristics influence airspace complexity, which can affect controller 
workload and influence the probability of safety occurrence.
An investigation is performed on FABEC airspace in Europe, based on 2 weeks 
of realised traffic during summer and fall of 2017, with aim to answer several 
questions: How changes in traffic demand influence complexity and conflict risk? 
Is there any correlation between traffic demand, conflict risk and complexity? Are 
there any differences between seasons?
Figure 11. 
Distribution of complexity and the number of PLoS per FL.
Figure 12. 
Shares of encounter types.
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Daily fluctuations of both complexity and safety indicators follow a similar 
pattern throughout the week in both summer and winter. Analysis of complexity 
parameters shows that overall complexity score is mainly influenced by changes in 
adjusted density which show that interactions are not only related with the traffic 
volume but also with how this traffic is dispersed in airspace.
The changes in the number of PLoS and conflict risk do not follow strictly the 
changes in daily traffic demand, and the numbers of PLoS and the conflict risk 
are lower in winter. This could be related to the fact that traffic demand is lower in 
winter months and that traffic is more predictable.
Strong correlations were found between traffic demand, safety and complexity 
indicators. These findings could lead to conclusion that with increase in traffic, one 
can expect the higher complexity, which in turn influences the number of PLoS and 
conflict risk. In other words, this means that ATCo task load will increase, leading 
to a higher ATCo workload.
Both complexity and conflict risk can change with flight level. The highest 
average values of complexity and number of PLoS are on higher altitudes (FL350 to 
FL380) which correspond to the level used for en route cruising. Increase in number 
of PLoS at these altitudes is higher, in relation to increase in complexity, during 
summer. This could be related to the fact that summer traffic is less predictable 
(due to existence of increased number of charter flights and summer destinations 
traffic).
In a conclusion, this small-scale analysis showed that changes in traffic demand 
do influence complexity and safety performance (both in terms of the number of 
PLoS and conflict risk). Moreover, this analysis set a benchmark for future monitor-
ing of safety and operational performance after FRA implementation at FABEC 
airspace. Further analysis should investigate whether dispersion of traffic after FRA 
implementation is enough to create complexity decrease and whether change in 
complexity have not compromised safety and ATCo workload. Moreover, analysis 
could increase credibility by considering traffic flows, sectors, types of flights 
(charter, low cost, business, etc.) and vertical profiles of flight.
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Conflict Risk Assessment Based 




This chapter presents a conflict risk assessment based framework for airspace 
planning and design developed for the purpose of preventing aircraft conflicts and 
collisions. During airspace planning and design process, airspace designers are often 
guided by the need to increase capacity and/or reduce air traffic controller (ATCo) 
workload. In order to consider safety risks in a systematic way, the proposed frame-
work contains an additional step—safety risk assessment, performed by safety ana-
lysts guided by the risk reduction need. In such a way, they are providing feedback 
to airspace designers regarding safety issues of their solutions. This chapter presents 
four conflict risk assessment models, each one developed for different airspace 
planning level (strategic, tactical, operational, and current day) contained in the 
proposed framework. Basic development principles for every model were explained 
together with specific objectives, assumptions, conflict risk concepts, and required 
input data. Models are illustrated by the simple numerical examples.
Keywords: conflict risk assessment, airspace planning, airspace design,  
air traffic control, aviation safety
1. Introduction
Air traffic is growing with an average annual rate of about 4–5% in the last 
30 years [1, 2]. The increase of the air traffic volume in Europe up to 2050 is fore-
casted in the European Commission (EC) document “Flightpath 2050” [2] to be 
almost a threefold relative to the year 2011 (25 million commercial flights in 2050 
relative to 9.4 million expected in 2011), i.e., with an expected average annual rate 
of about 4%. Also, an increase of 25% in aircraft operations is predicted up to 2039 
relative to 2019 in the USA [3], i.e., 1,25% annually in average. Simultaneously, an 
increased level of safety is required [2].
In order to accommodate such a growth, a development of new air traffic 
operational concepts is expected [4]. But accommodation of growing traffic with 
requirement to increase safety presents a significant challenge for the research and 
scientific community since an increase of traffic should not lead to a decrease in 
safety. That is why a development of new safety measures and system safety perfor-
mance indicators is also expected [4].
The air traffic system is a complex, socio-technical, safety-critical, and dynamic 
system with three main components at macro level—airlines, airports, and air traf-
fic control/management services. Those components mutually interact at different 
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hierarchical levels. At microlevel air traffic system presents a very complicated, 
highly distributed network of human operators, procedures, and technical/techno-
logical systems within different operational environments. Safety of flight opera-
tions in such a complex system is influenced by interactions between the various 
components and elements [5, 6]. Airports and the air traffic control/air traffic man-
agement (ATC/ATM) system as an air traffic system infrastructure are expected to 
be able to support such growth safely and efficiently with adequate capacity.
The research presented in this chapter is focused on the ATC/ATM system and 
more specifically on airspace planning, design, and organization.
An airspace as main infrastructure resource of ATC/ATM system is characterized 
by the capacity, which is usually given as the maximum number of aircraft passing 
through a given airspace in a given time period [7]. Capacity depends on the air traffic 
flows and the aircraft separation minima applied. One of the possibilities to increase 
airspace capacity is to reduce the separation minima [8]. This approach is driven by 
the fact that suitable communication, navigation, and surveillance technology (COM/
NAV/SUR) already exist [9]. The reduction of separation minima could increase the 
traffic throughput but also could affect the safety of the flight operations. This is the 
reason for the development of models for safety assessment of such a change and for 
balancing between an increase in capacity and any possible decrease in safety.
The main objective of the research described in this chapter is the development 
of a framework for airspace planning and design based on a conflict risk assess-
ment. The main purpose of such a framework should be prevention of aircraft 
conflicts and collisions.
To enable implementation of the proposed framework, it was necessary to 
develop a risk assessment model for airspace planning, design, and organization 
purposes at the strategic, tactical, operational, and current day planning levels.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of different 
risk modeling approaches in air traffic system. Section 3 describes the proposed 
framework. Section 4 explains the development of a conflict risk assessment model 
for strategic, tactical, operational, and current day planning levels as well as illus-
trates their application. Finally, Section 5 draws conclusions and presents further 
research directions.
2. Risk modeling approaches
2.1 Overview of risk modeling approaches
The main concern in the daily operation of ATC system is prevention of conflicts 
between aircraft either while airborne or on the ground, which could possibly 
become a collision [5, 6].
The main reason for developing risk models since the 1960s was the need for 
increasing airspace capacity (in order to accommodate growing traffic demand) 
by reducing both space and time aircraft separation minima. However, due to the 
reduction of this separation, an air traffic safety could be jeopardized. That is why 
an assessment of the risk of conflicts and collisions has been studied using different 
models. It was expected from using those models to show whether a reduction of 
separation would be sufficiently safe. The following models were in use [5, 6]:
• The Reich-Marks model was developed in the early 1960s [10]. It is based on the 
assumption that both aircraft positions and speeds are random variables. The  
model computed the probability of aircraft proximity and the conditional prob-
ability of collision given the proximity [11, 12].
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• The Machol-Reich model was developed in 1966 with the idea of develop-
ing the Reich-Marks model as a workable tool, as well as to increase airspace 
capacity over Atlantic. Consequently, the ICAO adopted the threshold for risk 
of collision of two aircraft due to the loss of separation [11, 13].
• Intersection models are simplest among collision risk models. They assume that 
aircraft follow predetermined crossing trajectories at constant speeds. Using the 
intensities of traffic flows on each crossing trajectory, aircraft speeds, and airways 
geometry, the probability of collision at the crossing point is computed [14–18].
• Geometric conflict models are similar to intersection models. They are devel-
oped in the 1990s with the main assumption that aircraft speed is constant, but 
their initial three-dimensional positions are random. The conflict occurs when 
two aircraft are closer than the prescribed separation minimum [19–23].
• The generalized Reich model was developed during the 1990s by removing 
restrictive assumptions from the Reich model [9, 24–27].
Collision risk models have gradually been developed since the 1960s, but their 
main purpose has always been to support decision-making processes during system 
planning and development.
2.2 ICAO risk modeling approach
The ICAO has developed the collision risk model (CRM) as a mathematical tool 
used in predicting the risk of mid-air collision [28–30]. The CRM model became 
a crucial part of the Airspace Planning Methodology for the determination of 
separation criteria [28] which purpose is to determine separation minima based on 
calculated collision probability.
CRM calculates probability of collision as the lateral or vertical overlap prob-
ability, given the probability density functions of position errors at a given moment 
[31, 32]. However, [33, 34] CRM is not able to model all situations, especially 
operational errors.
2.3 Conflict vs. collision risk modeling
What is a conflict? A conflict is an operational situation in which two (or some-
times more) aircraft come closer to each other than a specified separation minimum 
distance (both in the horizontal and the vertical planes). In order to detect conflict 
situation, a cylinder-shaped “forbidden volume” [35] (“protected zone” [22] or 
“conflict cylinder” [34]) is defined around the aircraft. The dimensions of this 
volume are defined by the minimum horizontal Smin (cylinder radius) and vertical 
Hmin separation (cylinder height). Whenever one aircraft enters the other’s forbid-
den volume (Figure 1), a potential conflict situation occurs. Conflicts could be 
of different types—crossing or overtaking—depending on the relations between 
aircraft trajectories both in horizontal and vertical planes [35].
What are collisions? Collisions are defined by forbidden volumes which are 
much smaller than in the case of conflicts (Figure 1). The dimensions of those 
volumes are defined by the size of the aircraft [10, 16, 30].
As already mentioned, one of the principal matters of concern in the daily 
operation of ATC system is the prevention of conflicts between aircraft (inci-
dents) either while airborne or on the ground, which might escalate to collisions 
(accidents).
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3.  Conflict risk assessment based framework for airspace planning  
and design
The basic idea of the proposed framework is that different risk assessment 
models are required for different planning levels in ATC/ATM system [35, 36]. 
Their main purpose of those models is to support decision-making during airspace 
planning and design process through evaluation of safety risks of proposed changes 
(either in the existing or the new system).
Generally, airspace designers are often guided by the need to increase capacity 
and/or reduce air traffic controller (ATCo) workload, during planning and design 
process. Usually, the safety risk assessment is not explicitly performed, but in order 
to consider safety risks in a systematic way (explicitly), the proposed framework 
contains an additional step. In this step a safety risk assessment is performed by 
safety analysts driven by the risk reduction need (Figure 2). Safety analysts in such 
a way are providing feedback (both positive and negative) to airspace designers 
regarding safety issues of their solutions [9]. It is important for provision of objec-
tive feedback that safety analysts are independent of airspace designers.
A proposed conflict risk assessment modeling framework contains four plan-
ning levels (strategic, tactical, operational, and current day). It is developed to be 
complementary to ICAO CRMs and not as its replacement. The main differences 
between proposed framework and ICAO CRM are the following [37]:
• They are considering different events: the proposed framework considers risk 
of conflict (incidents) while CRM considers risk of collision (accidents);
• They are used for different purposes: the proposed framework considers 
airspace designs based on conflict risk, while CRM uses collision risk for 
determination of separation minima which further allow increase of airspace 
capacity.
Figure 1. 
Conflicts vs. collision forbidden volumes.
Figure 2. 
Iterative process for airspace design and planning (compiled from [9]).
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• They use protection volumes of different sizes: the proposed framework con-
siders the forbidden volume around aircraft, while CRM considers the physical 
dimensions of aircraft.
• They use different separation minima types: the proposed framework uses 
distance-based separation minima only, while CRM uses both distance- and 
time-based.
• The resulting risk values are not the same: the conflict risk value is always 
bigger then collision risk value due to the fact that conflicts are more frequent 
than collisions.
The proposed framework is intended for use by the safety analysts (as presented in 
Figure 2). For each of the four planning levels, the necessary (not exhaustive) inputs 
are listed, and possible types of models are proposed (Figure 3, Table 1 [35, 36]).
From Figure 3 it can be seen that proposed framework is sequential in nature, 
meaning that outputs obtained after the application of conflict risk assessment 
models at one planning level are used as inputs into another planning level.
Starting from the initial larger set of scenarios, applying the suitable conflict risk 
assessment models, a gradually reduced set of scenarios (positively evaluated from 
the safety point of view) is obtained as outputs from the model application [37]:
• The output at strategic planning level is a list of airspace scenarios A1,…, An 
chosen to be used on the tactical planning level.
• The output at tactical level is a list of airspace scenarios B1,…, Bm (m < n from the 
strategic planning level) chosen to be used on the operational planning level.
Figure 3. 
Planning levels in conflict risk assessment modeling framework (based on [35–37]).
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• The output at operational level is a list of airspace scenarios C1,…, Ck (k < m from 
the tactical planning level) chosen to be used in current day operation.
At the current day level, risk assessment model should help decision-makers to 
timely organize sectorization based on a given list of sectors and confirmed flight plans.
Table 1. 
Inputs for conflict risk assessment vs. planning levels.
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It is evident from Table 1 that moving closer to the current day planning level, 
safety risk assessment models become more detailed and complex. Actually, the 
level of abstraction is getting smaller due to availability of specific information, 
while their nature also changes (from analytical models to simulation models and 
further to decision support systems).
In the following text, a framework is described separately through the developed 
conflict risk assessment models for each planning level as well as illustration of their 
application.
(compiled from [35–37]).
4. Conflict risk assessment models
All conflict risk assessment models developed under the proposed framework 
are sharing the few general characteristics [37]:
1. The main starting point is that the risk depends on airspace geometry (static 
element) and the air traffic using it (dynamic element).
2. All models are based on the concept of critical sections, as part of the aircraft 
trajectory, which are traversed by the aircraft during level flight or while climb-
ing or descending through these sections. A critical section was defined as 
portion of trajectory j in which aircraft should not be at the same time, if other 
aircraft is in intersection point O flying on trajectory i, in order to prevent oc-
currence of conflict (similarly is in the case of flying on the same trajectory).
3. A conflict is defined as a situation in which two aircraft are coming closer than 
a separation minimum distance (both in horizontal and vertical planes).
4. In order to detect conflict situations, around the aircraft a cylinder-shaped 
forbidden volume (protected zone) is defined (its dimensions are defined by 
the minimum horizontal Smin and vertical separation Hmin).
5. The following assumptions are introduced in developing the models for risk 
assessment:
• Risk is antonym for safety.
• If there is no traffic, there is no risk.
• Risk values are not constant.
• Risk values usually positively correlate to traffic demand and negatively to 
airspace volume.
6. All models, under certain conditions, could be applied both for en route and 
terminal maneuvering (TMA) airspace.
7. The risk values calculated using the developed models are only the relative 
measure of safety. This means that there are intended for the purpose of com-
parison between numerous scenarios, not for comparison with a Target Level 
of Safety (TLS) given by the international regulations [38–40].
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4.1 Conflict risk assessment model for airspace strategic planning
4.1.1 Objectives and assumptions
The conflict risk assessment model for the airspace strategic planning level 
[35, 37] is intended to facilitate comparisons and sensitivity analyses of different 
airspace designs (sector shapes) and organizational scenarios (sector configura-
tions) under different air traffic flow levels a year or more in advance. Conflict risk 
is assessed using two variables [35, 37]: the conflict probability and the number of 
conflicts in the given airspace under the given circumstances.
In order to detect conflicts, length and flying time through critical section (criti-
cal length and critical time) are defined. Those two values enable calculation of the 
conflict probability, which is (for a given pair of aircraft) defined as the product of 
the probability that an aircraft is in a given critical section of its own trajectory and 
the conditional probability that another aircraft is simultaneously in a corresponding 
critical section of its (crossing) trajectory. The number of conflicts is defined as the 
product of conflict probability and estimated traffic flows for the given airway [35, 37].
Taking into account all available flight levels and airway combinations in the 
given airspace, it is possible to calculate total conflict numbers. Details of the model 
development are provided in [35, 37].
Proposed conflict risk assessment model is intended for airspace planning 
purposes at the strategic level, based on risk assessment of the current, and 
future airspace, following its modifications (changes of sector shapes or sector 
configurations).
The main inputs for conflict risk assessment using the proposed model are [35, 37]:
• Airspace geometry and characteristics (sector shape/boundaries, number and 
spatial distribution of available airways, length of the airways, number of 
intersecting points, available flight levels, etc.)
• Traffic characteristics (special and temporal distribution of traffic flows, 
proportion of level flights (in cruising phase) vs. flights in climb/descent, share 
of specific aircraft category in total traffic volume, etc.)
Human operator (pilots and ATCos) issues and behaviors are not considered.
4.1.2 Illustration of the model application
In order to illustrate the developed model, a hypothetic en route sector is used 
containing two unidirectional airways, one bidirectional airway, and four flight 
levels (Figure 4).
In this example traffic flow increase (e.g., on AWY3) as well as airspace volume 
change (e.g., length extension of AWY3) was considered together with the change 
in separation minima applied. Details of the model application illustration are 
provided in [35].
Experimental results show the following:
• Higher risk of conflict can be obtained in the case of traffic demand increase in 
airspace volume that does not change (sector volume and airway length, Figure 5).
• Decrease in risk of conflict can be obtained in the case of an increase of 
airspace volume (sector volumes and airway lengths), with traffic demand that 
does not change (Figure 6).
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Figure 4. 
Sector geometry (compiled from [35, 37]).
Figure 5. 
Risk for the given sector dependent on traffic flow on AWY3 [35, 37].
Figure 6. 
Risk for the given sector dependent on length of AWY3 (change of sector volume) [35, 37].
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• Reduction of separation minima is causing higher conflict risk values (Figures 5 
and 6).
4.2 Conflict risk assessment model for airspace tactical planning
4.2.1 Objectives and assumptions
The conflict risk assessment model for airspace tactical planning level is 
intended for evaluation and comparison of different alternative flight scheduling 
scenarios for a given airspace sectorization, or comparison of different alternative 
airspace sectorization scenarios for a given flight schedule, from 1 week up to a 
season in advance [36, 37].
Assessment of conflict risk is based on two variables [36, 37]: duration and 
severity of conflict situation in the given airspace. Both, duration and severity, 
depend on different factors: aircraft entry time into given airspace, aircraft speed, 
relative speed between conflicting aircraft, trajectory crossing angle, separation 
minima, etc. The conflict risk is defined as the ratio between the “elementary 
risk” and the observed period of time. “Elementary risk” is calculated as the ratio 
between [36, 37] (1) the surface limited by minimum separation line (from above) 
and function representing the change of conflicting aircraft separation (from 
below) and the surface limited by minimum separation and time moments pre-
senting the conflict duration (beginning and ending of conflict) and (2) abscissa. 
Conflict risk is being calculated for each aircraft pair, as well as for all conflicting 
pairs, i.e., total conflict risk in the given airspace. Details of the model are provided 
in [36, 37]. The proposed conflict risk model is intended for [36, 37]:
• Assessment of conflict risk in given airspace under given flight schedules
• Approval of filed flight plans or suggestions for their modifications (flight 
re-scheduling or slot assignments with the aim to reduce conflict risk)
The main inputs for conflict risk assessment using this model are [36, 37]:
• Known airspace geometry and characteristics (e.g., sector shape/boundar-
ies, number and length of the airways, airway tracks, number of intersecting 
points, available flight levels, etc.)
• Known traffic demand characteristics (flight plans—planned routes, speeds, 
altitudes, aircraft types, temporal and spatial distribution of air traffic flows 
over specific airspace entry points, etc.)
The main assumption of this model is that flight perfectly follows their planned 
routes (trajectories) and altitudes. Also, human operator (pilots and ATCos) issues 
and behaviors are not considered.
4.2.2 Illustration of the model application
In order to illustrate the developed model, a hypothetic en route sector is consid-
ered containing two unidirectional airways and one flight level (Figure 7).
For illustration purposes only, flights on one flight level are considered. Five flights 
entering the sector in a 6-minute period are considered (Figures 8–10). For each 
flight, an entry time, together with aircraft type and assigned airway, was the input.
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Potential traffic separation violations in the horizontal plane between succeed-
ing aircraft pairs are observed in the simulated situations for the case of separation 
minima of Smin = 10 NM (only intersecting conflicts are presented (shaded areas in 
Figure 8)). The calculated total risk was 3.08∙10−3.
In order to examine the influence of changes in flight entry time on the indi-
vidual and total risk values, a simple change is introduced.
Namely, allowing one flight to enter into the system 30 seconds earlier (red line, 
Figure 9), the total risk value is reduced from 3.08∙10−3 to 2.86∙10−3.
Additionally, a previous situation is simulated with a lower separation minima 
Smin = 5 NM resulting in lower total risk. The risk value is now reduced from 
2.86∙10−3 to 1.39∙10−3 (Figure 10). Details of the model application illustration are 
provided in [36, 37].
Figure 7. 
Sector geometry with flights (compiled from [36, 37], xikh,t is horizontal separation between flights i and k at 
time t).
Figure 8. 
Change of spacing between aircraft pairs and the potential conflicts in the horizontal plane (Smin = 10 NM), 
compiled from [36, 37].
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4.3 Conflict risk assessment model for airspace operational planning
The conflict risk assessment model for airspace operational planning level is 
intended for evaluation and comparison of different alternative operational sce-
narios (different separation minima, delegation of responsibility between pilots and 
ATCos, introduction of different ground and/or airborne-based decision support 
systems and tools, etc.) one or more days in advance [37].
In order to assess conflict risk, two variables are used [37]: duration of single or 
all conflict situations and severity of conflict situations.
The main inputs for this model are [37]:
• Airspace geometry
• Characteristics of the COM/NAV/SUR system equipment (technical character-
istics and reliability)
• Actual traffic data (aircraft types, entry time in the airspace, exit time from  
the airspace)
Figure 9. 
Change of spacing between aircraft pairs and the potential conflicts in the horizontal plane (Smin = 10 NM) 
with modified entry time case, compiled from [36, 37].
Figure 10. 
Change of spacing between aircraft pairs and the potential conflicts in the horizontal plane (Smin = 5 NM), 
compiled from [36, 37].
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• Data on aircraft behavior during the flight, reliability of certain aircraft techni-
cal parts, etc.
The influence of human operators (pilots, ATCos, etc.) at this level is considered 
through the modeling of their state (situational awareness, workload, etc.) [37].
An example of conflict risk assessment model for airspace operational planning 
level (one or more days in advance) is presented in the work of [41–43]. Although 
those papers are not directly related to the developed framework, they are showing 
the type of models which could be used for risk assessment at operational planning 
level. The goals of the research described in those papers were to assess the potential 
collision risk reduction for a historical en route mid-air collision event by using 
traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS).
This model (Figure 11) contains the technical elements (Cockpit Display of 
Traffic Information (CDTI), speakers for aural annunciation, TCAS, Mode S 
airborne-airborne communication link, airborne-ground communication link 
(COM)), human elements (pilot crews and ATCos), and procedural elements of 
TCAS operations (change of ATCos and pilots’ roles during TCAS encounters) and 
fully supports mathematical analysis as well as rare event agent-based Monte Carlo 
simulation of aircraft encounters [43].
4.4 Conflict risk assessment model for airspace current day planning
4.4.1 Objectives and assumptions
A final step of the proposed framework is presented by the conflict risk assess-
ment model for airspace current day planning level [37, 44].
The main objective (purpose) of this model is to support decision-making 
processes during sectorization (for a given set of available elementary sectors deter-
mined at operational planning level) through evaluation of the number of conflicts, 
the conflict probability, and the risk of conflict as well as their distribution at inter-
sections or along airways, and ATCo task-load according to the approach of [45] for 
a given airspace and traffic load [44], few hours in advance. Decision-makers, using 
the proposed model and the results obtained, could decide whether or not to accept 
the estimated risk with a certain specified probability as well as the estimated 
task-load. Based on these results, they could decide, in advance, to keep the existing 
sectorization or not, at current day level [37, 44].
Figure 11. 
High-level representation of TCAS agents [37, 43].
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The following input data are used in this model [37, 44]:
• Known traffic data (confirmed flight plans and flight schedules with known 
aircraft types)
• Known airspace geometry (sector shapes and boundaries, number and length 
of airways, as well as airway tracks) determined as the most appropriate from a 
conflict risk point of view at the operational level
The influence of humans is considered through the ATCo task-load. Details of 
the model are provided in [37, 44].
Apart from the main assumptions, an additional one is introduced here: risk is 
a random variable and one aircraft at an airway can be simultaneously in conflict 
with only one aircraft from another airway.
The objectives and assumptions of this model show that the main difference 
between this model and models presented in previous subsections [35, 36] is that 
risk is assumed to be random variable and that consequently the developed conflict 
risk assessment model should now be able to serve as a decision support tool.
4.4.2 Illustration of the model application
In order to illustrate the developed model, a hypothetic en route sector is used 
(Figure 4). For each flight the following inputs were used: the entry points into the 
airspace, entry time, entry flight level, heading, ground, and vertical speed. Values 
for those inputs were assumed to remain constant during the flight [37, 44].
In real operations, the decision on specific sectorization usage in a certain time 
period is based solely on the forecasted number of aircraft in the sector. But, other 
factors exist as well, one of which is the number of potential conflicts. This number 
indicates an ATCo task-load and conflict risk in the sector. Correct assessment of 
those indicators is the responsibility of air traffic managers, and it serves them to 
adjust the existing airspace capacity by changing the sector configuration [37, 44].
Figure 12. 
Example showing possible usage of outcomes of developed model by the air traffic managers [37, 44].
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Based on the values for the number of conflicts, the risk of conflict, the risk 
probability, and the task-load determined by the simulation, their possible usage by 
air traffic managers is explained.
Let the number of conflict Nc* = 7, with a horizontal separation minima of 
10 NM and 12 aircraft/hour on AWY3. Figure 12 (upper left) enables the deter-
mination of a frequency (probability) of seven conflicts (23%), while Figure 12 
(upper right) enables the determination of ATCo task-load of 63%. This task-load 
value could be compared with critical threshold values which are usually used to 
define an overload situation [37, 44]. A conflict risk value of R* ≈ 6.6 • 10−1 was read 
from Figure 12 (lower left) for given Nc*, while Figure 12 (lower right), for a risk 
value R ≤ R*, shows a cumulative probability of 0.71.
Figure 12 presents a value which could serve air traffic managers to decide 
whether or not a specific merging or partitioning of sectors is necessary within a 
certain time period (e.g., 30–90 minutes), allowing them in such a way to perform 
real-time analysis on a regular basis (e.g., every half an hour) [37, 44].
5. Conclusion
This chapter presents a framework for airspace planning and design based on 
conflict risk assessment developed for the purpose of preventing aircraft conflicts 
and collisions. The proposed framework is hierarchical by nature, containing four 
planning levels: strategic, tactical, operational, and current day.
During airspace planning and design process, airspace designers are often 
guided by the need to increase capacity and/or reduce air traffic controller (ATCo) 
workload. In order to consider safety risks in a systematic way, the proposed 
framework contains an additional step—safety risk assessment performed by 
safety analysts guided by the risk reduction need. In such a way, they are providing 
feedback to airspace designers regarding safety issues of their solutions.
This chapter presents four conflict risk assessment models, each one for dif-
ferent airspace planning level (strategic, tactical, operational, and current day), 
contained in the proposed framework.
Each of those models defines conflict risk on a different way and also has differ-
ent objectives. The idea behind every model, i.e., basic development principles, was 
explained together with specific objectives, assumptions, and conflict risk concepts.
All models are illustrated by the simple numerical examples. The illustration of 
the model application shows that in addition to airspace geometry (airways length 
and airways crossing angles), conflict risk in the given airspace also depends on 
traffic flows/traffic demand, average flow speeds/aircraft speed, average aircraft 
inter-arrival times, spatial and temporal distribution of aircraft in the airspace, as 
well as separation minima in horizontal plane.
Experimental results confirmed that conflict risk values are sensitive on traffic 
demand and airspace volume changes.
A plan for further research considers application of the proposed framework in 
real-life systems and on large-scale cases. Special attention will be given to investi-
gation of air traffic managers’ behavior during decision-making process.
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Abstract
In this chapter the connection between air traffic complexity and risks in air 
traffic management system will be explored. Air traffic complexity is often defined 
as difficulty of controlling a traffic situation, and it is therefore one of the drivers 
for air traffic controller’s workload. With more workload, the probability of air 
traffic controller committing an error increases, so it is necessary to be able to assess 
and manage air traffic complexity. Here, we will give a brief overview of air traffic 
complexity assessment methods, and we will put the traffic complexity assess-
ment problem into a broader context of decision complexity. Human reliability 
assessment methods relevant to air traffic management will be presented and used 
to assess the risk of loss of separation in traffic situations with different levels of 
complexity. To determine the validity of the human reliability assessment method, 
an analysis of conflict risk will be made based on the real-time human-in-the-loop 
(HITL) simulations.
Keywords: air traffic complexity, risk, human reliability assessment,  
air traffic control, simulation
1. Introduction
Humans are at the core of every complex system in the world, and that is true for 
the air traffic management (ATM) system as well. While extremely resourceful and 
capable of dealing with unexpected circumstances, humans are also prone to errors. 
Although significant technological, organizational, operational, and other advances 
have been made in recent decades, catastrophic accidents driven by human errors 
are still a regular, albeit increasingly rare, occurrence. Recently, the realization that 
complete elimination of all human errors will probably never be achievable has 
took hold [1]. As with any system that requires high degree of safety, ATM system 
solves this issue by employing multiple levels of risk and safety management, each 
providing a layer of the safety net. Nevertheless, methods for reducing the human 
error are still widely used and being researched. These methods, which consider the 
effect of human error on risk and reliability, are generally classified under the name 
of human reliability analysis (HRA). This chapter explores the applicability of HRA 
as part of the overall risk assessment with a focus on air traffic complexity issues.
There are many motivations for performing a risk or reliability analysis. In most 
cases it is to reduce the potential for system failure caused by humans. In this case 
the risk analysis can be used either in the design process or during the operation. 
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Sometimes it is needed to change or restructure the organizational design in a 
manner which ensures at least the same level of safety as before. In other cases, risk 
analysis can be performed as a part of licensing arrangements where the operator 
is tasked with assuring that a system meets a safety target. Or it can be used during 
the decision-making process where an operator chooses one of the possible systems 
to procure. In many of these cases, HRA will be undertaken as part of the more 
comprehensive risk assessment process.
Air traffic controllers (ATCOs) are at the core of the ATM. They are the central 
node where most important safety-related tactical decisions are made. Their job is 
to gather information and process them with the goal of reaching solutions which 
ensure safe and cost-efficient air traffic. One of their main tasks is prioritization 
of actions because human mental capacity is limited and it has been shown that 
ATCOs frequently deal with information overload [2]. Previous research showed 
that overload usually causes performance decline [3]. Air traffic complexity is one 
of the main factors driving the increase in the ATCO workload, so it is a reasonable 
assumption that increased complexity will result in increased errors due to decay in 
ATCO performance. Therefore, it is important to be able to assess air traffic com-
plexity as a possible source factor of risk.
In this chapter, the connection between air traffic complexity, controller work-
load, HRA, and risk assessment will be made. For that purpose, in Section 2, a brief 
overview of complexity will be made, starting with definition and ending with 
assessment methods. In Section 3, a broader area of decision complexity and inher-
ent difficulty of making the correct decision in a complex system will be presented. 
In Section 4, a very brief overview of HRA methods relevant to ATM system will 
be presented, as well as an HRA method developed specifically for use in ATM. In 
the latter parts of Section 4, an example of how to include the air traffic complexity 
into the HRA will be shown, and, in comparison, risk analysis based on real-time 
human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations will be presented.
2. Air traffic complexity
2.1 Definition and purpose
The Random House dictionary defines complexity as “the state or quality of 
being complex; intricacy”, and complex as “composed of many interconnected 
parts; compound; composite”, “characterized by a very complicated or involved 
arrangement of parts, units”, and “so complicated or intricate as to be hard to 
understand or deal with” [4]. While this example uses complicated to define complex, 
some other sources argue that there is a major difference between the two. Collins 
English Dictionary states that [5]:
Complex is properly used to say only that something consists of several parts. It 
should not be used to say that, because something consists of many parts, it is dif-
ficult to understand or analyze.
On the other hand, Cilliers, in his seminal book on the topic, claims exactly the 
opposite [6]:
If a system—despite the fact that it may consist of a huge number of compo-
nents—can be given a complete description in terms of its individual constituents, 
such a system is merely complicated. [...] In a complex system, on the other hand, 
the interaction among constituents of the system, and the interaction between the 
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system and its environment, are of such a nature that the system as a whole cannot 
be fully understood simply by analysing its components.
One example of such thinking is presented by Snowden in [7]. He claims that 
the aircraft can be considered complicated due to many parts. Once disassembled 
and analyzed, the function of all parts and their relationships can be determined. 
Human organizations and systems are, on the other hand, complex. They are made 
up of many interacting agents, with agent being any component of the system with 
identity. Agents can have multiple identities based on the context, i.e., a person 
can assume group identity or switch between formal and informal identities based 
on the environment. As these identities change, the components of the system 
change, the rules an agent follows change, and interactions between the compo-
nents change. This makes it impossible to distinguish between the cause and effect 
because they are intertwined [8].
In the context of air traffic control, complexity was rarely clearly defined, per-
haps due to assumed common knowledge. One notable exception is Meckiff (et al.) 
who stated that the air traffic complexity can be most easily defined as difficulty of 
monitoring and managing a specific air traffic situation [9]. It is intuitively clear that it 
is easier for the air traffic controller to monitor the airspace sector in which aircraft 
trajectories do not intersect and there are no level changes than the sector in which 
there are a lot of merging traffic flows and aircraft often change levels. As such, air 
traffic complexity could also be defined as a number of potential aircraft-aircraft 
and aircraft-environment interactions during a given time frame. Not all of these 
interactions require the same level of attention, urgency, or, ultimately, controller 
workload to resolve.
Complexity is not the same as traffic density. Obviously, the number of aircraft in 
a sector (also known as density, traffic load, or traffic count) directly influences the 
air traffic complexity. This number, however, is not the only indicator of the level of 
complexity, especially if one wishes to compare different sectors of airspace [10–12]. 
Two traffic situations can have equal density but vastly different complexity. Due to 
two different types of interactions, some researchers have chosen to make a distinc-
tion between airspace complexity (also static, structural) and air traffic com-
plexity (also dynamic, flow complexity [13]) which is influenced by the airspace 
complexity. This distinction will be used in this chapter as well. Unless explicitly 
stated, complexity will from now on refer exclusively to air traffic complexity.
Complexity is not a synonym for workload, although it has been proven multiple 
times that the increase in complexity results in increase in workload which in turn 
limits the airspace sector capacity [14, 15]. Mogford et al. [11] reviewed numerous 
research articles in search of complexity and workload relationship. They concluded 
that the complexity is actually a source factor for controller workload (Figure 1). 
However, complexity and workload are not directly linked. Their relationship is 
mediated by several other factors, such as equipment quality, individual differ-
ences, and controller cognitive strategies [11].
Controller cognitive strategies can be improved through training and experience 
that is readily seen when comparing experienced and inexperienced controllers. 
However, if one takes into consideration an average controller with average training, 
only two avenues to reduced controller workload remain—increasing equipment 
quality and decreasing complexity.
2.2 Previous research on air traffic complexity
Complexity was a common research topic since the early days of modern 
ATC operations. First papers that mention complexity were written in the early 
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1960s [16]. Since then, dozens of papers and reports were written on the topic of 
complexity—excellent reviews of those papers were written by Mogford [11] and 
Hilburn [17]. Instead of writing a completely new literature review, this chapter will 
present important research paths, ideas, methods, and facts, which are relevant to 
the present research.
It needs to be noted that most of the early research was conducted in order to 
better define factors that affect workload. Today, most of those factors, with pres-
ent understanding and definitions, would probably be called complexity factors. 
Some studies were nonempirical and lack exact definitions and measurement 
methods for complexity indicators. Those studies were excluded from this short 
review to give more room to those studies with experimentally validated complex-
ity factors.
Schmidt [18] approached the problem of modelling controller workload from 
the angle of observable controller actions. He created the control difficulty index, 
which can be calculated as a weighted sum of the expected frequency of occur-
rence of events that affect controller workload. Each event is given a different 
weight according to the time needed to execute a particular task. Though the author 
conducted extensive surveys to determine appropriate weights and frequencies for 
various events, this approach can only handle observable controller actions, which 
makes it very limiting.
Hurst and Rose [19], while not the first to realize the importance of traffic 
density, were first to measure the correlation of expert workload ratings with traffic 
density. They concluded that only 53% of the variance in reported workload ratings 
can be explained by density.
Stein [20] used Air Traffic Workload Input Technique (ATWIT), in which 
controllers report workload levels during simulation, to determine which of the 
workload factors influenced workload the most. Regression analysis proved that out 
of the five starting factors, four factors (localized traffic density, number of hand-
offs outbound, total amount of traffic, number of handoffs inbound) could explain 
67% of variance in ATWIT scores. This study showed the importance of localized 
traffic density which is a measure of traffic clustering. Technique similar to ATWIT 
will be used throughout the next three decades, including a modified ATWIT scores 
that will be used in this research.
Laudeman et al. [21] expanded on the notion of the traffic density by introduc-
ing dynamic density which they defined as a combination of “both traffic density 
(a count of aircraft in a volume of airspace) and traffic complexity (a measure of 
the complexity of the air traffic in a volume of airspace).” Authors used informal 
interviews with controllers to obtain a list of eight complexity factors to be used in 
Figure 1. 
The relationship between air traffic complexity and workload.
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dynamic density equation. The only criterion was that the factors could be calcu-
lated from the radar tracks or their extrapolations. The intention was to obtain an 
objective measure of controller workload based on the actual traffic. Their results 
showed that the dynamic density was able to account for 55% of controller activ-
ity variation. Three other teams [13, 22, 23] working under the Dynamic Density 
program developed additional 35 complexity indicators (factors), which were 
later successfully validated as a group by Kopardekar et al. [24]. Unfortunately, 
it was later shown that the complexity indicator weights were not universal to all 
airspace sectors, i.e., they had to be adjusted on a sector-by-sector basis [25]. This 
shortcoming, while making the dynamic density technique difficult to implement 
for operational purposes, has no influence if one wishes to compare two concepts of 
operations under similar conditions (similar sector configuration). Furthermore, 
same authors [24] suggested that, due to possibly nonlinear interactions between 
complexity factors, the dynamic density performance could be improved by using 
nonlinear techniques such as nonlinear regression, genetic algorithms, and neural 
networks.
Almost the same group of authors will use multiple linear regression method 
5 years later to determine which subset of complexity indicators will correlate well 
with the controller’s subjective complexity ratings [26]. After extensive simulator 
validation, results of this study showed that there are 17 complexity indicators that 
are statistically significant. Top five complexity indicators were sector count, sector 
volume, number of aircraft under 8 NM from each other, convergence angle, and 
standard deviation of ground speed/mean ground speed. Similar work was done 
by Masalonis et al. [27] who selected a subset of 12 indicators and Klein et al. [28] 
who selected a subset of only 7 complexity indicators, though with less extensive 
experimental validation.
In a similar vein, Bloem et al. [29] tried to determine which of the complexity 
indicators had the greatest predictive power in terms of future complexity. The 
authors concluded that there is a significant difference in predictive power of dif-
ferent complexity indicators. To complicate the matter further, they concluded that 
the subset of the complexity indicators that had the best predictive power changed 
depending on the prediction horizon.
To calculate potential impact of air traffic complexity on workload and costs, 
in 2000 the EUROCONTROL has given the same set of traffic data to UK National 
Air Traffic Services (NATS) and the EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre (EEC) 
with a task of independently devising a method of measuring the level of service 
[30]. While NATS has estimated ATS output (the service provided), the EEC has 
estimated the ATS workload needed to deliver the service. Both “were found to 
produce reasonably consistent results,” with an additional note that further analysis 
should be done before the final parameters for determining ATS provider costs are 
established. By 2006 EUROCONTROL’s Performance Review Commission finalized 
the complexity indicators to be used for ANSP benchmarking [31]. For this method 
the European airspace is divided into 20 NM X 20 NM X 3000 ft. cells, and for each 
cell the duration of potential interactions is calculated. Aircraft are “interacting” if 
they are in the same cell at the same time. The ratio of the hours of interactions and 
flight hours is the so-called adjusted density. In addition, the “structural index” is 
calculated as a sum of potential vertical, horizontal, and speed interactions. The 
final complexity score is calculated as a product of adjusted density and structural 
index. All in all, only four complexity indicators are used for this analysis, and no 
validation of any sort was presented in the report. It was noted, however, that shift-
ing the starting position of the grid by 7 NM caused the ANSP ranking to change 
dramatically (up to 16 places in an extreme case). Nonetheless, this method is still 
used for ANSP benchmarking.
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First to consider measuring complexity during TBO were Prevot and Lee [32]. 
They coined the term trajectory-based complexity (TBX) which is a measure 
of complexity in TBO. The basis of the TBX calculation is a set of nominal 
 conditions—nominal sector size, nominal number of transitioning aircraft, and a 
nominal equipage mix. Any difference to nominal operations causes a modification 
to the TBX value. Authors do not explain the method to determine the nominal 
conditions except that they can “be defined through knowledge elicitation sessions 
on a sector by sector basis or based upon more generic attributes.” The TBX value is 
then a number of aircraft that would produce the same workload under the nominal 
conditions as do aircraft under real conditions (e.g., the TBX of 20 means that the 
workload is equal to the aircraft count of 20 under nominal conditions even though 
there are actually only 16 aircraft in the sector). The advantage of this method is 
that it gives a single complexity value that can be easily related to aircraft count and 
is thus very user-friendly and self-explanatory (unlike many other complexity met-
rics). However, this study included only six complexity indicators with weights that 
were determined in an ad hoc manner and hardly any validation with actual subjec-
tive complexity. Only one of those complexity indicators was indirectly related to 
TBO (number of aircraft with data-link). Many human-in-the-loop simulation runs 
were performed in which the controllers had to give workload scores which were 
then compared with TBX value and simple aircraft count. While the authors claim 
that the subjective workload score correlated better with the TBX value, there was 
no objective correlation assessment presented. Finally, the authors have not com-
pared the effect of fraction of TBO aircraft on air traffic complexity.
In a subsequent paper by same authors, the relationship between workload and 
data-link equipage levels was explored [33]. It was concluded that the workload 
ratings correlated much better with the TBX score than with the aircraft count for 
varying data-link equipage levels.
Prandini et al. have developed a new method of mapping complexity based 
exclusively on traffic density [34]. This method is applicable only to the future 
concept of aircraft self-separation and does not take into account the human factors 
at all.
Gianazza [35–37] proposed a method for prediction of air traffic complex-
ity using tree search methods and neural networks. This method is based on the 
assumption that the air traffic complexity in historic flight data increased prior to 
the splitting of the collapsed sector into two smaller ones and decreased prior to 
collapsing the sectors into a larger one. The neural network was trained using this 
historical data, and then it could predict future increase in air traffic complexity. 
Tree search method was then used to determine the airspace configuration which 
yields lowest workload and complexity for the given air traffic pattern.
Lee et al. [38] have proposed that airspace complexity can be described in 
terms of how the airspace (together with the traffic inside it and the traffic control 
method) responds to disturbances. The effect of disturbances on control activ-
ity needed to accommodate that disturbance is what defines complexity in their 
opinion. The more control activity needed, the more complex the airspace is. They 
propose a tool, airspace complexity map, which should help to plan the airspace 
configuration and the future development of ATM.
In Radišić et al. [39], authors used domain-expert assessment to test the effect 
of the trajectory-based operations (TBO) on air traffic complexity. ATCOs were 
recruited to perform human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations during which they 
were asked to provide real-time assessment of air traffic complexity. Linear regres-
sion model was used to select, among 20 most used complexity indicators, those 
indicators which correlated best with subjective complexity scores. Six indicators 
were used to generate a predictive linear model that performed well in conventional 
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operations but less so under TBO. Therefore, the authors defined and experimentally 
validated two novel TBO-specific complexity indicators. A second correlation model 
combining these two novel indicators with four already in use generated much better 
predictions of complexity than the first model. Nonetheless, the best correlation that 
was achieved was R = 0.83 (R2-adjusted = 0.691). In subsequent work, the authors 
attempted to achieve better prediction by using artificial neural networks; however, 
similar results were obtained. This indicates that there is some variation in subjective 
complexity scores provided by ATCOs that cannot be explained by traffic properties. 
Indeed, it might be the case that ATCOs introduce a degree of noise into the com-
plexity scores due to difficulty of maintaining the consistent scoring criteria [40].
Wang et al. [41] in their work used network approach to calculate air traffic 
complexity based on historical radar data. Their assumption is that air traffic 
situation is essentially a time-evolving complex system. In that system aircraft are 
key waypoints; route segments are nodes; aircraft-aircraft, aircraft-keypoint, and 
aircraft-segment complexity relationships are edges; and the intensities of vari-
ous complexity relationships are weights. The system was built using a dynamic 
weighted network model.
Xue et al. [42] in their work analyzed three complexity indicators for simulated 
UAS traffic: number of potential conflicts, scenario complexity metric, and number 
of flights. Scenario complexity metric is based on cost of pairwise conflict which 
is defined as deviation from the original path. To perform analysis on around 
1000 scenarios at different density levels, authors had to develop a UAS simulator. 
Analysis was done using Pearson and ACE statistics methods.
Future concept of operations will involve usage of far wider range of air traffic 
controller tools; therefore, it is expected that new complexity indicators related to 
interaction of controllers and equipment will have to be developed. Furthermore, 
novel complexity assessment methods are needed due to limits of current 
techniques.
2.3 Complexity estimation methods
In this section, several air traffic complexity estimation methods will be exam-
ined in greater detail. All complexity estimation methods are based on the traffic 
data which describes a traffic situation. Since the complexity is a psychological 
construct, the most relevant estimator of complexity in a given traffic situation is 
the air traffic controller. The air traffic controller can look at the traffic data and 
decide whether a traffic situation is complex or not. All other methods are just 
attempts at approximating the level of complexity as estimated by the controller. 
The main problem with expert-based estimation is the inconsistency between con-
trollers, where one controller gives a different complexity estimate than the other. 
Therefore, most other methods seek ways to make the complexity estimate without 
human input. Ideally, those other methods would be validated by comparing them 
to the expert, i.e., controller’s estimate; however, this is not always the case.
Three main methods of control-based (i.e., based on ATCOs’ experience of 
complexity as a driver for workload and, subsequently, limiting factor of airspace 
capacity) air traffic complexity estimation will be presented here:
• Expert-based air traffic complexity estimation—where an expert, in most 
cases an air traffic controller, gives their estimate of the complexity
• Indicator-based air traffic complexity estimation—where the values of com-
plexity indicators, derived from traffic data, are used to determine the level of 
complexity
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• Interaction-based air traffic complexity estimation—where the complexity is 
estimated on the basis of the number of aircraft interactions in a given airspace 
cell (this method could be broadly defined as a very narrow indicator-based 
complexity estimation method due to a very low number of indicators)
• Others—methods based on other principles, such as counting the number 
of clearances [43], evaluating proximity based on probabilistic occupancy of 
airspace [44], measuring sensitivity to initial conditions of the underlying 
dynamic system called Lyapunov exponents (i.e., assessing predictability of 
traffic) [45], and many others
3. ATC operations and the decision domains
The decision-making process needs to be adapted to the context in which the 
operations take place. It is often seen that one kind of decision-making, completely 
adapted to its environment and therefore useful, cannot be easily transferred to 
another environment. This is often the case with accomplished engineers being 
notably less successful after moving into the managerial role.
Classification of such environments and appropriate decision-making modes is 
sometimes attempted with the goal of making rules about the best ways to manage 
each context. However, this is not an exact science because there are multiple factors 
that can change the decision-making context depending on who the person making 
the decision is, or how experienced they are. Nevertheless, there is still utility in 
being aware of the environment in terms of decision contexts and learning how to 
detect when the environment shifts from one domain to another.
One such classification attempt is the Cynefin framework [7]. It was developed in 
the early 2000s as a tool for decision-making, and it proposes five decision domains:
• Simple (also, obvious)—In this domain the situation is well known and 
stable. The cause–effect relations are established and rarely change. Following 
procedures and best practices is the best course of action to ensure efficient 
realization of goals. Decision-making process is usually made of the sense-
categorize-respond steps. A major issue in this domain is the overreliance 
on patterns and routine behavior which stifles innovation and precludes any 
change. This has caused many issues in the past when organizations were not 
willing to adapt to changes or innovate, but on the other hand, this has also 
created many opportunities for disruption by newcomers.
• Knowable (also, complicated)—This domain includes environments in which 
not everything is known but everything can be understood with enough 
time and effort. In knowable domain the experts can work rationally towards 
solutions by sensing the environment, analyzing the data, and applying the 
best practices. In contrast with simple domain, where the main part of the task 
is applying the best practices, in knowable domain most of the effort is spent 
analyzing the situation.
• Complex—In this domain are environments or systems which cannot be ana-
lyzed by breaking them down into smaller pieces, analyzing them individually, 
and creating the big picture based on the analysis of individual components. 
The very act of interacting with the system introduces changes which cannot 
always be predicted. The main mode of management of complex systems is 
through observation of patterns, finding ways to sustain those patterns we 
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desire, and disrupting those we do not. One particular phenomenon that arises 
in complex systems is the so-called retrospective coherence. The state of the 
system seems logical and coherent once it is retrospectively analyzed; however, 
current state of the system could hardly be anticipated in advance because 
there are many other equally plausible system states.
• Chaotic—Chaotic systems cannot be analyzed for cause and effect relation-
ships. Patterns are not visible, and if one waits for patterns to emerge, the dam-
age could become disastrous. It is in these conditions that the system is most 
difficult to manage but also most capable of change, for better or for worse.
Air traffic control is all about making decisions, so it is not a novel idea to apply 
the Cynefin framework to the ATC operations even though Cynefin was originally 
proposed for business-related decision-making [46]. Air traffic control is a complex 
system with numerous human and machine agents, organized in deep layers of 
components glued by multiple communication modes and protocols. This is even 
more apparent in air traffic management systems. Although someone might look at 
the routine ATC operations and consider them simple, or even mechanistic, such 
thinking is a sure way towards probably costly failure. In our opinion, ATC opera-
tions can be assigned to all domains depending on the traffic situation or changes in 
states of the system:
• During the nominal low-traffic ATC operations, the traffic situation is easy 
enough in terms of workload to be considered as belonging to the simple 
domain. The ATCO needs to sense the traffic situation or a particular part of it, 
usually by looking at the radar screen and talking to the pilots. Then they need 
to categorize the task that needs to be performed in order to ensure safe and 
efficient traffic. The task can be categorized as any of the numerous routine 
ATC tasks, e.g., conflict resolution, clearing or initiating climbs or descents, 
managing exit flight level constraints, etc. Then the ATCO acts by issuing a 
command or a clearance. This process occurs many times an hour, and some 
parts of it are trained to such a degree that the ATCO is often not even con-
scious of them.
• In nominal high traffic ATC operations, the number of interactions rises and 
so does the difficulty of maintaining safe and efficient air traffic. The situ-
ation needs to be sensed and then analyzed for all the tasks that need to be 
performed. Tasks are often prioritized based on the urgency and difficulty. A 
lot more time is spent on this analysis than in low-traffic situation. The ATCO 
then solves the issues by applying solutions that are considered to be best prac-
tice. There are multiple ways of solving an issue, and all of them are correct 
if the safety is maintained and flight efficiency is not unreasonably reduced. 
Unless there is some source of major uncertainty present, such as adverse 
weather conditions, this type of operations is best described as belonging to 
the knowable domain.
• In off-nominal operations of any traffic level or nominal operations with a 
major source of uncertainty, such as adverse weather, the decision context 
often enters the complex domain. The traffic situation evolves into unpredict-
able directions which can be completely explained only post hoc. Systemic 
complexity management measures, such as regulations, are undertaken to 
ensure safety because continuing with business as usual could lead, with unac-
ceptable probability, to incidents or accidents. Nonetheless, these measures 
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are sometimes not enough or are compounded with additional issues which 
altogether cause the loss of situational awareness for the ATCO or the pilots. 
Incidents lurk in these conditions.
• Operations in the chaotic domain should never happen in ATC. The whole 
system is designed to prevent such occurrences. However, history has shown 
us that there are sequences of events that can throw the whole system into a 
disarray and shift the decision context very quickly from the simple into the 
chaotic domain. One example of such a sequence is Croatia Control’s area 
control center (ACC) outage of 2014 when flooding due to unprecedented 
rainfall combined with human error and organizational deficiencies caused 
the complete loss of power to all ATC systems for 2 h [47]. When radar screens 
went blank, quick-thinking ATCOs used their personal mobile phones to 
contact ACCs of neighboring countries to warn them of potential conflicts, 
thus preventing midair collisions. This incident clearly illustrates how quickly a 
situation can go from bad (complex domain, operations in adverse weather) to 
worse (chaotic domain, complete loss of power).
It should be noted here that air traffic complexity should not be confused with 
complex domain in the Cynefin framework. Air traffic complexity is present in all 
decision domains, usually being lower in the simple domain and higher at the other 
end of the spectrum in the chaotic domain.
The main purpose of this classification of decision contexts in ATC is to help 
make ATCOs and supervisors aware of the different environments that are possible 
behind the seemingly unchanging radar screen. Another purpose, which will be dis-
cussed in the next section of this chapter, is to lay down the framework for assessing 
risks associated with air traffic complexity.
4. Assessing risks associated with air traffic complexity
Complexity in ATM is often split into two parts: airspace complexity (static 
complexity) and air traffic complexity (dynamic complexity). It is generally agreed 
that both dynamic and static components of complexity can affect controller 
workload and influence the probability of occurrence of an ATC (i.e., controller) 
error. Dynamic complexity relates to the factors describing air traffic complexity, 
i.e., it can include factors such as traffic volume, climbing/descending traffic, mix 
of aircraft type, military area activity, and types of aircraft intersection. Static fac-
tors, on the other hand, encompass factors related to the airspace, such as airspace 
structure, proximity of reporting points to sector boundaries, and standing agree-
ments between ANSPs.
In a human factors study, areas rated as some of the biggest contributors to risk 
in ATM are workload, human error, allocation of function, and situational aware-
ness [48]. As mentioned previously, air traffic complexity is a measure of difficulty 
of controlling the air traffic in a given sector; therefore, it is a direct contributor to 
workload. In a sense, ATCO’s job is to make correct decisions, whereas air traffic 
complexity is a factor that makes the search for the right decision more difficult. 
Therefore, increased complexity can directly increase the probability of a wrong 
decision being made because the size of the search space increases faster than the 
set of correct solutions. Here lies the main connection between air traffic complex-
ity and risk. Probability of human error (i.e., human error risk) increases with 
increased complexity. Thus, it is reasonable to assess the complexity-related risks 
from the human reliability assessment point of view.
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EUROCONTROL investigated the possible relationship between ATM system 
complexity and safety. They tried to develop a complexity hazard and operability 
(HAZOP) technique with the main objective being to trial this approach and 
evaluate its utility for safety assessment and obtain feedback on its acceptability 
with operations personnel [49]. The attempt at developing complexity HAZOP was 
unsuccessful due to difficulty of adjusting the HAZOP technique to the complexity 
issues. Therefore, in this section only HRA methods will be presented.
4.1 Human reliability assessment
This section will provide a brief overview of the HRA methods and their 
development over the years; however, for a more thorough review of HRA methods, 
one can find more information in [46, 50]. Only those methods that are in some way 
relevant to HRA in aviation will be considered.
HRA can be defined as “any method by which human reliability is estimated” 
[51], and it is generally presented as having three main parts: (1) identifying pos-
sible human errors and contributors, (2) modelling human error, and (3) quantify-
ing human error probabilities. These methods were first developed in nuclear power 
safety systems.
In the early models of HRA, human was often considered as just another part 
of the system. For example, in [52], a technique for human error-rate prediction 
(THERP) was developed based on the techniques used in nuclear power plant risk 
management, i.e., a straightforward event tree analysis was performed. Each human 
action (e.g., reading a display, operating a lever) was given a human error probabil-
ity (HEP) as a probability with a value from 0 (least probable) to 1 (most probable). 
Sample of values for different errors can be seen in Table 1. The values assigned to 
each error type came from authors’ experience and from earlier studies performed 
in the defense sector.
THERP also specified performance shaping factors (PSF) which were used to 
modify the nominal HEPs based on the context of the action (e.g., time pressure, 
human-machine interface, etc.). A list of possible PSFs for one error is given in 
Table 2. One can notice that there are no error multipliers associated with each 
PSF. It is the duty of the assessor to define the maximum affect that each PSF could 
have on HEPs. Criticism of THERP was mostly that it was too difficult to apply 
because of quite detailed decomposition of tasks that it relied on a database of HEPs 
which was never really validated and that it took very broad and casual definitions 
of human performance factors.
Error HEP
Failure to perform rule-based actions correctly when written procedures are available and used 
(with recovery)
0.025
Inadvertent activation of a control; select wrong control on a panel from an array of similar-
appearing controls identified by labels only
0.003
Omitting a step or important instruction from a formal or ad hoc procedure 0.003
Omitting an item of instruction when use of written procedures is specified (<10 items) 0.001
Checking the status of equipment if that status affects one’s safety when performing his tasks 0.001
Turn rotary control in the wrong direction when there is no violation of populational stereotypes 0.0005
Errors of commission in check-reading analog meters with easily seen limit marks 0.001
Table 1. 
Examples of HEPs given in [52].
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Another version of this type of model was done in human error assessment 
and reduction technique (HEART) [53]. The database of HEPs was much smaller 
and more generic, so it was more flexible and easier to apply than THERP. Instead 
of highly detailed errors, the focus is on a handful of generic task types for which 
probabilities of failure are given (Table 3). This simplification has made the HEART 
technique much more accepted outside the nuclear power industry for which the 
THERP was designed.
The author has identified the human factors he found relevant by searching the 
human factors literature and assigned relative weights to them, identified impacts 
of errors, and suggested a set of human error data which should enable higher 
reliability of the system. Instead of calling them PSFs, the author called them error-
producing condition (EPC) and provided the multipliers for each. Multipliers are 
used to increase the nominal human unreliability in cases where there are circum-
stances that increase the probability of human error. Some of the EPCs are shown in 
Table 4.
More generic error types have led to confusion when trying to apply it to a spe-
cific industrial application. This problem was addressed by developing specialized 
versions of HEART for specific industries. One such derivative will be discussed 
shortly.
These models are characterized by defining two broad categories of errors: 
errors of omission (when human operator fails to make an action) and errors of 
commission (when operator makes a wrong action). These simplifications were 
later put, at least partially, into the context of actual human behavior which knows 
many other ways of committing an error. For example, [54, 55] included contextual 
effect such as stress, organizational culture, and tiredness into the model, whereas 
[56, 57] also included the possible variation in operator’s responses and recovery 
actions undertaken once the errors have been noticed. By taking into account the 
context of human behavior, these techniques have made a qualitative step forward 
in comparison to the THERP and HEART, so they are generally called second-
generation HRA techniques. This did not, however, improve their adoption in the 
industry because simpler and more flexible techniques, such as HEART, are more 
usable and sustainable. For this reason, the first HRA technique developed specifi-
cally for ATM was based on HEART technique. It was developed in 2008 and named 
Controller Action Reliability Assessment (CARA) [58].
4.2 Human reliability assessment in ATC
Compared to HEART, CARA’s generic task types were developed to better suit 
the needs of HRA in ATM (Table 5). To make sure that the task types are in line 
with the commonly used models of ATCO tasks, the basis for task development was 
1 Stress level of the operator
2 Rate at which the operator must process signals
3 Frequency with which a particular display is scanned
4 Whether a written checklist is used to direct the operator to specific displays
5 Relationship of the displays to annunciators or other attention-getting devices
6 Extent to which the information needed for operator decisions and actions is displayed directly
7 Human factors engineering related to the design and arrangement of the displays
Table 2. 
Examples of PSFs for errors related to reading unannunciated displays [52].
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found in EUROCONTROL’s studies. Literature and ergonomics database reviews 
were undertaken to find the data which supports new values of HEPs for each 
generic task type. Where more than one error probability for a given task was found 
in the literature or the databases, geometric mean was used to establish a single 
value. Furthermore, uncertainty bounds of each HEP were determined using the 
single sample t-test [59].
EPCs used in CARA were, like general task types, developed by adjusting EPCs 
from HEART and other techniques (most notably SPAR-H [60] and CREAM [61]). 
To ensure that the CARA EPCs closely follow the well-established contextual struc-
ture used in ATC, they were modelled to fit the Human Error in ATM (HERA) [62] 
classification structure. For initial consideration, CARA EPCs’ maximum affect 







Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of likely 
consequences
0.55 0.35–0.97
Shift or restore system to a new or original state on a single attempt 
without supervision or procedures
0.26 0.14–0.42
Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and skill 0.16 0.12–0.28
Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant attention 0.09 0.06–0.13
Routine, highly practiced, rapid task involving relatively low level 
of skill
0.02 0.007–0.045
Completely familiar, well-designed, highly practiced, routine task 
occurring several times per hour, performed to highest possible 
standards by highly motivated, highly trained, and experienced 
person, totally aware of implications of failure, with time to correct 
potential error but without the benefit of significant job aids
0.0004 0.00008–
0.009
Respond correctly to system command even when there is an 
augmented or automated supervisory system providing accurate 




Generic tasks and proposed human unreliability in HEART technique [53].
Error-producing condition Maximum predicted increase in 
unreliability when going from good 
conditions to bad
Unfamiliarity with a situation which is potentially important 
but which only occurs infrequently or which is novel
×17
A shortage of time available for error detection and correction ×11
A low signal-to-noise ratio ×10
A means of suppressing or overriding information or features 
which is too easily accessible
×9
No means of conveying spatial and functional information to 
operators in a form which they can readily assimilate
×8
A mismatch between an operator’s model of the world and 
that imagined by a designer
×8
Table 4. 
EPCs and their multipliers as proposed in the HEART technique [53].
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values were taken from HEART, SPAR-H, and CREAM by selecting the most similar 
EPCs and then picking the one with the highest value (Table 6). It is expected that 
with further refinement of underlying data, the maximum affect values will be 
adjusted to better suit the actual values in ATC.
For the first time here, one can see that the traffic complexity was taken into 
account (EPC 17) with maximum affect of 10. CARA User’s Manual provides addi-
tional information about this EPC, adding three anchor points for this EPC [63]:
• Higher than normal traffic levels with some non-routine conflicts to solve 
(EPC multiplier 0.1)
• Higher than normal traffic levels with some non-routine conflicts requiring 
constrained solutions; possibility of secondary conflicts (conflict resolution 
can lead to a second conflict) (EPC multiplier 0.5)
• High traffic levels with unusual patterns of traffic requiring problem solving 
and a number of future conflicts requiring resolution (EPC multiplier 1.0)
EPC multipliers are used to scale the EPC affect from its maximum value to 
the actual value for the situation that is being assessed, thus getting the actual 
Task context Generic task type HEP Uncertainty 
bounds
A. Offline tasks A. Offline tasks 0.03 —
B. Checking B1. Active search of radar or FPS, assuming 
some confusable information on display
0.005 0.002–0.02
B2. Respond to visual change in display (e.g., 
aircraft highlighted changes to low-lighted)
0.13 0.05–0.3




for conflicts or 
unanticipated changes
C1. Identify routine conflict 0.01 Holding 
value’
C2. Identify unanticipated change in radar 
display (e.g., change in digital flight level due to 
aircraft deviation or corruption of datablock)
0.3 0.2–0.5
D. Solving conflicts D1. Solve conflict which includes some 
complexity. Note for very simple conflict 
resolution consider use of GTT F
0.01 Holding 
value’
D2. Complex and time pressured conflict 
solution (do not use time pressure EPC)
0.19 0.09–0.39
E. Plan aircraft in/out of 
sector
E. Plan aircraft in/out of sector 0.01 Holding 
value’
F. Manage routine traffic F. Routine element of sector management (e.g., 
rule-based selection of routine plan for an 
aircraft or omission of clearance)
0.003 Holding 
value’
G. Issuing instructions G1. Verbal slips 0.002 0.001–0.003
G2. Physical slips (two simple choices) 0.002 0.0008–
0.004
Holding values are to be updated once more data is available.
Table 5. 
Generic task types used in CARA technique [59].
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effect (AE). As is the case with many HRA techniques, some expert opinion is 
needed here to determine where the assessed scenario falls on the scale of 0.1–1.0. 
An example of human error risk calculation is given in the next section.
4.3 Using CARA to assess the effect of complexity on ATCO error risk
To better show how CARA is used to assess the effect of complexity on ATCO 
error risk, a simple example will be used. In this example, we suppose that the 
ATCO is working on an en route sector with moderately high air traffic complexity. 
Weather is calm and there are no failures in any of the air or ground equipment. In 
these conditions, we might want to assess the probability that the ATCO will not 
notice a conflict.




1. Shortfalls in the quality of information conveyed by 
procedures
5
Training and experience 2. Unfamiliarity and adequacy of training/experience 20
3. On-the-job training 8
Workplace design/HMI 4. A need to unlearn a technique and apply one which 
requires the application of an opposing philosophy—
stereotype violation
24
5. Time pressure due to inadequate time to complete the task 11
6. Cognitive overload, particularly one caused by 
simultaneous presentation of non-redundant information
6
7. Poor, ambiguous, or ill-matched system feedback—general 
adequacy of the human-machine interface
5
8. Trust in system —
9. Little or no independent checking 3
10. Unreliable instrumentation 1.6
Environment 11. Environment—controller workplace noise/lighting issues, 
cockpit smoke
8
Personal factor issues 12. High emotional stress and effects of ill health 5
13. Low vigilance 3
Team factor issues 14. Difficulties caused by team coordination problems or 
friction between team members
10
15. Difficulties caused by poor shift hand-over practices 10
Pilot-controller 
communication
16. Communications quality —
Traffic and airspace 
issues
17. Traffic complexity 10
18. Unavailable equipment/degraded mode—weather issues —
Weather 19. Weather —
Non-HERA: 
organizational culture





21. Shift from anticipatory to reactive mode 10
22. Risk taking 4
Table 6. 
CARA EPCs and values of their maximum affect [59].
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To do this, we select a generic task type (GTT) that best suits our situation. 
Here, it is C1. Identify routine conflict with HEP of 0.01. Appropriate EPC to select 
in this case is the EPC 17: traffic complexity with maximum affect of 10. Also, we 
use our expertise to determine that the current traffic situation is moderately 
complex, so we use EPC multiplier to determine the assessed effect (AE) equal to 
0.4. Calculating the probability (P) of ATCO’s failure to detect the conflict is then 
calculated using Eqs. 1–3.
  P = GTT ×  ( (EPC − 1) × AE + 1) (1)
  P = 0.01 ×  ( (10 − 1) × 0.4 + 1) (2)
  P = 0.046 (3)
The result shows that the probability of ATCO failing to notice a conflict in a 
moderately complex situation is 0.046 or 4.6%. The −1 and +1 in Eq. 1 are added 
to ensure that the resulting EPC is more than 1 without needlessly increasing the 
EPC (e.g., if only the final +1 was added). Conversely, the probability of ATCO 
identifying a conflict is equal to 95.4%. These probabilities are valid for a situation 
with only one ATCO; however, en route ATC operations are usually performed with 
two ATCOs handling a sector (planning and executive ATCOs). The probability 
that both ATCOs will fail to notice the conflict is equal to 0.046 x 0.046 = 0.0021 
which is to say that approximately 1 in 500 conflicts in moderately complex traffic 
situations will not be identified (step 1 in Figure 2). Fortunately, ATC tools, such as 
short-term conflict alert (STCA), will sound the alarm in that case, and the ATCO 
will have the opportunity for a timely recovery.
This calculation showed how to use CARA to determine probability of a single 
event. Events can be chained into probability trees to calculate the probability of a 
sequence of events. Building on the previous example, we can calculate the prob-
abilities of further events after the conflict was identified or after a conflict was 
missed. First possibility, and a more probable one, is that the conflict was identified. 
Next step for ATCOs is to solve it. Let us assume that this task can be assigned to the 
D1. Solve conflict which includes some complexity GTT which is assigned HEP of 0.01. 
Using a GTT with the same HEP as in previous example, in combination with same 
EPC for traffic complexity, will yield the same error probability of 0.046 (step 2 in 
Figure 2). If ATCO notices that the conflict is not solved, they will make another 
attempt to solve it (step 3 in Figure 2). This can be considered a recovery action for 
the previous error (not solving the conflict). It is up to the assessor to analyze the 
traffic situation and operational procedures to determine how many attempts an 
ATCO could have before the STCA alarm rings. Modelling of additional tools, such 
as separation tool which helps ATCO to determine whether the conflict resolution 
action was successful or not, can assist the assessor in determining the most accu-
rate sequence of events.
If the conflict was missed or the ATCO could not solve it in time, STCA will 
sound the alarm. This usually occurs 2 min before the loss of separation. ATCOs’ 
response to the STCA can be modelled using the B3. Respond to unique and trusted 
audible and visual indication GTT which is assigned HEP of 0.0004. Due to short 
time until loss of separation, it is reasonable to use EPC number 5: time pressure 
due to inadequate time to complete the task which is assigned maximum affect value 
of 11. Since this GTT only relates to noticing and responding to the STCA, the 
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actual effect of this EPC will be on the lower side, so the multiplier is set to 0.2. 
Calculation of the error probability is then made with Eqs. 4–6.
  P = GTT ×  ( (EPC − 1) × AE + 1) (4)
  P = 0.0004 ×  ( (11 − 1) × 0.2 + 1) (5)
  P = 0.0012 (6)
This calculation shows that the probability of not noticing the STCA alarm 
will be 0.12% (step 4 in Figure 2). Once the ATCO notices the STCA, they will 
make another effort to solve the conflict. This time, the appropriate GTT is D2: 
complex and time pressured conflict solution which is assigned HEP value of 0.19 with 
confidence interval between 0.09 and 0.39. The assessor should use expert guid-
ance to determine which value should actually be used; in this example, 0.15 will 
be used. In addition, assessor could add two EPCs, one for time pressure ((5) time 
pressure due to inadequate time to complete the task) and one for complexity ((17) 
traffic complexity); however, CARA User Manual states that the EPC 5 should not be 
Figure 2. 
Probability tree for conflict resolution in moderately complex traffic according to CARA.
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combined with GTT D2 and neither should EPC 5 and 17 be used together [63]. This 
prevents overly pessimistic results. Therefore, only EPC 17 will be included in the 
assessment. Like in previous steps of this example, we will use 0.4 as EPC multiplier 
to determine the assessed effect. The calculation is given by Eqs. 7–9.
  P = GTT ×  ( (EPC − 1) × AE + 1) (7)
  P = 0.15 ×  ( (10 − 1) × 0.4 + 1) (8)
  P = 0.69 (9)
This calculation shows that, in complex traffic situation, the probability of a 
conflict not being solved under time pressure (STCA alarm) will be 69% (step 5 in 
Figure 2). In comparison, if the traffic is not complex, the probability of failure 
will be only 15%. Obviously, assessor should adjust the values of GTTs and EPCs to 
better suit the situation being assessed, so these probabilities are in no way final.
Finally, the probability of each outcome can be calculated by multiplying the 
probabilities of each event that led to that outcome. For example, if one wishes 
to calculate the probability that the conflict will be solved only after two failed 
attempts and an STCA alarm, step 5 in Figure 2, they should multiply probabilities 
of all events leading to that outcome as seen in Eqs. 10–12.
  P outcome =  P event1 ×  P event2 × … ×  P eventN (10)
  P outcome = 0.9979 × 0.046 × 0.046 × 0.9988 × 0.31 (11)
  P outcome = 6.5 ×  10 −4 (12)
The last step in this process is to sum up all the probabilities of a favorable out-
come (conflict solved) versus all the probabilities of an unfavorable outcome (loss 
of separation). In this example, the probability of the favorable outcome is 99.71% 
versus the probability of an unfavorable outcome which is 0.29%.
To better appreciate the effect of traffic complexity on the risk of human error, 
comparison with the traffic situation which is not complex can be made by exclud-
ing the traffic complexity EPC from the calculation. This calculation is omitted 
here for brevity, but the same method without the traffic complexity EPCs yields 
probability of a loss of separation below 3.5 × 10−5 per conflict (approximately 1 in 
28,600 conflicts). That is two orders of magnitude less probable than in the case 
with moderate complexity (0.29% or 1 in 345). On the other hand, if the traffic is 
highly complex, the assessor might use higher EPC multiplier for complexity, all 
the way up to 1. In that case, the probability of an unfavorable outcome, i.e., loss 
of separation, is 2% (1 in 50) which is 7 times more probable than in the example 
above (Table 7).
4.4 Using simulations to assess the effect of traffic complexity on risk
In addition to CARA, another method for assessing risks related to air traffic 
complexity is by conducting simulations. Simulation is a core method for ATM 
research and training, with different purposes requiring different levels of fidelity 
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and simulation scope. Fidelity refers to the level of similarity between the simu-
lated environment and the actual operations. Simulation scope can be broadly 
divided into strategic and tactical simulations. Strategic simulation tools (e.g., 
EUROCONTROL’s NEST) are used to analyze current and forecast future ATM 
situation on a global level. On the other hand, tactical simulation tools are used 
to accurately simulate ATC operations on a sector level (e.g., ATCoach by UFA or 
Micronav’s BEST Radar Simulator) [64]. For studies involving human factors, tacti-
cal real-time human-in-the-loop simulations provide the most reliable results.
Most representative results are produced when the simulator satisfies these 
requirements:
• Realistic working environment
• Accurate and versatile aircraft models
• Representative ATC tool operation
• Built-in stochasticity
• Human voice communication
• Research-level data logging
• Suitable meteorological model
• Suitable system and sub-system failure modelling
We used HITL simulations to assess the effect of trajectory-based operations 
(TBO) on air traffic complexity; for more information about that study, see [39]. 
Here we will provide a brief description of the methodology used and additional 
analysis of human errors made during that experiment. This will enable comparison 
of the simulation with the results obtained from CARA.
4.4.1 Example of an HITL simulation methodology
Simulation scenarios were developed based on the actual flight data. To measure 
complexity in conventional and trajectory-based operations, each simulation sce-
nario had to be developed in three versions: conventional operations, 30% aircraft 
flying TBO, and 70% aircraft flying TBO.
Ten suitably experienced air traffic controllers were recruited to perform 
simulations. They all held professional air traffic controller licenses and had 
operational experience in Zagreb CTA Upper North sector (where the simulated 
traffic situations would take place). Before the actual experiment began, each 
controller received training in order to get accustomed with the simulator inter-
face and operational procedures (though they were designed to closely resemble 
Low complexity Moderate complexity High complexity
p(solved) 0.999965 0.9971 0.98
p(loss of separation) 0.000035 0.0029 0.02
Table 7. 
Comparison of probabilities to solve the conflict in traffic situations with different levels of complexity.
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their actual working environment). The training consisted of an introductory 
lecture, pre-simulator briefing, simulator runs, and post-simulator briefing. One 
pseudo-pilot was used for all simulation runs. The controller could communi-
cate with the pseudo-pilot only via voice communication (through headset) or 
data-link.
Each controller performed three scenarios for each of the three types of the 
operations, each corresponding to different traffic loads—low, medium, and high 
(9 runs in total). Low scenarios were modelled to represent off-peak traffic, medium 
scenarios to represent peak traffic, and high scenarios to represent future peak 
traffic loads with 15% higher peak traffic. To prevent order of simulation scenarios 
affecting results, each controller was randomly assigned order in which he or she 
will perform different versions of the scenario (conventional, 30% TBO, 70% TBO). 
The order in which scenarios with different traffic loads (low, medium, high) were 
performed was, however, fixed and known to ATCOs. This enabled controllers to 
assess complexity more consistently.
During each simulation run, a subjective complexity measurement (SCM) tool 
opened every 2 min, accompanied by nonintrusive aural notification. The tool 
consisted of seven buttons (1–7), and the controller had to click on the one which 
was closest to the perceived level of air traffic complexity. The controller’s complex-
ity assessment was time-stamped and stored.
In addition to the subjective complexity measurement scores, objective complex-
ity indicators were also calculated in real time, time-stamped, and stored. For the 
purpose of calculating new complexity indicators post-simulation, all aircraft states 
were stored for each time step of the simulation (1 s). Aircraft state included all 
data that pertained to the specific flight at that point in time (e.g., position, velocity, 
heading, mass, pitch, bank, throttle, drag, climb mode, acceleration mode, assigned 
flight level/speed/heading, route, etc.).
All other available information was also stored. Human-machine interactions 
were recorded in-application, while an additional application was used to record 
radar screen and voice communication.
4.4.2 Simulation results and comparison with CARA
Overall, 88 simulator runs were performed, each lasting for approximately 
50 min. Though it is very difficult to ascertain the number of potential and actual 
conflicts, the frequency of STCA alarms and loss of separation occurrences can 
be used to assess the risk that air traffic complexity introduces. Before going into 
further details, it must be noted that the probabilities presented herein are accurate 
only for this particular set of scenarios in this particular airspace controlled by these 
particular ATCOs, even if the sample size issues are disregarded. These probabilities 
should not be used for making real-life operational decisions and are presented here 
as an example of the human reliability analysis that can be produced from real-time 
HITL simulations.
In Figure 3, all 88 simulation runs are plotted, showing scenario complexity 
and number of STCA alarms for each. Blue dots represent simulation runs which 
had only STCAs, whereas red dots show those runs in which loss of separation also 
occurred. ATCOs were not allowed to give additional complexity scores once the 
loss of separation occurred, thus preventing that event from influencing their opin-
ion. Separation minima were 5 NM horizontally and 1000 ft. vertically. Complexity 
scores were calculated as an average of the ATCO’s subjective complexity scores 
made during the peak 20 min of the simulation run [39]. Correlation coefficient 
between these two variables, complexity and number of STCAs, is 0.71, which 
indicates a somewhat strong correlation.
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First thing to notice is that most of the simulator runs, 58 out of 88, finished 
with zero STCAs. Of the remaining 30, only 5 were in medium traffic load sce-
narios, i.e., scenarios with traffic loads equal to current peak traffic. The remaining 
25 were all in high traffic load scenarios which were designed with 15% higher peak 
traffic loads.
Next thing to notice is that, even though the complexity scores are highly 
subjective, it is very rare to have scenarios with complexity higher than 4 and no 
STCAs (only 4 out of 33 or 12%). This indicates that the ATCOs are bunching most 
of the scenarios into the lower half of the scale, perhaps underestimating the actual 
difficulty of managing the traffic situations.
In terms of HRA, it is interesting to calculate the probability that the STCAs 
will be resolved before the loss of separation occurs. Overall probability of human 
error in this case is only 0.155 (11 out of 71) compared to the figure calculated 
by CARA in the example presented in the previous section, which was 0.69. 
Surprisingly, this probability will not change much even if the scenarios were 
filtered by complexity. For example, for scenarios with complexity above 5, the 
probability of an STCA turning into a loss of separation is 0.175 (10 out of 57). For 
scenarios with complexity above 6, the probability is only slightly higher at 0.189 
(7 out of 37). Here, ATCOs obviously show significant compensatory effects which 
should be included into CARA or modelled more precisely by assessors using the 
existing GTTs and EPCs.
On the other hand, the probability that the simulation run will contain at least one 
loss of separation rises sharply with complexity. For the lower half of the complex-
ity scale, this probability is zero. If we consider all scenarios with complexity score 
equal to or above 4, the probability of loss of separation is 0.33 (11 out of 33). For 
scenarios with the score equal to or above 5, the probability is 0.5 (10 out of 20), and 
for scenarios with the complexity score above 6, the probability is 0.538 (7 of 13). This 
shows that even though the probability of an STCA turning into loss of separation is 
lower than expected by CARA, the number of conflicts rises to the level at which the 
loss of separation becomes extremely probable.
As for the Cynefin framework, it could be applied here only in broad brushes. 
One could argue that the first quarter of the complexity scale in these simulations 
Figure 3. 
Number of STCA alarms vs. scenario complexity (red dots represent loss of separation).
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maps to the simple domain because there are no STCAs. Second quarter, with only 
a couple of STCAs which were quickly resolved, perhaps maps to the complicated 
domain. The third quarter could be mapped to the complex domain because there 
are many STCAs, but only two were not resolved in time. Finally, the last quarter 
of the scale arguably maps to the chaotic domain due to high probability of loss of 
separation which indicates that the ATCOs had lost the immediate control of the 
situation. Notwithstanding the Cynefin framework, it is clear that the ATM system 
should be designed to keep the complexity in the lower half of the scale and serious 
efforts are needed to achieve this in the face of the rising traffic demand.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown how the air traffic complexity, through increas-
ing the difficulty of finding the correct solution to the traffic conflict, influences 
human error probability and, consequently, risk in ATM as well. CARA HRA 
technique was used to show an example of calculation that can be used to assess the 
probability of a loss of separation in traffic situations with low, moderate, and high 
complexity.
Like other HRA techniques, CARA also relies on an expert assessor who must 
be able to correctly model the ATC operations by choosing the appropriate GTTs 
and EPCs. This process is very sensitive to small changes in the initial conditions 
because adding or omitting a single probability calculation often results in an order 
of magnitude different final probabilities. This problem is further exacerbated by 
uncertainty in modelling the ATC operations. For example, it is nearly impossible to 
determine beforehand how many opportunities to resolve a conflict will an ATCO 
have before a loss of separation occurs. In the example shown in Section 4.3, we 
used two attempts before an STCA sounded the alarm and one attempt afterwards. 
If any of those attempts were omitted, the probability of a loss of separation would 
have increased by a significant amount (up to 10 times). Furthermore, different 
ATCOs will use different strategies to solve a conflict, especially if the conflict solu-
tion implies secondary potential conflicts, which makes modelling of ATC opera-
tions in CARA even more difficult. This is not to say that CARA should not be used 
for HRA or as a part of broader risk assessment. It just means that CARA should be 
used with caution and that the results should be considered more as an indication of 
a risk instead of as an exact quantification of risk.
To better illustrate the accuracy of CARA and to show an additional method 
for risk assessment, we have presented a brief analysis of a simulation-based risk 
modelling. During the HITL simulations, which included complexity assessment, 
STCA alarms and loss of separation occurrences were identified and recorded. 
Expectedly, it was shown that the number of STCAs quite strongly correlates with 
the perceived level of air traffic complexity. More interesting was the fact that the 
probability of STCA turning into loss of separation was much smaller than the one 
predicted by CARA. Also, it almost did not change with the increase of complexity 
which indicates presence of strong compensatory effects.
On the other hand, the human error probability for a conflict, defined as a prob-
ability of a failure to solve the conflict resulting in a loss of separation, increases 
with the increase in complexity. Of all 88 simulation runs, zero losses of separation 
occurred in scenarios with complexity below 4 (55 simulation runs). However, 
for simulation scenarios with score above 6, loss of separation occurred in 54% of 
simulation runs. This increase can somewhat be explained by higher traffic loads, 
leading to more conflicts which then led to more occurrences of loss of separation. 
The truth is, however, that the increase in traffic was not such that the number of 
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conflicts should rise to the levels achieved in the simulations. Simulation scenarios 
with high traffic load had only 15% more flights than scenarios with medium traffic 
load. It is the complexity of the traffic situation that precluded the ATCOs from 
being aware of all possible interactions and from solving the conflicts before it was 
too late. Though the sample size in the simulation study was quite small, it is clear 
that the model developed by the assessor in the CARA technique should be adjusted 
to reduce the probability of failing to solve the STCA.
In conclusion, both CARA and simulator study have a place in risk analysis in 
ATM. Best results are achieved when the simulations are performed to gather the 
probabilities of human error in a specific environment and when CARA is used 
to integrate the individual probabilities into a big picture assessment of ATM 
risks. The simulation study showed that the air traffic complexity is not only a 
large source of uncertainty but that it correlates nonlinearly with probability of 
loss of separation. This makes it difficult to model in common HRA techniques, 
with results having large error margins, but the greatest error would be to not 
model it at all.
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ICAO Risk Tolerability Solution
via Complex Indicators of Air
Traffic Control Students’ Attitude
to Risk
Serhii Borsuk and Oleksii Reva
Abstract
The solution of the ICAO risk tolerability is proposed via complex indicators of
air traffic control students’ attitude to risk. Physically tangible rates and character-
istics are used to determine air traffic control students’ attitude to risk levels during
flight separation minima violation. The following features of human factors
expression are taken as corresponding indicators: main decision-making dominants,
aspiration levels, and parameters of the fuzzy risk estimates. The final solution is
received with the help of a multiplicative approach. Indicators developed in the
paper are proposed to be received with special survey procedure and further results
processing and normalization. The explained method is applicable for both acting
air traffic controllers and students of the corresponding educational majors.
Keywords: human factor, risk estimation, air traffic control, separation minima,
aspiration level, main-decision making dominant, fuzzy estimates,
risk tolerability solution
1. Introduction
Professional activity of “frontline” air operators (flight crew and air traffic
controllers) can be considered a continuous decision-making chain in risk circum-
stances. This activity is part of the human factor, which is the main reason for air
accidents for the last decades according to the statistics [1, 2]. Detrimental impact of
the risk perception on flight safety is relevant for civil aviation. This is especially
urgent for a complex system “flight crew—aircraft—environment—air traffic
control authority” [3–5].
Results of researches dedicated to the development and operation of air trans-
port management (ATM) system show that sufficient flight safety level support is
impossible without efficient, proactive risk management activities. In turn, these
activities are an integral component of the system and entirely correspond to the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) safety paradigm.
According to the ICAO definition, flight safety is “the state, in which risks
associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of
aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.” Thus, it is necessary to
take into account risk estimates for the proper support of flight safety. Considering
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the definitions by Eurocontrol, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
and other sources [6–10], let us regard risk as a probability of undesirable situation
with harmful consequences. Its “severity” part can be determined using various
methods, including the qualimetrical ones. They allow forecasting hazardous situa-
tions and performing necessary activities by the management and operator of the
air transport system. It contributes to accident prevention and risk reduction.
Risk management-related tasks should be resolved. In order to do this, some
necessary qualimetrical steps should be carried out. They should include the evalu-
ation of quality-quantity indicators of the control process. This issue is relevant and
complex for civil aviation. Indeed, hazards tend to accumulate during air transport
system operation. Taking into account numerous objective and subjective factors,
this might result in the so-called “factor resonance” phenomenon [11].
2. Risk tolerability
Generalizing worldwide experience of flight safety management, ICAO pro-
posed to estimate civil aviation threats with special risk tolerability distribution [7].
It is composed of two aviation accidents parameters: likelihood and severity. All
their possible combinations were considered. ICAO divided obtained results into
three groups: Intolerable, tolerable, and acceptable (Figure 1).
There are five qualitative levels of the air accident likelihood and severity pro-
posed by ICAO. They are recommended for risk estimation and combined into the
safety risk matrix. These levels can be described using the terms of fuzzy mathe-
matics taken as corresponding fuzzy variables T Sð Þ and T Lð Þ [12, 13]:
T Sð Þ ¼ RC þ RH þ RMj þ RMn þ RN; (1)
T Lð Þ ¼ RF þ RO þ RR þ RI þ REI; (2)
where fuzzy variables’ terms are RC—catastrophic, RH—hazardous, RMj—major,
RMn—minor, RN—negligible, RF—frequent, RO—occasional, RR—remote, RI—
improbable, and REI—extremely improbable. Risk cases distribution across all pos-
sible likelihood and severity combinations is shown in Table 1.
Using the ICAO flight safety management recommendations, the US Federal
Aviation Administration published circular with their own safety risk matrix. Com-
binations of severity and likelihood explained there have 62.5% of partially or
totally acceptable levels [14]. However, they use four levels for both severity and
likelihood. Moreover, the “acceptable risk level” is determined as a flexible value,
which depends on the pilot’s particular opinion.
Risk estimation proposed by Eurocontrol is partial and concerns severity only
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combinations to the national authorities. Another risk matrix is proposed by the
Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS), Hongneung Campus, Seoul [15]. Some
of these examples use four and five risk levels, while ICAO sticks to the three ones
mentioned earlier. To keep up with ICAO, it’s definitions are used; and, therefore,
4-rate and 5-rate cases falls out of the analysis scope.
Providing general comments on risk tolerability, ICAO unfortunately gives no
exact values. That is why various methods should be used to resolve risk tolerability
distribution. Results of this kind can be implemented to enhance ATC learning
process, to influence aircraft separation minima changes, to improve rules and
instructions, etc.
The priority arrangement method (PRM) is the first one. It applies the normal-
ized significance coefficient for each term of both fuzzy variables. Unfortunately,
this led to a significant decrease in the number of generally acceptable cases that is
unacceptable from the common-sense point of view [16]. Another method used for
the same purpose is Harrington desirability function [17]. The results for all the
mentioned approaches are shown in Table 2.
Another crucial point is that risk tolerability distribution solution should be
performed with tangible and clear indicators and parameters. The “frontline” air
operators should be primarily familiar with them. Such clarification problem is
resolved with application of such ICAO safety concept components as the use of
sound SOPs, hazard sources determination, risk factors control, personnel attitude
to hazardous actions and conditions, etc. [18]. Considering the “attitude to risky
actions or conditions” as the leading inbound marker to the problem, it is regarded
as an explanatory link for flight safety within the human factor.
Risk cases indicators Risk level description
5A, 5B, 5C, 4A, 4B, 3A Intolerable
5D, 5E, 4C, 4D, 4E, 3B, 3C, 3D, 2A, 2B, 2C, 1A Tolerable
3E, 2D, 2E, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E Acceptable
Table 1.
ICAO risks cases [7].
Approach Risk level (%)
Intolerable Tolerable Acceptable
ICAO proposal 24 44 32
FAA proposal 18.75 18.75 62.5
Harrington coefficients 40 36 24
PRM iteration 1 28 40 32
PRM iteration 2 68 20 12
PRM iteration 3 76 12 12
PRM iteration 4 76 20 4
PRM iteration 5 84 12 4
PRM iteration 6 88 8 4
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“Frontline” air operators’ professional activity is a continuous chain of decisions
generated and implemented in apparent and latent forms. It is also influenced by
multiple factors of stochastic and deterministic nature. Thus, it is possible to
research the mentioned above attitude through the human factor indicators that
influence decision making under risk circumstances:
• Main decision-making dominants;
• Aspiration levels;
• Fuzzy risk estimates.
Typical values of these indicators should be used to resolve risk tolerability
distribution. It is worth mentioning that there are no similar studies of risk
tolerability distribution resolution for presented rates.
Let us examine these indicators and their roles in more details. Researches
performed so far deal with the risk of flight separation minima violation set by
ICAO for the horizontal plane as at 2014.
3. Case study conditions
All methods proposed later on were implemented in the case study, which
includes survey and data processing. In the performed survey, 132 air traffic con-
troller students of fourth to fifth years of study from National Aviation
University (Kyiv, Ukraine) and Kirovohrad Flight Academy (Kropyvnytskyi,
Ukraine) were involved. By the time of the survey, all of them had completed at
least 1 year of learning with more than 100 hours at ATC simulation facilities. In
the survey, 11 flight separation minima were proposed including 8 km (1 mini-
mum), 10 km (4 minima), 12 km (1 minimum), 20 km (4 minima), and 30 km
(1 minimum ). All minima were proposed to the students one by one during
the survey.
4. Main decision-making dominants
Main decision-making dominants [19–30] are parameters of human factor
influence on decision making. They describe the attitude of “frontline” air operators
to risk: whether the operator is inclined, not inclined, or indifferent to risky behav-
ior. They also characterize motivation to achieve success or avoid failure. Domi-
nants are found from utility estimation functions f UF Lð Þ received from the
distances between two aircraft within violated separation minimum.
In the simplest cases, the form of the utility function chart can be used to define
the main decision-making dominant. However, for more detailed analysis, risk
premium (RP) concept is introduced [31]. Risk premium is the difference between
expected lottery reward, and it is determined equivalent.
The classical approach uses only one point L0:5 for dominant determination:
RP ¼ L� L0:5
<0 � inclined to risk
>0 � not inclined to risk
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where L� is an expected lottery point:
L ¼ 0:5 � L0 þ L1ð Þ ¼ 0:5 � 0þ Lnormð Þ ¼ 0:5 � Lnorm: (4)
Use of Eq. (4) for dominant determination makes results a bit rough. It can be
show by the example, when L ¼ L0:5 (Figure 2, blue line). In this case, the respon-
dent demonstrates an indifferent attitude to risk. But an example when this con-
clusion is wrong can be easily proposed (Figure 2, red line). It is achieved with
introducing of two more points in the dominant analysis.
Five points are used instead of three to increase accuracy. The analysis of the
points can be performed using coordinates proportion method [20]. According to
this method, the sum of coordinates
P
y, which is equal to 2:5L, corresponds to the
linear utility function of the respondent who is indifferent to risk. Thus, it is enough
to compare coordinates of the sum of five points with 2:5L. Risk-indifferent partic-
ipants have
P




The key distances, taken as the points, are 0 km, distance for ¼ of utility,
distance for half of the utility, distance for ¾ of utility, and full separation mini-
mum (L0, L0:25, L0:5, L0:75, Lnorm). Such distances are chosen to support utility
lotteries solution. Each distance possesses a particular utility u Lð Þ. Border points
obviously have utilities equal to 0 and 1. Intermediate points have utility values
equal to 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, correspondingly:
u L ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ f UF L ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 0; u L0:25ð Þ ¼ f UF L0:25ð Þ ¼ 0:25;
u L0:5ð Þ ¼ f UF L0:5ð Þ ¼ 0:5; u L0:75ð Þ ¼ f UF L0:75ð Þ ¼ 0:75;
u L1 ¼ Lnormð Þ ¼ f UF L1 ¼ Lnormð Þ ¼ 1:
(5)
All intermediate distances are found with the help of lotteries. These lotteries are
commonly implemented in economic proceedings [32]. However, they were applied
for hardware performance as well [19], what makes them applicable for aviation
risks assessment. The method of two-level lotteries application in aviation risk
evaluation is already explained in details earlier [20–30].
Lottery method is applied three times to get three lottery equivalents. Here, a
lottery equivalent is a result that represents the distance between two aircraft. This
distance is such that operator does not care whether to get it with 100% probability
or to participate in the lottery. In other words, it is used to find the distance of
lottery equivalent L0:5 with the utility of 0.5. The lottery has 50% of receiving any
Figure 2.
Rough estimation example leading to wrong conclusion for L ¼ 20 km . Blue line—rough estimate; red
line—improved estimate.
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Figure 3.
Lotteries used to determine utility function points for flight separation minima.
Figure 4.
Generalized utility estimate function for all participants with the flight separation minimum L ¼ 20 km.
Figure 5.
Normalized utility estimate function for all participants and all flight separation minima.
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marginal results. For the lottery of the first level, these results are 0 km and full
flight separation minimum.
The first received lottery equivalent is used to find two more lottery equivalents
for L0:75 and L0:25 (Figure 3). Considering two initial points and three point received
from lotteries, it is possible to build the desired utility estimate function.
The example of generalized utility estimate function for all participants plotted
for L ¼ 20 km is given in Figure 4.
Normalized utility estimate function for all participants concerning all proposed
minima is given in Figure 5.
Figures 4 and 5 show that utility rise in a non-linear way. Utility function data
are taken from case study survey. In both graphs, a fundamental understanding of
risk for all involved ATC students concerning single L ¼ 20 km separation mini-
mum (Figure 4) and all mentioned minima taken together (Figure 5) is presented.
According to the graph points, it can be stated that, in general, ATC students
possesses non-inclined to risk behavior.
5. Aspiration level
Aspiration level is one of the main psychological features and participants’
typical peculiarities, fundamental for personality. It is recommended to be deter-
mined during the medical investigation of air accident [33]. Basically, aspiration
level is the stable characteristic of an identity, which is used: (a) for defining the
complexity level of tasks wanted to be resolved, (b) for the target selection of
further actions depending on the previous success/failure, and (c) for determining
the desired self-image. Aspiration level demonstrates the correspondence between
personal goals and capabilities. Thus, aviation operators with high aspiration level
are characterized by high confidence level, persistence, high productivity, and
healthy criticism in achievements estimation [34, 35].
Given researches are related to the of human factor expression qualimetry dur-
ing flight separation minima violation. Considering recommendations of the pro-
ceedings [5], hereafter, the aspiration level is defined as a point of distance L* on the
flight separation minimum. The L* point corresponds to the highest utility increase
from the air traffic controller’s point of view. In other words, it corresponds to ATC
operator’s highest performance during support of proper flight safety level at given
distance between two aircraft. The proceedings [16, 36, 37] allow plotting and
analyzing utility chart by a formally unlimited number of points for open
decision-making task.
Since the aspiration level LAL is the relatively stable indicator of personal air
traffic controller commitments [16, 38–41], then LAL = L if and only if.
Δ f UF Lð Þ ¼ f UF Lrð Þ � f UF Lr�1ð Þ> f UF Lið Þ � f UF Li�1ð Þ;




Δ f UF Lð Þ ¼ f UF Lrð Þ � f UF Lr�1ð Þ ) max ;
f UF Lrð Þ>0:
�
(7)
The overall contribution from this utility function includes three more reference
points. They are L�, which corresponds to maximum utility increase in lower semi
plane (�100; 0), L0, which corresponds to distance with 0 utility for (�100; 100)
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scale, and Lþ, which corresponds to the maximum utility increase in top semi plane
(0; 100).
After data analysis, a series of charts for all 11 separation minima were plotted.
The examples of these charts are presented in Figure 6. Each chart here represents a
single aspiration indicator distribution for one of four L ¼ 10 km minima. Each of
the presented four plots shows how many participants consider each particular
distance between 0 km and separation minimum as delivering maximum utility. In
other words, every plot shows aspiration level distribution for all respondents. For
all the taken minima, the distance chosen most often is 10 km, which is the separa-
tion minimum itself. However, many ATC students choose other distances to pro-
vide maximum utility growth.
Interestingly, all the taken minima have peak point close to the middle of the
separation minimum range. In Figure 6, such middle peaks coincide for all L ¼
10 km separation minima. The same effect is observed for the group of L ¼ 20 km
separation minima as well.
6. Fuzzy estimates
Main decision-making dominants and aspiration levels do not cover the whole
totality of human factors expression during flight separation minima violation. The
experience of earlier researches witnesses that the human factor qualimetry can be
significantly improved by fuzzy models of risk level estimation [42–50]. These
models implementation conforms to the human mental process property of provid-
ing qualitative estimates rather than quantitative.
Considering all mentioned above and applying Miller’s “magic number” [51], the
following risk severity scale can be presented as the fuzzy variable T:
T ¼ ~RC þ ~RVB þ ~RB þ ~RAV þ ~RS þ ~RVS þ ~RD: (8)
where ~RC—critical, ~RVB—very big, ~RB—big, ~RAV—average, ~RS—small,
~RVS—very small, and ~RD—disappearing.
Figure 6.
The aspiration levels distribution of the respondents for four flight separation minima of the cross-aircraft
aircraft L ¼ 10 km: Distances as at 2014. Red line—under IFR (instrument flight rules) procedure with
continuous radar monitoring in the approach area APP (local ATC) (TMA (terminal control area)) using
ATC automated system except approach segment; Blue line—at take-off phase (within control zone (CTR
(control zone) at altitudes 1700 m and below) when medium aircraft follows heavy; Green line—for lateral
separation for the IFR flights under continuous radar monitoring when crossing the level occupied by the same
direction traffic in ACC (general ATC) (CTA (control area)) and APP (TMA) at the moment of crossing on
conditions that no tracks converging; Purple line—under IFR procedure with continuous radar monitoring
when crossing the same direction level occupied by another aircraft in approach area APP (TMA) using ATC
automated system at the moment of crossing on conditions that no tracks converging.
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Using the proposed scale (Eq. (8)), air traffic control students as respondents
expressed their opinions about hazard severity for all distances between two aircraft
during flight separation minima violation [45, 52]. Their answers gave data for the
fuzzy variable membership function of “risk severity” [53, 54]. After the initial data
are collected, they are normalized using the “supportive matrix” method [55]. The
final values are used to plot the family of membership functions charts for all terms
of “risk severity” fuzzy variable (Figure 7).
Starting from the left side, each line represents a separate fuzzy variable term of
the membership function value (catastrophic, very big, big, average, small, very
small, and negligible) concerning every possible distance between two aircraft.
Every line in Figure 7 shows the integral opinion of cross-aircraft distance
categorized as one of the seven severity levels. For example, the distance of 6 km is
considered to have a “very big” severity level with the membership value of 1. At
the same time, the nature of fuzzy values also possesses the severity of “cata-
strophic,” “big,” and “average” levels with the correspondent membership values.
Such plot allows finding aggregated ATC students’ opinion about the distances
belonging to the particular severity levels.
Since one of the main requirements is to be as close as possible to the ICAO
terms, the number of given terms should be reduced. It is performed by the removal
of the modifier “very” [9, 51, 55]. After all, the seven use terms were reduced to five











~RC ~RB ~RAV ~RS ~RD
: (9)
7. Aggregation
Since three different parameters are used to define the opinions of ATC students
about risk, it would be convenient to combine them into one single indicator. Such
Figure 7.
The values of the membership function for “risk severity” fuzzy variable terms: Blue—“Critical,” red—“Very
big,” green—“Big,” purple—“Average,” light blue—“Small,” orange—“Very small,” and teal
—“Disappearing.”
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an indicator should include all three parameters with reasonable proportions. In









where р is conditional compromise coefficient which is used to define the
acceptable compensation rate of small values with big ones, k is number of risk
indicators (in current case k = 3), Ri is an indicator, determined by risk level, and α
is a weight coefficient. For main decision-making dominant, RD is used, RAL is used
for aspiration level, and RF for fuzzy estimates. Since there is no preliminary
information about their significance, they are considered to be equally important.






The multiplicative approach is clear, applied with ease, and has an extensive
application history among technical and humanistic systems research [51, 55–59].
However, since data should be normalized to the [0, 1] range, it should be changed
























Here, LD,LAL,LFð Þ are generalized and normalized distances found for main
decision-making dominant, aspiration level, and fuzzy estimates, correspondingly.
The Lnorm distance stands for the separation minimum distance taken for reference.
The last thing to do is to select the proper key points of all three methods. During
the detailed analysis, the following rules were reached:
• All 11 flight separation minima should be taken into account;
• Dominants should be used for all risk inclination categories;
• Lottery equivalent in use is 0.75 as it strongly correlates with the aspiration
level;
• The aspiration level itself is taken for all minima;
• A fuzzy estimate is considered as the severity level changing from minor to
major in the ICAO concept (from average to small in authors’ terms).
These rules allowed to receive separate formulas for each risk level indicator and
the general formula for integral calculations. The correspondent results of
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generalized and aggregated indicators overall calculations are presented in Table 3.
Given results show that air traffic controllers, in general, consider distances more
than 0.73 of flight separation minima as acceptable.
Table 3 shows the final point, which may be called severity separator. It can be
found in the right bottom cell. In the opinion of ATC students, all distances to the
left from this point are more likely to be risky, and vice versa, all distances to the
right from this point are more likely to be riskless. Such a result can be also
considered as an integral reserved value for flight separation minima.
8. Risk tolerability distribution solution
To resolve the ICAO risk tolerability distribution, the following approach was
applied. Since there are five levels of severity, four key points are required.
• Concerning main decision-making dominants, three lottery key points were
considered as an intermediary between the severity levels. The last fourth
point was taken as flight separation minimum distance.
• Concerning aspiration levels, three key utility points were used with the flight
separation minimum distance as well.
• Concerning fuzzy estimates, the reduced intersection points were used, as
shown in Eq. (9).
The final results with all three presented methods are presented in Table 4.
Here, RC—catastrophic risk level, RH—hazardous risk level, RMj—major risk level,
RMn—minor risk level, RN—negligible risk level, LC—distance equivalent to cata-
strophic risk level, LH—distance equivalent to hazardous risk level, LMj—distance
No Separation minimum Particular methods indicators Integral indicator R
RD RAL RF
1 L = 8 km 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.75
2 L = 10 km 0.78 0.75 0.66 0.73
3 0.78 0.72 0.66 0.72
4 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.75
5 0.80 0.77 0.69 0.75
Generalize within distance 0.79 0.75 0.68 0.74
6 L = 12 km 0.75 0.72 0.76 0.74
7 L = 20 km 0.70 0.68 0.60 0.66
8 0.65 0.75 0.73 0.71
9 0.72 0.73 0.62 0.69
10 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.70
Generalize within distance 0.69 0.71 0.66 0.69
11 L = 30 km 0.68 0.73 0.71 0.71
Final estimate 0.73 0.74 0.71 0.73
Table 3.
Aggregated indicators for risk level estimation (yellow cells designate final value for a single separation
minimum or generalized minima with the same distances).
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equivalent to major risk level, LMn—distance equivalent to minor risk level, LN—
distance equivalent to negligible risk level, L0:25—distance equivalent to 0.25 lottery
determinant, L0:5—distance equivalent to 0.5 lottery determinant, L0:75—distance
equivalent to 0.75 lottery determinant, L�, L0, and Lþ were explained earlier, ~LC—
distance where “critical” term ends, ~LB—distance where “big” term ends, ~LAV—
distance where “average” term ends, and ~LS—distance where “small” term ends.
Finally, the application of a multiplicative approach allows to resolve the ІСАО
risk tolerability distribution (Table 5) with integral estimates.
9. Conclusions
It is possible to make general conclusions based on the presented scientific
results. These conclusions concern the development of a new methodology. It is
dedicated to the qualimetry of human factor regularities expression during the
decision making in aeronautical systems. The ICAO recommendations were taken
into account during the correspondent indicators development. They were
implemented by the composition of fuzzy models applied to air traffic control
students’ attitude to flight separation minima violation in a horizontal plane. Other
components of such attitude include well-grounded key points of utility estimate
functions for the mentioned minima continuum plotted within formally closed and
open decision-making tasks. The first group of points is used to find respondents’
main decision-making dominants (inclination, indifference, and non-inclination to
Risk levels Models in use
Dominants Aspiration levels Fuzzy estimates










~LC <LH < ~LB⇔
⇔0:42<LH <0:56
RMj L0:5 <LMj <L0:75⇔
⇔0:53<LMj <0:73
L0 <LMj <L ∗⇔
⇔0:65<LMj <0:74
~LB <LMj < ~LAV⇔
⇔0:56<LMj <0:71
Acceptable RMn L0:75 ≤LMn <Lnorm⇔
⇔0:73<LMn <Lnorm
L ∗ <LMn <Lnorm⇔
⇔0:74<LMn <Lnorm
~LAV <LMn < ~LS⇔
⇔0:71<LMn <0:83
RN LN ≥Lnorm LN ≥Lnorm LN ≥0:83
Table 4.
Partial solutions of ІСАО risk tolerability distribution for flight separation minima.
Risk levels Integral estimates
Unacceptable Catastrophic LC <0:39
Hazardous 0:39≤LH <0:58
Major 0:58≤LMj <0:73
Acceptable Minor 0:73≤LMn <0:94
Negligible LN ≥0:94
Table 5.
The integral solution of ICAO risk tolerability distribution with risk estimates.
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risk). The second group of points is used to find aspiration levels that correctly
characterize respondents’ self-image.
Important scientific results include:
1.For the first time, the multiplicative approach is grounded and implemented to
determine the integral estimate of air traffic control students’ attitude both to
sole flight separation minimum and minima totality. The correspondent cent is
equal to 0.73 of flight separation minima.
2.The new method of main decision-making dominant determination is
proposed. It differs from the widely known one by more key points being used
and a novel algorithm submitted for their analysis.
3.The results of the main decision-making dominants analysis show that non-
inclination is a major attitude among air traffic control students. It allows
changing the professional education programs, taking into account the
received results.
4.Especially important feature of the received results is their proactivity. It will
enable preventing potentially harmful consequences of air traffic controllers’
work by implementing personalized training on various simulators.
All the results form strong premises for further researches, which should be
performed in the following areas:
a. The study of decision-making indicators, taking into account age, academic
performance, and other factors;
b. The analysis of the mentioned indicators dynamics during the whole
professional activity period of air traffic control personnel;
c. The complex research of the proposed indicators for three dimensions with
space utility functions plot and integral indicators estimation for such
conditions.
It should be mentioned that further research areas are not limited to the pro-
posed ones but merely demonstrate opinion on primaries.
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Abstract
System safety assessment (SSA) has become a standard practice in air traffic
management (ATM). System safety assessment aims, through a systematic and
formal process, to detect, quantify, and diminish the derived risks and to guarantee
that critical safety systems achieve the level of safety approved by the regulatory
authorities. Verification of compliance with the established safety levels becomes
the last but an essential part of the safety assurance process. This chapter provides a
Bayesian inference methodology to assess and evaluate the compliance with the
established safety levels under the presence of uncertainty in the assessment of
systems performances.
Keywords: risk assessment, Bayesian inference, uncertainty, safety compliance
1. Introduction
Safety in aviation, and particularly in air traffic management (ATM), has evolved
to the concepts of safety management and risk management. To achieve and guaran-
tee safety, operators and providers develop and implement safety management sys-
tem (SMS). SMS is a methodical and explicit approach for handling safety that
comprises the required organisational arrangements and accountabilities, as well as
the applicable safety policies and safety procedures. Hazard identification, risk
assessment and risk mitigation have become essential processes within the frame-
work of the SMS. Manufacturers, air navigation service providers (ANSPs) and
operators shall implement a formal risk management process within their SMS.
This process, known as safety assessment (SA), has become a standard practice
in the aviation industry. The global aim of SA is to ensure (by means of formal and
systematic identification, evaluation and management of risks connected with haz-
ards) that the design, production and operation of a system attain the safety levels
settled by the safety regulatory authorities. Safety assessment has become a stan-
dard practice in the aviation industry [1–8].
SA typically implies three major phases that advance alongside the whole
lifespan of the system [9, 10]:
• FHA—Functional hazard assessment
• PSSA—Preliminary system safety assessment
• SSA—System safety assessment
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Figure 1 illustrates the liaisons between these three phases and the system
life cycle.
System definition is the first stage of the system lifecycle. Its purposes are as
follows:
i. To establish initial objectives for the system operating within its pertinent
operational environment
ii. To define the functions to support these objectives
iii. To agree on high-level system requirements and interfaces
From the safety perspective, the first phase in the SA is referred to as functional
hazard assessment (FHA). FHA aims to specify the safety level to be attained by
the system in terms of safety objectives. A safety objective is a qualitative or
quantitative statement that outlines the maximum acceptable frequency or proba-
bility of occurrence for a specific hazard or failure condition. If the hazard is a
system failure, the safety objective will be the maximum allowed rate of failure.
FHA is executed at the start of system design and development before the functions
of the system have been deployed into procedures, equipment, or people
components.
To determined system safety objectives, each function and combination of
functions is assessed by safety analysts to:
Figure 1.
Safety assessment phases alongside and system life cycle.
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• Identify possible hazards and failures modes derived from the system
definition.
• Identify hazard consequences or effects on operations.
• Evaluate the severity of each hazard consequences.
• Determine safety objectives, i.e. the maximum acceptable frequency for each
hazard’s occurrence.
• Assess intended aggregated risk.
The main step in this phase is the identification and classification of failures by
their severity [11, 12] and the definition of safety objectives.
The following lifecycle stage is a system design. At this stage, the system opera-
tion and functions are defined in detail, describing the new system as an assortment
of subsystems or components. In parallel, the risk assessment process develops a
preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA). The objective of the PSSA is to prove
that the designed system architecture can soundly attain the safety objectives stated
during the FHA.
PSSA inspects the system architecture and concludes how failures could cause
the hazards acknowledged in the FHA, it identifies required mitigations to minimise
the risk or even eradicate them, and it specifies these measures in the form of safety
requirements. A safety requirement is a risk measure, which may cover several
different aspects such as operational, human, functional, organisational, procedural
and performance, among others. Therefore, the PSSA process apportions safety
objectives to the system elements and generates safety requirements, and then it
stipulates the level of risk of each system element. The system architecture will
meet the safety objectives established at the system level at the FHA, only if the
architecture components satisfy their safety requirements.
After design, the next steps in the system lifecycle are implementation and
integration. System implementation includes the production of the individual
components, and integration refers to their amalgamation into the system. The
next step, known as transfer into operations, refers to the system deployment, its
on-site installation, its integration as part of an operational environment and the
validation of its performances. During the system operation, maintenance actions,
preventive and corrective, are accomplished in order to preserve the required
safety and service level. Finally, once the system has reached the end of its
operational life, decommissioning stands for the system withdrawal from the
operation.
The last stage of the safety process, the system safety assessment (SSA), is
developed in parallel to system implementation to verify whether the system, as
implemented, achieve an acceptable risk. This means that the envisage mitigations
have been put in place; all safety goals, objectives and requirements have been
satisfied; and the expected level of safety has been successfully attained during the
system operation [13, 14].
SSA monitors the safety performances of the system through its lifetime. It
collects evidence and arguments to confirm that each implemented system compo-
nent satisfies its safety requirements and safety objectives. It is, in the end, a
continuous safety compliance assessment [15].
The SA process, although extended and widely accepted in aviation, is affected
by a series of limitations. The main limitation neither resides in the fact that the
process does not sufficiently considers nor widely capture the inherent uncertainty
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in every step of the safety assessment. The process has also shown limitations in
dealing with lacking data if when the system is brand new or when there is few
measurable information about its performance. These limitations severely affect the
effectiveness of the last step in the process, the system safety assessment. Addi-
tionally, many times, decision-makers cannot support their safety compliance deci-
sion on objective tools. As a consequence, the process has not enough objectivity or
transparency.
This chapter illustrates that a systematic approach for dealing with uncertainties
in safety compliance evaluation is possible through Bayesian reasoning. Bayesian
inference is a systematic method that helps decision-makers to select a suitable path
in relation to the acceptance of a system against its safety results. It is particularly
useful if under the presence of uncertainty about the actual failure rates of a system
and/or about the consequences of the decision-making process. It could also take
into consideration the predilections of the decision-makers, experts’ understanding
and the consequences of the decisions to be made.
2. System safety assessment limitations
Most safety assessment decisions are taken under the assumption that the mag-
nitudes of the variables and parameters describing the system performance are
equal to their estimates. But, this postulation is valid as long as there is enough data
or precise expertise for an accurate estimation of the system parameters [16]. This
does not happen in many situations, particularly for new systems where only tiny
information is accessible about its performance. Uncertainty also comes from par-
tial or imprecise models or deficient data gathering.
There are several approaches to the concept of uncertainty [17–19]. Uncertainty
is often understood as a “state of knowledge” [20]. Ayyub [21] describes it in terms
of knowledge imperfection due to intrinsic shortages of knowledge acquisition.
Walker [22] expresses uncertainty as “any departure from the unachievable ideal of
complete determinism”. Aven [23] defines it as “….lack of understanding about the
behaviour and outcomes of a system, and discernible magnitudes”.
Although there is a wide variety of definition for the concept of uncertainty, the
common element in all of them is the notion of deficient or partial knowledge of a
system and its performances because of shortages in apparent information and
noticeable data [24, 25].
Uncertainty denotes the nondeterministic conduct of a system and the ambigu-
ous magnitudes of the parameters that define how the systems behave or perform.
It might have an epistemic or aleatory nature. Aleatory uncertainty accounts for the
usual disparity of the physical phenomena. Epistemic uncertainty accounts for the
limited knowledge of the parameters used to describe and explain the system
[26, 27].
Both types of uncertainties are an essential component of any safety assessment.
Uncertainty is introduced through the SA process at several stages. During FHA
uncertainty is related to the modes of failure and the consequences of such failures.
There are also uncertainties related to the extent of the consequences and conse-
quently to the severity assigned of every failure condition. All these uncertainties
are also translated into the assignment of SO—safety objective (the lower frequency
of occurrence admissible for each failure circumstance), and into the derivation of
safety requirements during the PSSA. During the SSA, uncertainties will come from
inaccurate or incomplete medialization or data gathering.
The current safety compliance process acknowledges that multiple potential
failure situations are possible, i.e. a single failure condition or hazard might lead to
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several failure modes and, accordingly, to diverse effects and consequences. This
uncertainty has been traditionally mitigated with the definition of the worst-case
scenario. This way to proceed appears to be too biased and over-conservative,
which lead to excessively conservative safety requirements. The consideration of
worst-case scenario incorporates a sort of guard band to reduce the chance of
accepting a system that does not perform safely enough. This guard band implies a
cost to the system. This could only be evaded if the decision-maker has truthful (i.e.
not conservative neither optimistic) guesses of the uncertainties in the magnitudes
backing up the decisions.
As can be seen, most decision-making processes in safety compliance assessment
during SSA imply judgement of safety performance in a context with uncertainty
[28, 29]. However, the existing SSA process does not comprise a methodical process
to cope with all those uncertainties. Today, SSA is reduced to gathering evidence
and a simple binary comparison of those evidence towards safety goals and
requirements.
3. System acceptance decision under uncertainty
Let us consider that the outcome of the SSA process is a dual pronouncement by
the safety regulator to authorise, or not, the operation of a system. To help decision-
makers in such a judgement, six uncertainties should be computed: two related to
the acceptance of the system, two linked with the nonacceptance of the system and
two linked with the consideration of insufficient information.
An essential step is also to evaluate the decision-maker’s utilities. Decision-
maker’s utilities reflect the consequences, expressed typically as costs, connected to
each of the former listed uncertainties. Determining an individual’s utilities typi-
cally comprises expressing preferences among different options [30–33].
Figure 2 shows a decision diagram for safety assessment. Rectangles stand for
decision node. The decision-maker choices ai are as follows:
a1—Judge the system compliant.
a2—Judge the system as noncompliant.
a3—Judge the information insufficient.
Circles are random nodes representing the “states of nature”, where:
S1 represents that the system is actually compliant.
Figure 2.
Safety assessment decision tree.
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S2 represents a NOT compliant system.
The uncertainties about the system states P j are dependent on the data “Data”
and information “Inf”available and will be calculated in subsequent sections of the
chapter.
P1 ¼ P S1ð Þ ¼ P S1jData, Infð Þ;
P2 ¼ P S2ð Þ ¼ P S2jData, Infð Þ ¼ 1� P1 (1)
The paths in the tree correspond to the likely outcomes Oij following the actions
by the decision-maker. Six outcomes are considered:
O11: The system is affirmed compliant and it is so.
O12: The system is affirmed compliant though it is not.
O21: The system is affirmed NO compliant while it is truly trustable.
O22: The system is affirmed NO compliant and it actually is so.
O31: Although the system is truly compliant, it is not enough to make a decision.
O32: It is not enough to make a decision.
The rightmost end of the tree indicates the decision-maker’s utilities uij for each
of the six branches. Each pair ai, Sið Þ∈C ¼ AxN determines a consequence of
decision-making. The utility uij cð Þwhich is defined on C ¼ AxN can be expressed as
uij cð Þ ¼ u ai, S j
 
and defines the preferences of the decision-maker.
If action a1 is taken, larger compliance is preferred over a smaller one:
uða1, S1 a1, S2ð Þ if and only if  S1 ≥ S2 (2)
If action a2 is taken, diverse preferences can be outlined.
a. After a nonacceptance decision, the actual state of the system becomes irrele-
vant. This situation is equivalent to a constant utility for each value of S j, i.e.
u a2, S j
  ¼ cte ∀ S j ∈N:
b. The combination of a nonacceptance decision and low system compliance is
perceived as an opportunity loss. With a2 decision-maker loses the occasion to
admit a trustworthy system. The utility function u a2, S j
 
would not be con-
stant any more, and smaller values of the actual system compliance would be
preferred over larger opportunity loss). u a1, S1ð Þ≥ u a1, S2ð Þ if and only of
S1 ≤ S2.
Despite the precise forms of u a1, S1ð Þ and u a1, S2ð Þ, there is an “equilibrium”
value S0 such as
u a1, S0ð Þ ¼ u a2, S0ð Þ ∀Ns j ∈ 0, 1½ � (3)
Therefore, the utility functions must follow the following relations:
u a1, S j
 
. u a2, S j
 
 if  S j . S j0
u a1, S j
 
, u a2, S j
 
 if  S j , S j0
(4)
A decision-maker should choose the action that maximises the predictable utility
P S j
  ¼ P S jjData, Inf
 
. He should choose the action a ∗ such that satisfy the fol-
lowing expression:
EN u a ∗ , Sð Þ½ � ¼ max
ai ∈A,
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4. Quantification of the uncertainties
Safety compliance has been allocated a probability of truth or falsity. This prob-
ability corresponds to the decision-maker uncertainty (or state of knowledge),
about safety compliance being true.
This probability is, namely, the uncertainty on the state of nature of the system
compliance considering previous knowledge and information which is expressed as
P S j
� � ¼ P S jjData, Inf
� �
, where a proposition “Data” stands for data, while “Inf”
stands for background information. This section details how P S j
� � ¼ P SsjData, Infð Þ
are calculated.
The proposed structure subscribes the concept that probability is not a fre-
quency, rather a measure of uncertainty, belief or a state of knowledge. That is,
probability allows doing credible thinking in situations where reasoning with
certainty is not possible.
The result is the predictive probability that the system meets the safety objec-
tives for what it has been designed, considering the envelope of data, knowledge
and information gathered about the system during its design, production
and operation.
To that aim, compliance assessment is redefined as the calculation of the degree
of belief in the fulfilment of the applicable SO by the candidate system. The system
is considered compliance if all the rate of failures λn satisfy their pertinent safety
objective On:
Here the basis of Bayesian theory is applied to obtain an improved estimation of
the system’s components rate of failure λn.
Let us define a set of propositions, each one with a probability stating the grade
of confidence in its states, being these states either TRUE if λn is lower than its
safety objective, On, or FALSE otherwise.
S ¼ Sn : n∈Qf g where Sn ¼




This grade of confidence P SnjData, Infð Þ is denoted as a conditional probability.
Each conditional probability P SnjData, Infð Þ mirrors our grade of assurance in λn
satisfying its mandatory safety objective, On.
The grade of assurance in the system compliance P CsjData, Infð Þ will be
evaluated as the intersection of the belief of compliance of all particular failure
conditions:
P S jjData, Inf
� � ¼ ⋂Nn¼1P S jjData, Inf
� �
¼ P S1jData, Infð Þ⋂P S2jData, Infð Þ⋂…⋂P SnjData, Infð Þ
(7)
Uncertainties about the magnitude of the variables that govern the stochastic
performance of the system are random variables which follow particular probability
functions (pdfs). Consequently, rates of failure λn become, therefore, also random
variables. Therefore, safety assessments are reduced to the determination of the
failure rate pdfs.
For straightforwardness, we adopt probability function for the failure rate of
a component, λn, conditional upon one or more unknown parameters θ. Other
indicators could be selected instead, for example, the delay time between defect
and failure or the number of failures in a period of time, but the theory hereafter
applies equally.
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The corresponding probability function is indicated as λnjθð Þ. To some extent
previous knowledge about the expected values of λn should impact decisions about
the system acceptability. However, θ is commonly unknown, and f λnjθð Þ is not
known unambiguously, so it cannot be used directly in making such decisions about
system acceptance. f λnjθð Þ is usually approximated by estimating θ over data and
supposing the parameters are equal to estimates.
Maximum likelihood method is applied [34, 35]. Eq. (24) expresses the likeli-
hood function:






f λijθð Þ (8)
The Maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) is
L θ̂; Data
� �
≥L θ; Datað Þ ∀ θ 6¼ θ (9)
In practical applications, previous inequality is usually strict, and a single
maximum exists. The classical approach to inference now substitutes θ by the
first-order approach. In this case, as few data are available; this approximation
would be very poor:
f λnjθð Þ≈ f λnjθ̂
� �
(10)
Decisions concerning compliance assessment, which seek for unknown values of
λn, might alternatively be resolved conditional upon the observation, information,
data or available knowledge, rather than on the unknown parameters. This allows to
base decisions upon f λnjData, Infð Þ instead on f λnjθð Þ, provided that Data and Inf
are known.
The conditional probability distribution P λnjData, Infð Þ describes then the
uncertainty in the parameter under study (λn) considering observed data “Data”
and the prior understanding of the system Inf. It denotes the sample of the rate of
failure distribution, conditional upon the observed data, and it is exactly the mag-
nitude required for the decision-making process, with no approximation.
P λnjData, Infð Þ is calculated using the Bayes’ theorem:
P λnjata, Infð Þ ¼ P Datajλn, Infð Þ � P λnjInfð ÞP DatajInfð Þ (11)
where:
P λnjData, Infð Þ is referred to the posterior distribution. All inference regarding
λn will be derived from the posterior distribution.
P Datajλn, Infð Þ corresponds to the likelihood distribution, at times mentioned as
sampling.
P λnjInfð Þis the prior distribution.
P DatajInfð Þ is the marginal probability.
Epistemic uncertainty is incorporated through the prior distribution P λnjInfð Þ. It
synthesises the level of confidence in our model parameters λn, and it expresses
experts’ preliminary state of information or knowledge. The prior distribution
might be informative or non-informative.
The first ones deliver important information about the unquantified parameters.
They are the way to capture past data and expert knowledge into a probability
distribution and incorporate them into the model. Conjugate priors streamline the
assessment of the preceding equation and permit analytical resolutions. However,
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prior can follow any distribution, and the preceding equation can be solved using
numerical integration.
Non-informative priors are sometimes named as flat priors, vague priors, diffuse
priors or reference priors. They are used when there is just very little background
information about the parameters.
Most of the times, the Bayesian method requires numerical simulation because
of the complexity of the distributions involved. That implies that the solution of
Eq. (27) has to be obtained by numerically Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
simulation [36, 37].
The resulting posterior distribution, P λnjData, Infð Þ, stands for updated knowl-
edge about λn and, as stated before, will be the foundation for all inferential con-
clusions regarding λn:
The distribution P Datajλn, Infð Þ signifies the aleatory uncertainties or change
naturally included in data and models. It also accounts for inefficiencies in the data
assembly as well as inadequacies in the models. Likelihood function most commonly
employed in system safety assessment are binomial, Poisson or exponential ones
[38–40].
And finally P DatajInfð Þ is just a normalisation factor.
P SnjData, Infð Þ can be obtained from the posterior distributions P λnjData, Infð Þ
through the marginalisation of the parameter λn, as shown in the next equation:
P CsnjData, Infð Þ ¼
ð
Ʌ
P On, λnjData, Infð Þ:dλ ¼
ðOn
O




P Onjλnð ÞP Datajλn, Infð Þ � P λnjInfð ÞP DatajInfð Þ : dλ
(12)
Eq. (12) calculates an average of the model uncertainty through the integration
of the sampling P Onjλnð Þ through the posterior distribution P λnjInfð Þ [36]. The
outcome is a predictive probability of a failure rate λn meeting its safety objective.
5. Conclusions
The safety assessment is a methodical and prescribed procedure applied by
ANSP to find, quantify and diminish risks in ATM systems and ensure that new
services or systems reach assurance levels required by the aviation authorities. The
assessment of safety compliance against approved safety levels becomes the last but
essential part of the safety assurance process.
Nevertheless, this method is still exhibiting a series of limitations, the most
important being its failure to cope with the uncertainty intrinsic in each step of the
assessment and its lack of ability to deal with the lack of data in early stages of
operation, and only small measurable information about its performance can be
accessed. While most choices in the safety assessment involve a trial under uncer-
tainty, the present system safety assessment process does not embrace any
organised process or help to address all these uncertainties. So, the process misses
the simplicity and impartiality essential for regulatory decision-making.
This chapter discussed the mathematical grounds for a cohesive Bayesian infer-
ence methodology, to assess and evaluate compliance with system safety goals and
requirements, taking into account the uncertainty in performances. This work pro-
poses a Bayesian structure that assesses safety compliance as a decision-making
issue taken place under the presence of uncertainty.
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Bayesian approach enables more comprehensive management of the uncer-
tainties inherent to all system safety assessments and improves impartiality and
accepting of compliance decisions and judgements, particularly in the cases where
uncertainty is a limitation. This method might be applied to any safety or regulatory
compliance process. It might be directly implemented by either operator or manu-
facturers, as well as by safety oversight authorities.
This work aims to increase the use of statistical Bayesian methods in the ground
of aviation safety compliance assessment, up to a level equivalent to the one
achieved so far in other critical industries, such space or nuclear power industries.
The method offers a significant improvement to how ANSP presently take on
regulatory safety compliance. Whereas the theoretical grounds are not new, their
application to aviation signifies a noteworthy progression over current practices.
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Risk Model for UAS Operations
Hector Usach, Juan A. Vila and Áurea Gallego
Abstract
To enable the safe integration of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) into the
civil airspace, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has elaborated a new
regulatory framework that is operation-centric and risk-based. Based on this prin-
ciple, gaining authorization to conduct certain types of operations depends on a
safety risk assessment. To harmonize this process, the Joint Authorities for
Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS) released a qualitative methodology
called Specific Operation Risk Assessment (SORA). However, SORA is not a com-
plete safety assessment tool since, in some cases, a quantitative risk analysis is still
required. This work develops a probabilistic risk model that extends SORA to
evaluate the ground risk and the air risk components along a specified UAS trajec-
tory quantitatively. The proposed model is supplied with illustrative data and is
validated in a representative UAS mission. In the future, the risk model will be
exploited to develop a decision tool for determining the minimum-risk trajectory
when multiple, alternative routes are available.
Keywords: risk assessment, UAS, SORA, Bayesian networks,
contingency management
1. Introduction
In order to harmonize the regulation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
across the European Union and to foster the development of the UAS market, the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is elaborating a new regulatory frame-
work that relies on the Concept of Operation (ConOps) for drones [1]. According to
this concept, UAS operations can be classified into three categories, named “open,”
“specific,” and “certified,” as summarized in Table 1. Each of these categories has
an associated regulatory regime that is proportionate to the risk of the operation.
Operations within the open category do not require prior authorization by the
competent authority. Operations within the specific category require authorization
by the competent authority based on an operational risk assessment performed by
the operator. Finally, operations within the certified category are subject to a full
certification process based on the safety objectives in [2].
The task of performing an operational risk assessment to obtain authorization
for operating a UAS is sensitive and complex. To facilitate and harmonize this
process, the Working Group 6 of the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on
Unmanned Systems (JARUS) initiative developed the Specific Operation Risk
Assessment (SORA) methodology [3]. The SORA is a qualitative process that basi-
cally particularizes the risk assessment steps in [4] to evaluate the risks involved
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with the operation of UASs of any class and size and for any type of operation; and
ultimately to determine the corresponding mitigation measures. Although it is
specially intended for UASs operating within the specific category, it may be used as
an acceptable means of compliance with safety objectives for the certified category
as well [3].
It is to be noted, however, that although the SORA analysis is qualitative in
nature, a quantitative risk analysis is still required in some circumstances. For
instance, Annex C to the SORA document encourages the use of quantitative data to
support the qualitative assumptions and decisions regarding the strategic mitiga-
tions for the air risk. Even so, SORA does not prescribe any quantitative model from
which these data should be obtained. There exist other shortcomings regarding the
qualitative approach of the SORA process. As an example, the work in [5] identifies
a number of inconsistencies that ought to be resolved.
Given all the above, this work proposes to complement the SORA process with a
probabilistic risk model that evaluates the ground risk and the air risk components
along a specified UAS trajectory quantitatively. The quantitative data provided by
the model can be used to validate whether a particular operation (either specific or
certified) reaches the Target Level of Safety (TLS) required by regulation. More-
over, the quantitative model can be exploited not only for risk assessment purposes,
but also as a decision tool for determining the optimal trajectory in case of mission
replanning.
Several works have already proposed quantitative models to assess the risk of
UAS operations. A review of some of these models can be found in [6]. Other
examples include the work in [7]. It provides both a qualitative and a quantitative
risk analysis of UAS operations in integrated airspace: the qualitative analysis is
actually a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), while the quantitative analysis
is based on a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). However, none of the previous approaches
is consistent with the SORA framework. Conversely, the aforementioned work in
[5] follows a similar approach than the one in this work: it identifies the inconsis-
tencies of SORA and proposes to close these gaps through a complementary, math-
ematically based approach to risk assessment. In particular, it provides a simple,
probabilistic formulation of a barrier-based safety model. The difference between
[5] and the work in this chapter is that we exploit the Bayesian formulation to
model how a threat can develop into a hazard (rather than a bow-tie representa-
tion); and, especially, that we are focused on estimating the risk along a specified
flight trajectory (rather than on evaluating the effectiveness of the safety
barriers). Other risk models in the literature will also be referenced along this
work conveniently.
An important consideration is that risk models for UASs are in general highly
dependent on the ConOps under consideration, and especially on the type of air-
space where the operation takes places (e.g., airspace type and class, operating
Open category Specific category Certified category
MTOWa < 25 kg; and height< 120 m; and
in VLOSb; and Outside reserved areas
MTOW a < 25; or
height≥ 120 m; or
BVLOSc
Risks like manned aviation
(size, complexity, kinetic
energy)
No certification SORA Full certification
aMaximum take-off weight.
bVisual line of sight.
cBeyond visual line of sight.
Table 1.
EASA’s concept of operation for drones.
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altitude, encounter rate, conflict management layers available, etc.). Due to the
wide variety of ConOps that can be envisaged, it is difficult develop a model that
captures the characteristics of all the possible operating environments. So consider-
ing the research interests of the authors, this work is focused on UASs operating in
the Air Traffic Management (ATM) environment. This implies that the UAS must
comply with existing rules and procedures for manned aviation (e.g., rules of the air
or airspace structure). UASs operating in the UAS Traffic Management (UTM)
environment (e.g., ConOps proposed by the CORUS project [8]) are therefore out
of the scope of this work.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 details the ConOps
considered in this work, as well as the demonstration mission that will be used to
validate the proposed risk model. Section 3 develops the probabilistic risk model for
the proposed ConOps. Section 4 provides the validation results. Finally, Section 5
concludes the chapter and outlines future lines of research.
2. Proposed concept of operation
In order to provide a broad vision of the problem under study, this work is not
focused on a particular type of operation. Rather, the proposed ConOps describes a
wide range of flight profiles with the following general common features:
• The UAS operation is to be performed Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) of
the operator.
• The UAS operation is to be performed under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR).
When airspace requirements impose compliance with Visual Flight Rules
(VFR), airspace segregation will be necessary.
• The UAS operation may enter in controlled airspace. The operation may also
take-off or land at a controlled airport. Therefore, coordination with the
corresponding Air Traffic Control (ATC) authority is compulsory.
Additionally, the UAS can fly under non-conventional ATC services not
included in controlled areas; for example, an ATC unit that acts specifically at
the operations area, similar to the one used to coordinate the operations in a
firefighting.
• The UAS operation is to take place out of urban areas.
Due to the inherent complexity of the proposed ConOps, it is assumed that
Unmanned Aircraft (UA) models capable of flying these missions will be compara-
ble to manned aircraft in terms of size and complexity. A representative UA that
will be used for demonstration purposes is the IAI Super Heron model. Further-
more, the UAS will be remotely piloted by an operator (called remote pilot); and the
communication between the remote pilot and the UA will be conducted using a
Command and Control (C2) data link. So, the UAS will actually be a Remotely
Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), which includes the Remotely Piloted Aircraft
(RPA), the remote pilot station(s), and the C2 link.
2.1 Demonstration mission description
One among all the possible missions described by this, ConOps will be used to
validate the probabilistic risk model discussed below. The proposed mission consists
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of a route from a departure airport to an operations area; a series of maneuvers
within this area; and finally a route toward the destination airport. In particular, in
the proposed demonstration mission, represented in Figure 1, the UAS must depart






1 Departure LETL ! VWP1 ! MANDY Uncontrolled airspace
2 En-route MANDY ! CLS ! RETBA !MOPIR
! LASPO
Controlled airways R29 and M871
3 Ingress LASPO ! F15B2 Uncontrolled airspace
4 Operations F15B2 ! VWP2 ! F15B2 Uncontrolled airspace
5 Egress F15B2 ! VLC VFR corridor
6 En-route VLC ! SOPET Controlled airway B26
7 Arrival SOPET! TATOS !NIBEN! LECH Standard arrival SOPET1S
Table 2.
Route specification for the demonstration mission.
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(ICAO) code LETL) to perform some direct observations over the Albufera’s natu-
ral park in Spain; and then land at the controlled airport of Castellón (LECH). The
operations area has well-specified limits (defined by perimeter F15B in Figure 1)
which must be enforced using a geo-awareness system. In addition, given that this
area is located within the Controlled Traffic Region (CTR) of the València Airport
(ICAO code LEVC), the mission will require special permission from Air Traffic
Service (ATS) authorities. To perform this mission, a route connecting the depar-
ture site, the operations area, and the arrival site must be specified. The proposed
route is composed of 14 flight legs, which are structured into seven flight segments
(described in Table 2), and which have been constructed in compliance with the
Spanish Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) [9]. The risk assessment results of
this mission will be presented in Section 4.
3. Probabilistic risk model compliant with the SORA framework
In order to develop a probabilistic risk model that is consistent with the SORA
framework, it is necessary to account with the Holistic Risk Model (HRM) behind
the SORA methodology. In short, the HRM is focused on the occurrence of a single,
generic hazard, named “UAS operation out of control,”1 an emergency condition
with the potential to provoke three possible harms: fatal injuries to third parties on
the ground, fatal injuries to third parties in the air or damage to critical infrastruc-
tures. At the same time, the out of control condition can originate from different
threats, like a technical error, a human error, etc. Further details can be found on
Version 1 of the SORA document [3].
To estimate the likelihood of occurrence of each of the previous harm categories
(here expressed as Pharm), the Version 1 of the SORA document mentions a mathe-
matical model that depends on three factors: the probability of being out of control
(Pooc), the conditional probability of striking the entity of value (i.e., third parties
on the ground or in the air, or critical infrastructures) once the operation is out of
control (Pstrike=ooc), and the conditional probability of causing the given harm if the
strike has actually occurred (Pharm=strike):
Pharm ¼ Pooc Pstrike=ooc Pharm=strike (1)
However, SORA does not further detail this model since SORA is a risk assess-
ment methodology of a qualitative nature. This work will use Eq. (1) as the basis to
develop a quantitative, probabilistic risk model for UAS operations. To do so,
Eq. (1) will first be rearranged for convenience so that it is expressed as a function
of the probability of impact (Pimpact) rather than the probability of being out of
control. In the sequence of events of a UAS mishap, the “impact” event is an
intermediate condition between the out of control event and the event of striking a
third party, see Figure 2. Having this in mind, Pimpact can be expressed as:
Pimpact ¼ Pooc Pimpact=ooc (2)
where Pimpact=ooc is the conditional probability of having an impact given the out
of control condition. Eq. (1) can thus be rewritten as follows with minor effort:
1
In Version 2 of the SORA document, the SORA hazard was renamed as “loss of control.” However, this
work retains the original name of the hazard to better differentiate it from the “loss of control in-flight”
condition, which refers to the aircraft stall.
129
Trajectory-Based, Probabilistic Risk Model for UAS Operations
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90688
Pharm ¼ Pimpact Pstrike=impact Pharm=strike (3)
Note, however, that the likelihood of occurrence of an aircraft accident is usually
expressed as the number of occurrences per flight hour, not as a probability.
Therefore, Eq. (3) can be rewritten in terms of rate of occurrence as follows:
λharm ¼ λimpact Pstrike=impact Pharm=strike (4)
where λharm is the rate at which the harm under analysis occurs (per flight hour),
and λimpact is the rate at which the impact event is expected to occur (also per flight
hour). In general, Eq. (4) expresses an instant risk as the different terms involved
in this equation can vary along space and time. For example, the probability of
striking a third party on the ground depends on the population density in the
vicinity of the impact area. The aim of this work is to assess the risk posed by a UAS
flying a given trajectory r ¼ r tð Þ, t∈ a, b½ �, a< b, where r tð Þ is a curve C between
two points r að Þ and r bð Þ. Therefore, in order to compute the overall risk along a
defined flight path, it is necessary to perform the line integral of Eq. (4) along the
curve C between r að Þ and r bð Þ:
Λharm ¼ ∮ Cλharm rð Þ ds ¼
ðb
a
λharm r tð Þð Þ ∥r0 tð Þ∥ dt (5)
where ds is an elementary arc length. Note that Eq. (5) is expressed in terms of
occurrences per hour of operation along a specified distance ( s�1 �m½ � using the
International System of Units). Then, the average risk along this trajectory in terms
of occurrences per flight hour is given by:
λharm ¼ ΛharmL Cð Þ (6)
where L Cð Þ ¼ ∮ Cds is the length of the curve C between r að Þ and r bð Þ (i.e., the
length of the planned trajectory). Next, Eq. (5) will be particularized to assess the
risk of causing fatal injuries to third parties on the ground (hereinafter ground risk),
and to third parties in the air (hereinafter air risk). Due to lack of data and time
constraints, the risk of causing damage to critical infrastructures will not be assessed
in this work.
3.1 Ground risk model
In order to derive the ground risk component (denoted as ΛG) from Eq. (5), it is
necessary to develop an impact model (term λimpact in Eq. (4)), a strike model (term
Figure 2.
Sequence of events of a UAS mishap.
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Pstrike=impact), and a harm model (Pharm=strike). The proposed models for these terms
are discussed next.
3.1.1 Impact model
The ground impact model provides the rate at which a ground impact occurs
(λimpact). In the literature, this term is often assumed to be constant and is either
estimated based on historical accident data, component failure data, and expert
judgment [10, 11], or deduced from the TLS required by regulation [12–14]. By
contrast, this work suggests modeling λimpact using Bayesian Belief Networks
(BBNs), which provides two major advantages:
1.The model can be supplied with both qualitative and quantitative data
simultaneously [15]. This is specially useful in models with high degree of
uncertainty, like in the problem under study.
2.Probabilistic inference can be used to replace an initial assumption regarding
one model variable by a perceived evidence regarding this variable and then,
the model automatically updates the remaining probabilities based on the
presence of such evidence [16]. In practice, this capability can be used to
update the probability of a ground impact given the real-time state of the
system (for instance, depending on whether the C2 link is loss or alive).
The proposed BBN describing the ground impact model is represented in
Figure 3. As it can be observed, the model is described by a directed, acyclic graph
where nodes represent variables and edges represent the conditional dependencies
between these variables. Each node variable is associated with a Bayesian probabil-
ity that is expressed with a Conditional Probability Table (CPT). In this case, the
sink node represents the probability of a ground impact (Pimpact), and the remaining
nodes describe the sequence of events between the initiating factors and the
expected outcome. Therefore, the probability of a “ground impact” depends on the
combined likelihood of experiencing a “loss of control in-flight” and a “boundary
violation” condition (i.e., exceeding the operational limits approved for the opera-
tion), see Figure 3. At the same time, these abnormal flight conditions can be
caused by an “inappropriate guidance,” i.e., a guidance command that is not suit-
able for the current state of the aircraft (because it exceeds the flight envelope
limits, because it is not consistent with the approved Mission Plan, etc.). In addi-
tion, the “boundary violation” can also result from a “navigation error” like the loss
of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signal. The “inappropriate guid-
ance” is based on the combined effect of an “autopilot malfunction” (including loss
of function and malfunction) and “pilot ineffectiveness.” The human pilot is con-
sidered to be “ineffective”when she or he takes a wrong guidance decision, or when
a correct decision is badly executed (e.g., selection of an inappropriate control
mode, poor piloting skills, etc.). The source of an “autopilot malfunction” or a “pilot
ineffectiveness” condition may be the use of incorrect navigation information
caused by a “navigation error.” Finally, the pilot may also be “ineffective” when she
or he is not in the control loop due to the “C2 link loss.”
In order to obtain the output probability Pimpact, it is necessary to define the
CPTs of each of the events of the previous BBN. As it can be observed, these events
basically include technical errors (e.g., “navigation error,” “autopilot malfunction,”
etc.) and human errors (e.g., “pilot ineffective”). The CPT of an event cataloged as
a technical error can be obtained from the technical specifications or can be
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deduced from system tests. By contrast, the CPT of an event cataloged as a human
error depends on human factors like type of activity being carried out, workload,
etc. Some authors have already attempted to develop human performance models
for specific activities (e.g., ATC controllers [17] or pilots of manned aircraft [18]).
However, the development of a detailed human performance model is a vast task
that exceeds the scope of this work. For this reason, we will calibrate the proposed
model using technical data when possible, and illustrative data from experts’ judg-
ment otherwise, see the Appendix. The output data will be assumed to be repre-
sentative of the case study, although it should be validated in a future stage using
some of the approaches proposed in the literature (e.g., see [19, 20]).
Another important remark regarding the previous model is that it provides the
probability of the occurrence of the ground impact event (Pimpact), not the failure
rate (λimpact). In order to derive λimpact from Pimpact, it is necessary to assume a given
probability distribution function. As in similar approaches in the literature (e.g., see
[15, 21]), this work assumes that Pimpact follows a Poisson distribution, so λimpact is
given by:




The strike model represents the conditional probability that an impact at a
specific location strikes a person. To model this term, this work will use a widely
accepted model in the literature [10–13, 16, 22]:
Figure 3.
Ground impact BBN model.
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Pstrike=impact rð Þ ¼ ρG rð Þ LA (8)
where ρG rð Þ is the population density at the impact point, and LA is the lethal
area of the airborne platform. Census data are often used to estimate ρG rð Þ [10, 14,
16, 23]. With respect to the lethal area, two crash modes are often considered in the
literature: vertical free fall [10, 22, 23] and unpremeditated, gliding descent [10, 11,
13, 16]. For simplicity, this work assumes that the ground impact occurs following
a vertical free fall so that the impact location is close to the point where the
initiating failure has occurred. Therefore:





where wua is the UA wingspan, Lua is the UA length, and Rp is the radius of an
average person. Note that LA is thus a constant parameter because none of these
terms vary with the aircraft trajectory.
3.1.3 Harm model
The harm caused to a person after a strike depends on multiple factors, including
type of UA (e.g., size, fragility, etc.), conditions at the point of impact (e.g., speed,
position), or secondary effects like explosions, etc. [24]. However, in compliance
with the SORA approach, this work assumes the worst-case condition where: (1)
there are no sheltering structures that mitigate the effect of a ground impact, and
(2) any direct impact of a UA causes the instant death of the people involved in
the accident. Therefore:
Pcasualty=strike rð Þ ¼ 1 (10)




λimpact r tð Þð Þ ρG r tð Þð Þ ∥r0 tð Þ∥ dt (11)
3.2 Air risk model
As in the case of the ground risk, deriving the air risk component (denoted
as ΛA) from Eq. (5) requires to develop an impact model (term λimpact in Eq. (4)),
a strike model (term Pstrike=impact), and a harm model (Pharm=strike). The proposed
approach to develop these terms is discussed next.
3.2.1 Impact model
The air impact model provides the rate at which a Mid-Air Collision (MAC)
between two aircraft occurs (λimpact). In the literature, this term is often modeled
using the Maxwell molecule formulation [21, 23, 25], which assumes that the air
traffic behaves randomly in airspace, and thus that the rate at which a MAC occurs
is proportional to the traffic density in the operational volume. However, this
theory does not contemplate the conflict management layers available in the air-
space [26], schematized in Figure 4; and, for this reason, it does not adequately
represent traffics operating in the ATM framework. To overcome this, this work
proposes to develop the air impact model following the same approach than in the
133
Trajectory-Based, Probabilistic Risk Model for UAS Operations
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90688
ground impact: using BBNs. In particular, two BBNs will be developed: one for
segments performed in controlled airspace and other for uncontrolled airspace.
3.2.1.1 Mid-air collision model for segments performed in controlled airspace
The proposed mid-air collision BBN model for flight segments performed in
controlled airspace is represented in Figure 5. The output node of this model is the
“MAC” node which has an associated probability Pimpact. The sequence of events
leading to this flight condition depends on two major events: the “separation error”
and the “collision avoidance error.” As it is shown in Figure 4, the “separation
error” occurs when both “strategic separation” and “tactical separation” fail. “Stra-
tegic separation error” basically refers to the failure of the procedural separation
mechanism, while “tactical separation error” involves the ATC surveillance capa-
bility. The “tactical separation error” node probability depends on the combined
likelihood of the corresponding ATC unit being “ineffective” and the remote pilot
performing an “inappropriate guidance.” ATC is ineffective when a possible con-
flict is not detected, or when ATC provides an incorrect clearance. This node
probability certainly depends on the “traffic density”2 in the area. “Inappropriate
guidance” refers to conditions where the ATC clearance is not correctly executed by
the remote pilot. Note that the probability of experiencing an “inappropriate guid-
ance” depends on the same sequence of events than in the ground impact BBN
model described in Section 3.1.1.
Once the “separation error” occurs, collision avoidance layers can still prevent
the MAC from occurring. In controlled airspace, it is assumed that aircraft will be
equipped with a transponder. Therefore, collision avoidance can be performed at
two levels with a different time horizon. At a first level, Traffic alert and Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS) can trigger a traffic alert/resolution advisory. The effec-
tiveness of this layer depends on the remote pilot because it is assumed that she or
he must still approve or reject the resolution advisory. If the TCAS alert results
“ineffective,” then the Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) condition will occur. After
this happens, a second collision avoidance mechanism can still reduce the probabil-
ity of a MAC impact by performing an evasion maneuver seconds after the point of
closest approach. This maneuver may be either a See and Avoid (SAA)-based
maneuver performed by the remote pilot, or a Detect and Avoid (DAA)-based
Figure 4.
Conflict management layers in UAS. Credit: Drone icon by Anthony Lui from the Noun Project.
2
Note that, in Figure 5, the “traffic density” node has a rectangular shape instead of an ellipse. This
notation emphasizes that this node is not a probabilistic node, but a decision node, i.e., a node
representing an input variable of the model. In other words, the traffic density is considered to be known
at a given airspace volume.
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maneuver performed by the automatic system (if a DAA system is equipped
onboard the UAS). A “DAA error” may occur if the onboard sensors are unable to
detect the conflicting traffic. SAA may be “ineffective” when the remote pilot has a
reduced situational awareness, or when the pilot is not in the control loop due to the
“C2 link loss.” Finally, as in the ground impact model, this work assumes that the
MAC event follows a Poisson distribution so λimpact can be deduced from Pimpact
using Eq. (7).
3.2.1.2 Mid-air collision model for segments performed in uncontrolled airspace
The proposed mid-air collision BBN model for flight segments performed in
uncontrolled airspace is represented in Figure 6. As in the BBNmodel for controlled
airspace, the output node is the “MAC” node which has an associated probability
Pimpact. However, as it can be observed in the figure, the sequence of events leading
to this flight condition differs when flying in uncontrolled airspace. To start with,
separation provision is independent of the ATC service. In this case, the main
separation mechanism is the definition of the mission boundaries and the use of
Figure 5.
Mid-air collision BBN model in controlled airspace.
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geofencing to enforce these boundaries. However, a “boundary violation” may
occur due to “inappropriate guidance” or because of a “navigation error.” Once the
“boundary violation” occurs, the likelihood of experiencing a “separation error”
increases with the “traffic density” in the area.
Even if the UAS flies within the specified boundaries, other traffics may also be
encountered in the same operational volume. For this reason, the remote pilot is
required to “remain well clear” of other aircraft at all times. However, the remote
pilot may fail at remaining well clear because she or he performs an “inappropriate
guidance.” The proposed model assumes that the likelihood of the remote pilot
failing at remaining well clear increases with the “traffic density” because of the
increased pilot workload.
The other key difference when operating in uncontrolled airspace is that aircraft
are not required to be equipped with a transponder. Therefore, one cannot assume
that an intruder aircraft will be a cooperative traffic, what makes the TCAS layer
inoperative. As a result, after a “separation error” occurs, the “NMAC” condition is
assumed to happen, and the only feasible collision avoidance mechanism is the SAA
or DAA maneuver. This is one of the factors that certainly increases the operational
risk when flying in uncontrolled airspace.
Figure 6.
Mid-air collision BBN model for uncontrolled airspace.
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3.2.2 Strike model
The strike model represents the conditional probability that an impact between
two aircraft strikes a person in the air. In the case of a UAS operation, an impact is
expected to cause a strike only if the transient aircraft is a manned aircraft. There-
fore, the strike model should account for the ratio between manned and unmanned
aircraft in the vicinity of the operating area. For simplicity, this work assumes
that all mid-air collisions involve a manned aircraft as long as the UAS is not
performing a formation flight with other UAs. This way, all impacts are supposed to
result in a strike:
Pstrike=impact ¼ ρA rð Þ (12)
where ρA rð Þ is the number of people onboard the collided aircraft. In order to
estimate this term, it is necessary to characterize the aircraft flying in the airspace
volume where the operation takes place. For example, it is possible to assume that
most aircraft flying a controlled airway will be airliners, while most aircraft flying in
uncontrolled airspace will be general aviation aircraft.
3.2.3 Harm model
The harm model determines the likelihood of causing fatal injuries to people
onboard the collided aircraft once the strike between the UAS and the manned
aircraft has occurred. As in the case of the ground risk model, this work assumes the
worst-case condition where all strikes result in a casualty:
Pcasualty=strike ¼ 1 (13)




λimpact r tð Þð Þ ρA r tð Þð Þ ∥r0 tð Þ∥ dt (14)
4. Validation results
The probabilistic risk model in Section 3 has been implemented in Matlab and
has been supplied with the illustrative data in the Appendix. To validate this model,
a risk assessment will be performed for the demonstration mission in Section 2.1. In
particular, the risk assessment will be performed considering six different opera-
tional conditions of the UAS (named as OC1 to OC6), described in Table 3. The
ID Operational condition DAA equipped
OC1 Nominal condition None
OC2 Autonomous condition (C2 link loss) None
OC3 Degraded navigation condition (GNSS signal loss) None
OC4 Nominal condition RTCA SC-228 compliant
OC5 Autonomous condition (C2 link loss) RTCA SC-228 compliant
OC6 Degraded navigation condition (GNSS signal loss) RTCA SC-228 compliant
Table 3.
Operational conditions evaluated in the risk assessment.
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results obtained are shown in Figure 7, where each subfigure shows the ground risk
component and the air risk component along each flight leg of the demonstration
mission, considering a specific operational condition.
As it can be observed, the air risk component is the main contribution to the
total risk whenever a DAA system is not equipped onboard the UAS (Figure 7a–c).
However, this risk component can be almost entirely removed if a DAA system is
equipped and it complies with the Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS) of RTCA SC-228 [27] (the most stringent requirements required by SORA,
almost an ideal DAA). When it comes to the ground risk component, it becomes a
determining factor specially when overflying high population density areas like the
metropolitan area of València (corresponding to flight legs 8 to 11, see Figure 1).
Another interesting result that can be deduced from Figure 7 is that the loss of
the C2 link has a greater impact on the air risk than on the ground risk (what is in
Figure 7.
Risk assessment results: Ground risk and air risk components in each flight leg of the demonstration mission.
(a) Operational condition OC1. (b) Operational condition OC2. (c) Operational condition OC3.
(d) Operational condition OC4. (e) Operational condition OC5. (f) Operational condition OC6.
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line with the results in [7]). This is due to the fact that, during this abnormal flight
condition, the remote pilot is unable to intervene in the operation; and consequently
tactical separation, TCAS and SAA conflict management layers are not effective.
Conversely, the results obtained indicate that the loss of the GNSS signal is slightly
more critical when it comes to the ground risk than to the air risk.
Finally, Table 4 shows the cumulative risk when considering the entire demon-
stration mission. Note that the cumulative risk Λ is computed by adding the ground
risk component and the air risk component along all the flight legs of the planned
trajectory; while the average risk λ is computed from Λ using Eq. (6). As an
example, the cumulative risk when the UAS operates in OC1 is Λ ¼ 9:29 �
10�2 h�1NM; although it can be reduced down to Λ ¼ 1:04 � 10�2 h�1NM by means
of the DAA capability (OC4). Considering that the estimated path length for this
route is L ¼ 199 NM, the average risk in these conditions is λ ¼ 4:67 � 10�4 h�1 and
λ ¼ 5:23 � 10�5 h�1, respectively.
5. Conclusions
Current regulatory framework for the operation of UAS in Europe is operation-
centric and risk-based. Based on this framework, the authorization for conducting a
specific mission is given on the basis of an operational risk assessment performed by
the operator. In order to facilitate and harmonize this process, EASA established a
qualitative risk assessment methodology called SORA. However, SORA is not a
complete safety assessment tool because quantitative results are still required to
demonstrate that a specific operation can be conducted safely.
In this chapter, a probabilistic risk model for UAS operations is proposed. The
proposed model estimates the likelihood of occurrence of a catastrophic accident
when a UAS flies a specified trajectory. One of the main novelties of the proposed
model is that it is consistent with the HRM of SORA. Therefore, the probabilistic
model can be used to support the qualitative assumptions and decisions taken by the
SORA applicant.
The risk model must be supplied with a number of input parameters such as
aircraft model, population density or traffic density, among others. The degree of
uncertainty about these parameters will determine the trustworthiness of the results
obtained. In this work, illustrative data is used to validate the model in a demon-
stration mission for different operational conditions. Results show that the C2 link
loss event is more critical to the air risk that to the ground risk. Conversely, the loss
of the GNSS signal has a greater impact on the probability of experiencing a ground
impact than a MAC, according to the results.











Cumulative risk and average risk when the UAS flies the demonstration mission in different operational
conditions.
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Future work is to make use of Bayesian inference to update the state of knowl-
edge about the system parameters and provide confidence in the approach. Another
line of research is to adapt or extend the risk model to account for future Very Low
Level (VLL), high density airspace like the UTM/U-space, where an encounter
between two UA is more likely to occur than one with a manned aircraft. Finally,
the risk model will be used to determine the minimum-risk trajectory when multi-
ple, alternative routes are available (e.g., after an in-flight contingency occurs).
Conflict of interest
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Appendix: model data
This appendix provides the illustrative data used to estimate the ground risk and
the air risk from Eqs. (11) and (14), respectively.
A.1. Ground risk model data
The model parameters of Eq. (11) are LA, λimpact, and ρG. To estimate the lethal
area LA, it is necessary to specify the UA dimensions and the average person model.
In this case, it is assumed that the intended mission will be performed using the IAI
Super Heron model, which has a wingspan and length of 16:6 and 8:5 m, respec-
tively [28]. An average person is usually modeled as a cylinder of height Hp ¼
1:75 m and radius Rp ¼ 0:25 m [23]. To estimate the ground impact event rate
λimpact from the BBN model, it is necessary to specify the CPT for all the nodes in
Figure 3. As an example, the CPT used for the “C2 link loss” node is shown in
Table 5 (which assumes that the corresponding Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) is 1 h); while the CPT for the “Inappropriate guidance” node is shown in





CPT for “C2 link loss” node.
Autopilot malfunc. Pilot ineffective Inappropriate guidance
F T
F F 1 0
F T 0 1
T F 0 1
T T 0 1
Table 6.
CPT for “inappropriate guidance” node.
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brevity. Finally, to compute the population distribution ρG, we have accessed the
Spanish census data provided by Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Spanish Statis-
tics Institute) (INE) in [30], and we have processed it using the ArcGis software.
The resulting data has been converted to a raster image with a cell size of 1� 1 km
(represented in Figure 8) and has been exported to Matlab.
A.2. Air risk model data
The model parameters of Eq. (14) are λimpact and ρA. In this proposal, λimpact
varies along the aircraft trajectory r tð Þ as a function of the airspace class where the
operation takes place (basically on whether it is controlled or not) and the aircraft
density in each operational volume. The airspace class is an evidence for this model,
since it is implicit in the route specification (see Table 2). To obtain the traffic
density, this work has exploited the Network Strategic Modeling Tool (NEST)
software by European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol),
which provides a dataset comprising 31.626 real cooperative flights operated in
Europe during AIRAC cycle 1307, see Figure 9. Then, the CPTs for all the event
Figure 8.
Population density in Spain (excluding the Canary Islands) based on census data from INE.
Figure 9.
NEST screenshot showing traffics flying over waypoint SOPET on July 18, 2013.
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nodes in Figures 5 and 6 are specified considering the possible traffic densities in
the mission; see [29] for further details. Finally, to estimate the number of people
onboard the manned aircraft involved in the MAC (ρA), this work assumes that
the most probable intruder aircraft when flying in controlled airspace is a short-to-
medium-range airliner like a Boeing 737 or an Airbus A320 (two of the world’s most
successful commercial airliners), with an estimated capacity of ρA ¼ 180 passen-
gers. When flying in uncontrolled airspace, the intruder aircraft is assumed to be a
general aviation aircraft like a Cessna 172 or a Piper PA-28 Cherokee, with an
estimated capacity of ρA ¼ 4 passengers.
Author details
Hector Usach1*, Juan A. Vila1 and Áurea Gallego2
1 Instituto de Automática e Informática Industrial (ai2), Universitat Politècnica de
València (UPV), València, Spain
2 Departamento de Ingeniería Cartográfica, Geodesia y Fotogrametría,
Universitat Politècnica de València (UPV), València, Spain
*Address all correspondence to: hecusmo@doctor.upv.es
© 2020TheAuthor(s). Licensee IntechOpen.Distributed under the terms of theCreative
CommonsAttribution -NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc/4.0/),which permits use, distribution and reproduction for
non-commercial purposes, provided the original is properly cited. –NC
142
Risk Assessment in Air Traffic Management
References
[1] European Aviation Safety Agency.
Concept of Operations for Drones: A
Risk Based Approach to Regulation of
Unmanned Aircraft. Cologne, Germany:
EASA; 2015
[2] Joint Authorities for Rulemaking of
Unmanned Systems Working Group 6.
AMC RPAS.1309: Safety Assessment of
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems.
Brussels, Belgium: JARUS; 2015
[3] Joint Authorities for Rulemaking of
Unmanned Systems Working Group 6.
JARUS Guidelines on Specific
Operations Risk Assessment (SORA).
Brussels, Belgium: JARUS; 2017
[4] International Civil Aviation
Organization. Doc. 9859, AN/474:
Safety Management Manual (SMM).
Montréal, Canada: ICAO; 2013
[5] Denney E, Pai G, Johnson M.
Towards a rigorous basis for specific
operations risk assessment of UAS. In:
37th Digital Avionics Systems
Conference (DASC). London, England:
IEEE/AIAA; 2018. pp. 1-10. DOI:
10.1109/DASC.2018.8569475
[6] Cour-Harbo Al. The value of step-by-
step risk assessment for unmanned
aircraft. In: International Conference on
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(ICUAS). Dallas, Texas: IEEE; 2018.
pp. 149-157. DOI: 10.1109/ICUAS.2018.
8453411
[7] Ferreira RB, Baum DM, Neto ECP,
Martins MR, Almeida JR, Cugnasca PS,
et al. A risk analysis of unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) integration into
non-segregate airspace. In: International
Conference on Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (ICUAS). Dallas, Texas: IEEE;
2018. pp. 42-51. DOI: 10.1109/
ICUAS.2018.8453455
[8] CORUS Consortium. Intermediate
Concept of Operations for U-Space.
Brussels, Belgium: SESAR Joint
Undertaking; 2019
[9] Enaire. AIP España: Servicio de
Información Aeronáutica [Online];
2019. Available from: https://ais.enaire.
es/aip/. [Accessed: June 2019]
[10] Clothier RA, Walker RA, Fulton N,
Campbell DA. A casualty risk analysis
for unmanned aerial system (UAS)
operations over inhabited areas. In: 12th
Australian International Aerospace
Congress (AIAC12). Melbourne,
Australia; 2007. pp. 1-15
[11] Lum C, Gauksheim K, Deseure C,
Vagners J, McGeer T. Assessing and
estimating risk of operating unmanned
aerial systems in populated areas. In:
11th AIAA Aviation Technology,
Integration, and Operations (ATIO)
Conference. Virginia Beach, Virginia:
AIAA; 2011. p. 6918. DOI: 10.2514/
6.2011-6918
[12] Burke DA. System Level
Airworthiness Tool: A Comprehensive
Approach to Small Unmanned Aircraft
System Airworthiness. Raleigh, North
Carolina: North Carolina State
University; 2010
[13] Grimsley F. Equivalent safety
analysis using casualty expectation
approach. In: AIAA 3rd Unmanned
Unlimited Technical Conference,
Workshop and Exhibit. Chicago, Illinois:
AIAA; 2004. p. 6428. DOI: 10.2514/
6.2004-6428
[14]Weibel RE. Safety considerations
for operation of unmanned aerial
vehicles in the National Airspace System
[MSc thesis]. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
2005
[15] Barr LC, Newman RL, Ancel E,
Belcastro CM, Foster JV, Evans J, et al.
143
Trajectory-Based, Probabilistic Risk Model for UAS Operations
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90688
Preliminary risk assessment for small
unmanned aircraft systems. In: 17th
AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration,
and Operations (ATIO) Conference.
Denver, Colorado: AIAA; 2017. p. 3272.
DOI: 10.2514/6.2017-3272
[16] Ancel E, Capristan FM, Foster JV,
Condotta RC. Real-time risk assessment
framework for unmanned aircraft
system (UAS) traffic management
(UTM). In: 17th AIAA Aviation
Technology, Integration, and
Operations (ATIO) Conference.
Denver, Colorado: AIAA; 2017. p. 3273.
DOI: 10.2514/6.2017-3273
[17] Jha PD, Bisantz AM, Parasuraman R,
Drury CG. Air traffic controllers’
performance in advance air traffic
management system: Part I—
Performance results. The International
Journal of Aviation Psychology. 2011;
21(3):283-305. DOI: 10.1080/
10508414.2011.582456
[18] Foyle DC, Hooey BL, Byrne MD,
Corker KM, Deutsch S, Lebiere C, et al.
Human performance models of pilot
behavior. Proceedings of the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual
Meeting. 2005;49(12):1109-1113. DOI:
10.1177/154193120504901202
[19] Arnaldo Valdés RM, Liang
Cheng SZ, Gómez Comendador VF,
Sáez Nieto FJ. Application of Bayesian
networks and information theory to
estimate the occurrence of mid-air
collisions based on accident precursors.
Entropy. 2018;20(12):969. DOI:
10.3390/e20120969
[20] Pitchforth J, Mengersen K. A
proposed validation framework for
expert elicited Bayesian networks.
Expert Systems with Applications. 2013;
40(1):162-167. DOI: 10.1016/j.
eswa.2012.07.026
[21] McGeer T, Newcome LR, Vagners J.
Quantitative risk management as a
regulatory approach to civil UAVs. In:
International Workshop on UAV
Certification. Paris, France; 1999.
pp. 1-11
[22] Shelley AV. A model of human harm
from a falling unmanned aircraft:
Implications for UAS regulation.
International Journal of Aviation,
Aeronautics, and Aerospace. 2016;3(3):1.
DOI: 10.15394/ijaaa.2016.1120
[23] Lum C, Waggoner B. A risk based
paradigm and model for unmanned
aerial systems in the national airspace.
In: AIAA Infotech @ Aerospace. St.
Louis, Missouri: AIAA; 2011. p. 1424.
DOI: 10.2514/6.2011-1424
[24]Washington A, Clothier RA,
Almeida da Silva J. A review of
unmanned aircraft system ground risk
models. Progress in Aerospace Science.
2017;95:24-44. DOI: 10.1016/j.
paerosci.2017.10.001
[25] Anno JN. Estimate of human control
over mid-air collisions. Journal of
Aircraft. 1982;19(1):86-88
[26] International Civil Aviation
Organization. Doc. 9859, AN/458:
Global Air Traffic Management
Operational Concept. Montréal, Canada:
ICAO; 2005
[27] Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics. SC-228 Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for
Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
Washington, D.C.: RTCA; 2011
[28] Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd.
Heron: Strategic & Tactical Missions
MALE UAV System [Online]. 2019.
Available from: https://www.iai.co.il/p/
heron. [Accessed: November 2019]
[29] Usach H. Automated contingency
management in unmanned aircraft
systems [PhD thesis]. València, Spain:
Universitat Politècnica de València;
144
Risk Assessment in Air Traffic Management
2019. DOI: 10.4995/Thesis/10251/
130202
[30] Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
Censos de Población y Viviendas 2011









Risk-Based Framework for the
Integration of RPAS in
Non-Segregated Airspace
Javier Alberto Pérez-Castán and Alvaro Rodríguez-Sanz
Abstract
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) are new airspace users that require to
be safely integrated into the non-segregated airspace. Currently, their integration
is planned for the horizon 2025, but there is a lot of pressure by RPAS operators to
fly as soon as possible. This research focuses on the development of a risk-based
framework for the integration of RPAS in non-segregated airspace. The risk-based
framework relies on a hierarchical methodology that is split into two time horizons:
design and operation. Different operational and geometrical factors characterise
each stage. Then, a set of risk and operational indicators are defined for each stage.
These indicators evaluate the operational airspace state and provide information
about how the integration of RPAS should be. Primary results provide information
about geographical and temporary restrictions. Geographical restrictions refer to
the airways that favour or inhibit the integration of RPAS, and temporary
restrictions denote the time span when the RPAS can pierce into the airspace.
Keywords: air traffic management, risk assessment, risk-based framework, RPAS,
RPAS integration
1. Introduction
The integration of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) in non-segregated
airspace is one of the most complex and demanding challenges for the aviation
community in the years ahead. The beginning of RPAS integration in non-
segregated airspace is expected to be reached by the time frame 2025, according to
European RPAS Steering Group [1]. This aim requires broad and structured analysis
of the current situation as well as the potential solutions to be implemented. In this
way, the development of a risk-based framework to ensure the safe integration of
RPAS is crucial for its achievement.
RPAS operation in upper airspace does not require higher technological devel-
opments, but it demands detailed analysis about the safety of their integration with
conventional aircraft. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) require that the integration of RPAS must not imply a
diminish on current safety levels [2, 3]. This requirement means that further
research is required to accomplish this goal. A new framework will be compulsory
in the future to take the operational features of RPAS into account. One of the goals
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of this framework is to allow setting out the safety of the RPAS operation jointly
with conventional aircraft [4–6].
Could RPAS fly safely in non-segregated aircraft? The complexity of the answer
does not fall into a yes or not issue, because it must be yes, but instead we must
focus on how. Currently, conventional aircraft fly according to prefixed routes that
are modelled according to air traffic flow patterns, although there are several
airspaces based on free-route [7]. Then, RPAS must adapt to the current airway
network and current air traffic patterns. One of the main concerns is that RPAS
operational patterns can differ from conventional aircraft ones [8, 9]. Although
RPAS could be assumed to be modelled as slow conventional aircraft, there are
uncertainties about communications, navigation and surveillance issues that must
be analysed in advance [10].
Due to this lack of operational and technical knowledge about RPAS operation,
regulators and Airspace Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) seek to introduce
RPAS based on a minimum interaction with conventional aircraft [11, 12]. The
problem arises when both airspace users operate jointly in the same scenario where
the interaction between them cannot be avoided. The first solution to his problem is
the segregation of specific air traffic volumes for the different airspace users. How-
ever, this segregation should only focus on specific flight levels (FLs) or airways, as
airspace cannot be completely segregated in different air traffic volumes for PRAS
and conventional aircraft. One of the expected outcomes of this work is to appraise
airways or FLs segregation for RPAS.
The most complex assessments about RPAS integration focus on three research
areas. The first deals with the global problem of risk management. Clothier et al.
[13] developed a framework for structuring the safety case of the RPAS operation.
Moreover, various regulators assessed the primary difficulties that must be solved
before RPAS operation [14, 15]. The second research area analyses the risk imposed
by the single flight for one RPAS in terms of the number of casualties. Several
authors developed different risk models to calculate what kind of populated areas
are riskier for on-ground pedestrians [16–18]. The third research area involves the
development of collision/conflict-risk models for the integration of RPAS. There are
several studies about RPAS collision avoidance [9, 19, 20] (similar to conventional
aircraft situations) but few of them focus on conflict risk [21, 22]. Conflict risk is a
prior indicator of collision risk. However, none of those studies responds either how
the RPAS integration should be or where RPAS could fly in non-segregated airspace.
With the goal of responding to the above research questions, it is required to
assess the safety level of the airspace and to develop one specific methodology.
Manual 9689 of International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) [23] sets out that
airspace planning requires a thorough analysis of every factor that could affect
safety. In [24, 25], authors claimed the need for airspace design fulfilling levels of
safety under different operational features. Different models were developed to
evaluate the collision risk based on airspace geometry [26, 27]. A step further,
Netjasov [28] developed a conflict-risk model to assess the level of safety, including
air traffic flows. However, there is not a unique methodology that allows analysing
the airspace risk-state for the integration of RPAS.
Therefore, the main goal of this research is to develop a risk-based framework to
provide geographical and temporary restrictions for the safe integration of RPAS.
The risk-based framework is split into two different temporal horizons: design and
operation. The risk-based framework evaluates the state of the scenario regarding
different risk-based indicators. The risk-based indicators relies on geometrical and
operational features of airspace. The risk-based indicators sort airways and crossing
points to detect airways (or flight levels): (1) where RPAS can operate because their
integration is safe, and (2) when should be planned the operation of RPAS
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depending on a particular schedule of conventional aircraft. A further aim is to set
out the pillars of a future decision-making process for ANSPs.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of
the risk-based framework and defines the different types of variables and indicators
that must be considered. The risk-based indicators constitute the main outputs of
the methodology that permit to assess the viability of the RPAS integration. It also
describes the methodology for the design phase and the operational phase. Section 3
presents the case study and the application to one Spanish airspace volume and
discusses the results. Lastly, Section 4 summarises the main contributions and
further works.
2. Risk-based framework
The risk-based framework aims to analyse the safe integration of RPAS in non-
segregated airspace. In non-segregated airspace, both conventional aircraft and
RPAS must operate together. The problem arises when RPAS operate with different
technical and operational features than conventional aircraft. Then, the integration
of RPAS focuses on reducing their impact on conventional aircraft; in other words,
RPAS must adapt themselves to current operations reducing their impact on current
aviation. The risk-based framework is split into two phases depending on the
operational information available:
• design phase: this phase aims to appraise the impact of RPAS in non-segregated
airspace for strategical phase. It can be applied both for design purposes and
for analysing the operation of one particular scenario. This phase works with
basic information of an airspace volume: airway structure and air traffic flow;
and
• operational phase: this phase addresses a temporal horizon where 1-hour
schedule of conventional aircraft is evaluated. The goal is to analyse how the
introduction of RPAS affects one specific schedule.
2.1 Design phase
This phase evaluates the way the integration of RPAS affects the airspace in a
design or strategic phase. Thus, this analysis covers different input variables as the
morphology or geometry and the main characteristics of the air traffic flow that
operates at the airspace. The main results of this phase are:
• thorough knowledge of the current airspace state, where it is intended to
integrate RPAS jointly with conventional aircraft; and
• identification of the airways and FLs that allows their segregated use for RPAS.
The segregated use implies that the RPAS can fly without any affection to the
conventional aircraft.
Design-phase indicators provide information about the state of the airways and
the crossing points. They are the most elementary components to analyse the
current operational situation of the airspace. These indicators separately evaluate
the morphological and geometrical features of the airspace (static indicators) and
their operation (dynamic indicators).
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2.1.1 Static indicators
Static indicators provide information to analyse the current state of the airspace
based on its morphology and geometry. The goal is to perform a prior analysis
setting out the airspace design. Static indicators focus on the basic airspace
components: airways and crossing points.
2.1.1.1 Static indicator of airway complexity
The complexity of an airway is characterised by the sections that are exposed to
risk. The risk in an airway is modelled by the locations of the airway that are
exposed to conflict with aircraft of other airways. These sections are denoted as
critical sections (di,j) around the crossing point. The static indicator of airway
complexity relates to the ratio of the airway that is exposed to conflict in regards





dij ¼ 2Sminsin αij
(1)
where i and j are the airways that intersect at the crossing point, αi,j is the angle
between both airways, and Smin is the separation minima (typically 5 Nautical
Miles—NM).
2.1.1.2 Static indicator of crossing-point complexity
The complexity of a crossing point depends on the number of intersections
between the airway pairs that coincides at it and the angle between the airway pairs.









WPndi,j is the sum of all critical sections in a crossing point (WPn) and
delem represents the elementary critical section. The elementary critical section is
calculated for the crossing angle of 900, which provides the minimum critical
section.
2.1.2 Dynamic indicators
Dynamic indicators focus on the operational features of the airspace. This allows
analysing the operational characteristics of the air traffic flows to select the airway
that favour or inhibit the RPAS integration.
2.1.2.1 Dynamic indicator of airway density
This indicator provides information about the number of aircraft that operates
an airway. It relates the real airway density Qið Þ and the theoretical maximum air











where við Þ is the average speed of aircraft in airway i.
2.1.2.2 Dynamic indicator of crossing-point density
Taking into account the operational characteristics of the airspace, the dynamic
indicator of crossing-point density provide an indicator of the number of aircraft






2.1.2.3 Dynamic indicator of airway conflict
This indicator evolves from the previous dynamic indicators with a different
goal. δ and ϵ are relative counters of the air traffic through the airways and crossing
points, while ζ is the dynamic indicator of airway conflict. This indicator provides









Moreover, this indicator also works as a reference value to analyse the air traffic
segregation by airways and FLs. Therefore, it is needed to calculate the total value





The operational phase focuses on a different temporal horizon than the design
phase. The operational phase is characterised by the disappearance of generic air
traffic flows (modelled by airway density and average ground speed), and it entails
a one-hour schedule. This schedule of air traffic fulfils the operational characteris-
tics of the scenario, but each aircraft has its own characteristics (speed and entry
time). Besides, this concept will relay on further work based on 4D trajectories. The
operational phase allows the introduction of RPAS in specific schedules. Apart from
analysing how this introduction affects the risk indicators, this phase provides the
following results:
• in-depth knowledge of the path evolution from the conventional aircraft
schedule;
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• safety assessment for the RPAS integration for different schedules based on the
risk indicators; and
• identification of airways and FLs that favour or inhibit the introduction of
RPAS based on the airway availability.
Operational-phase indicators provide information about the whole airspace. In
this way, they permit to appraise the airspace situation by the RPAS integration.
These indicators conclude if the integration of RPAS is feasible and the temporary
restrictions.
2.2.1 Number of conflict
Nc is the number of times that the separation minima are infringed (5 NM in
European en-route airspace).
Nc ¼ Number of times min sep tð Þð Þ< Smin (7)
where min s tð Þð Þ is the minimum distance between an aircraft pair.
2.2.2 Conflict severity
Conflict severity (θ) is an indicator of the seriousness of the conflict, as not
every conflict implies the same severity. Conflict severity is calculated by the
combination of the conflict time span (τ) and the minimum distance reached by an
aircraft pair:
θ ¼ min sep tð Þð Þτ (8)
2.2.3 Airway availability
This indicator aims to calculate the risk exposition of an aircraft flying an
airway. This indicator is called airway availability because it links the time span the
aircraft can safely fly an airway with the time span the aircraft can suffer a conflict.
Knowing the airways that present higher availability (the time span the aircraft can
safely fly without suffering a conflict), it can be extracted the airways that favour or
inhibit the integration of RPAS.
λi indicator is based on the Temporary-Blocking Windows (TBWs) concept
[29, 30]. The TBWs are calculated for every aircraft pair, i.e. the time span that the
airways are blocked because a separation minima infringement will occur. The
primary features of the TBWs are:
• the time duration of the TBWs depends on the crossing angle of the airways
and the ground speed of the aircraft involved; and
• the time location of the TBWs depends on the entry time of the conventional
aircraft and RPAS, length of the airways, the ground speed and the distance
between the airway entry-point and the crossing point.
λi is calculated by the size of overall TBW dBWð Þ that affect the airway i.
Therefore, the risk exposition of an aircraft relates the non-available time tNAið Þ and
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λi ¼ 1� tNAitexp where 0≤ λi ≤ 1 (9)
Herein, the exposition time relates to a one-hour schedule. A minor TBW
implies a bigger airway availability, which reduces the risk exposition. Moreover,
airway availability is a novel indicator defined in this work. There is no previous
knowledge about the threshold that this indicator should acquire. Then, the authors
propose a division into four stretches (0–25%, 25–50%, 50–75% and 75–100%).
Airways with airway availability greater than 50% are airways where RPAS could
be included.
3. Risk-based framework application
The risk-based framework was applied to the air traffic volume LECMPAU
(Pamplona) in Spain. This airspace is constituted by 24 airways and 55 crossing
points. The period of study was July and August 2016, and the operational data was
obtained from NEST [31].
3.1 Design phase
This section introduces the results of the design phase in the strategical horizon.
This is the most valuable innovation of this work, and a further motivation is related
to the fact that this methodology could also be applied to a pre-tactical phase. The
design phase focused on a fix air traffic distribution for the whole day while in the
pre-tactical phase, a temporary variation of the air traffic flow for a specific day
could be considered. However, the application for a pre-tactical phase was out of
the scope of this work. The process was as follows:
1.airways and crossing point were characterised based on the geometric
information (length, angle and critical section) and operational information
(air traffic flow and average speed); and
2.static and dynamic indicators were calculated for each airway and crossing
point. With this information, we ordered and analysed which of them had a
greater impact on safety.
3.1.1 Design-phase indicators
Firstly, design-phase indicators are calculated for LECMPAU both for airways
and for crossing points. However, for the sake of clarity, we only present the results
for the airway due to the high number of crossing points. Table 1 shows the results
for the design-phase indicators of the LECMPAU airways.
βi indicator was constituted by the number of crossing points, the number of
intersecting airways, their crossing angles and their lengths. The primary conclu-
sions were:
• most of the values of βi were, in general, very high because LECMPAU
presented 55 crossing points and 24 airways;
• the lowest values referred to the airway UM190 (βUM190 ¼ 0, 7518) because
there were only two intersections. This airway presented 75% of complexity
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that was very high, although this was the lowest value. This meant that
throughout the 75% of the airway length, an aircraft could suffer conflict with
other air traffic flows; and
• the highest values were referred to as airways UQ262 (βUQ262 ¼ 5, 4207 with
6 intersections), UL866 (βUL866 ¼ 7:1743 with 9 intersections) and UN995
(βUN995 ¼ 7, 0303 with 9 intersections). It was obvious that the number of
intersections implied higher values of complexity, but it was also remarkable
that the length of the airways was a crucial factor for complexity. Therefore,
the crossing point PPN was the most concurred and provided the highest value
of complexity.
Therefore, the highest values of the airway complexity static indicator
were referred to the airways that concurred at crossing point PPN. Figure 1
shows a representation of the static indicators of the airway and crossing-point
complexity.
Regarding the dynamic indicator of airway density (δi), see Table 1, there were



























Design-phase indicators for LECMPAU airways.
154
Risk Assessment in Air Traffic Management
in this airspace. This implied that the air traffic flow distribution was rather con-
centrated in specific airways and crossing points.
3.1.2 Airway segregation
The airway segregation aimed to identify the airways (or geographical restric-
tions) that allowed the safe integration of RPAS because they did not generate
conflicts with conventional aircraft. First, the total value for the whole airspace of
the dynamic indicator of airway conflict (ζtot ¼ 0:0037) was calculated. Second,
the airways without air traffic were individually evaluated by the introduction of
RPAS through them (δi ¼ 0 ! δi ¼ 1). Then, ζtot was recalculated to check if the
new ζtot exceeded the base-scenario value. In this case, the airway could not be
segregated because the introduction of RPAS increased current risk levels; other-
wise, RPAS could be introduced because they did not cross with other air traffic
flows. Table 2 presents the results of the indicator ζi.
As can be seen in Table 2, no airway was identified for its segregation.
3.1.3 FL segregation
The primary conclusion of the previous section was that no airway could be
segregated at LECMPAU. In spite of this limitation, this work evaluated the exis-
tence of specific FLs that allowed the safe integration of RPAS. The process was
similar to airway segregation but focusing on the FLs of interest: from FL250
to FL300.
Figure 1.
Results of the design-phase analysis.
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There are five airways that could be segregated at different FLs for the integra-
tion of RPAS, see Figure 1. UQ400, UQ88 and UQ300 presented three FLs (260,
280 and 300) where RPAS could be integrated without any interaction with con-
ventional aircraft. UM176 and UQ74 could be segregated at FL270 (see Table 3).
ζFLtot varied for each FL their value, which implied that it would be required to
estimate a specific and independent value for ζtot. This independent value would
remove inefficiencies for the integration of RPAS.
3.2 Operational phase
3.2.1 Base schedule with RPAS
To study the operational phase, a real one-hour schedule was selected from the
rush hour of LECMPAU at FL290. Table 4 shows the operational information of the
schedule composed of four conventional aircraft and one RPAS. In this schedule,
one RPAS is introduced by UM176 with a typical speed of 250 kts.
3.2.2 Temporary-blocking windows (TBWs)
The first step was to calculate the TBWs that will underline the airway indicator
and conflict detection. Table 5 provides de length or time span of the TBWs for the
different aircraft that could interact between them.
The length of the TBWs increased with the RPAS due to its lower speed. The
TBWs (i.e. the time exposed to conflict) almost doubled the value for conventional
aircraft. Table 6 provides the temporary limits (initial and final) for the TBWs
between aircraft pairs.
3.2.3 Operational-phase indicators
According to the TBWs, aircraft with an entry time located inside the TBWs

















Results of ζtot for LECMPAU airway segregation.
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conflict between any aircraft. In the same way, there was no conflict; the indicator
of conflict severity was zero.
However, airway availability was calculated for all airways taking into account
base schedule, see Table 7.
The airway availability indicator decreased with the introduction of RPAS. In the
case λi ¼ 0 (UQ262 and UN857), it meant that there was no availability of this












UN858 0 0 0 0 0 0
UM190 0.4903 0.5911 1.0445 1.7939 2.3628 1.1805
UP181 0.5528 0 0 0 0 0
UL176 0.2512 0 0 0 0 0
UQ262 0.4382 1.0439 1.5495 3.0551 2.7039 2.5510
UQ148 0.5058 0.9344 1.4552 2.7312 2.8154 2.9160
UN10 0 0.7542 0 1.1512 0 1.6451
UN857 0 0 0 1.0887 0 0.9156
UL866 0.9234 0.4331 1.1965 1.0887 0 0.9156
UN995 0 0 0 0 0 0
UN976 0 0 0 0 0 0
UM601 0 0 0 0 0 0
UM176 0.2564 0.2888 0.4519 0.9624 2.2068 1.4878
UQ57 0.3028 0.2888 0.5137 0.9624 2.4138 1.4878
UQ73 0.2564 0.2888 0.4519 0.9624 2.2068 1.4878
UT430 0.5058 0.4726 1.0935 1.9611 2.4653 2.5284
UP152 0.4903 1.0529 0 0 2.7128 1.5682
UN725 0 0 0.5137 0 0 0
UQ400 0.2351 0.1690 0.5137 0.8999 2.2080 0.7584
UQ88 0.2351 0.1690 0.5137 0.8999 2.2080 0.7584
UL184 0.6088 0.3702 0.9449 0.8999 2.6966 0.7584
UQ424 0.6088 0.3702 0.9449 0.8999 2.6966 0.7584
UQ300 0.2351 0.1690 0.5137 0.8999 2.2080 0.7584
UQ268 0.8537 1.3565 1.0451 2.5607 3.3841 3.3381
Table 3.
Values of ζFLtot for each airway and FL.
Aircraft Airway Entry time FL V(kts)
1 UL176 12:13:56 290 310.13
2 UM601 12:20:31 290 416.67
3 UN10 12:25:00 290 420.11
4 UL176 12:57:28 290 351.75
RPAS UM176 12:30:00 290 250
Table 4.
Schedule of LECMPAU with one RPAS.
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Aircraft 1 2 3 4 RPAS
1 — 206 — — —
2 206 — 177 192 310
3 — 177 — — 641
4 — 192 — — —
RPAS — 310 641 — —
Table 5.
Temporary-blocking windows (sec) for the base schedule.


























12:13:56 12:20:31 12:25:00 12:57:28 12:30:00
Table 6.
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conflict during the 1 hour. On the contrary, in the case λi ¼ 1 (UM190, UL184,
UQ424 and UQ300) there was full availability for the safe introduction of RPAS. In
other words, those airways allowed the introduction of RPAS because no interaction
with conventional aircraft would occur. Results of this indicator should provide
similar results to the dynamic indicator of airway conflict. However, air traffic
flows of the operational phase are not the same as the design phase because of the
specific rush hour characteristics.
4. Conclusions
This research developed a new risk-based framework to evaluate the safe intro-
duction of RPAS in non-segregated airspace. The risk-based framework tackled two
temporal horizons for the introduction of RPAS based on a design phase (strategical
horizon) and an operational phase (tactical horizon). This innovative approach
allowed considering the different variables that affected the aircraft operation at
both temporal horizons, which ensured a hierarchical assessment. The design phase
covered different input variables as the morphology or geometry, and the main
characteristics of the air traffic flow. Meanwhile, the operational phase was
characterised by the disappearance of generic air traffic flows (modelled by airway
density and average ground speed) and focused on a one-hour schedule (consti-
tuted by conventional aircraft and RPAS). Different indicators were modelled
depending on the temporal horizon. The design phase considered static and
dynamic indicators (based on the airspace structure and generic air traffic flows).
The operational phase considered three indicators: number of conflicts, conflict
severity and airway availability. The application of the methodology was to detect
geographical restrictions (airways that favour or inhibit the integration of RPAS)
and temporary restrictions (when the RPAS can pierce into the airspace without
generating any conflict).
This methodology was applied to Spanish airspace LECMPAU at different FLs
from FL250 to FL300, which were the most favourable for RPAS integration due to
their low density. The different static indicators ordered airways considering their
complexity. LECMPAU was a complex scenario because of the high number of
airways and crossing points. The airway segregation analysis concluded that no full
airway could be segregated for RPAS; however, different FLs could be used consid-
ering their segregation for RPAS. The segregation of FLs for RPAS implied that they
could operate these FLs without being exposed to conflict with conventional air-










Airway availability indicator for FL290.
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introduction of one RPAS. Operational-phase indicators were assessed and based on
the temporary-blocking windows, no conflict arose. The temporary-blocking win-
dows provided the temporary restrictions for the integration of RPAS. Moreover,
the airway availability indicator ordered the airway providing information about
the airways that favoured (or inhibited) the introduction of RPAS with the
operational-phase specific schedule. Regarding future research lines, the calculation
of an independent and fixed value for conflict probability is crucial for the assess-
ment of different airspaces and FLs. A further goal will be the analysis of the whole
process to introduce flight plans of RPAS in non-segregated airspace ensuring safe
scenarios.
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